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INTRODUCTION
The securities laws require issuers of securities sold to the
public to disclose significant amounts of prescribed informa-
tion. This Article is about the goal or goals served by the dis-
closure that the securities laws require, and the correspon-
dence between the proclaimed goals and actual practice. The
dominant view is that the goal of required securities disclosure
is to make prices in securities markets more accurate.1 I call
1 The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recommended in 1977 that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") adopt
the following statement of objectives:
The Commission's function in the corporate disclosure system is to assure
the public availability in an efficient and reasonable manner on a timely
basis of reliable, firm-oriented information material to informed invest-
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this goal "accuracy enhancement."
Accuracy enhancement has been so attractive to those who
think about the securities laws that it has never itself been the
subject of analysis. It appears as a justification for the securi-
ties laws, not as a proposition that is itself contestable. It casts
an attractive light on the bureaucrats, lawyers and accoun-
tants who minister to the demands of the securities laws. They
are not simply clerical drones who compile lengthy and tedious
documents containing long lists of numbers. They are servants
of economic efficiency, and not just garden-variety servants of
efficiency either, but servants of efficiency in the market for
capital, the nerve center of a capitalist economy.2 Perhaps
even better from their point of view, it gives them a great deal
of work to do.
The plausibility of accuracy enhancement is increased
because of the way in which the securities laws divide the
mert and corporate suffrage decision-making. The Commission should not
adopt disclosure requirements which have as their principal objective the
regulation of corporate conduct.
ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMIISSION 305 (Comm. Print 95-29 1977) [hereinafter "ADVISORY COM-
MTITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE"]. Although the Commission never adopted such
a formal statement of objectives, the recommendation has influenced Commission
practice.
In accounting, the authoritative statement is FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. L- OBJECTIVES
OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1978) [hereinafter TFASB 1"],
which drew on Chapters 1-3 of FINANCIAL ACCOUNTG STANDARDS BOARD, TENTA-
TIVE CONCLUSIONS ON OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMiENTS OF BUSINESS ENER-
PRISES (1976), which in turn drew on AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEIENTS (1973) [hereinafter "THE
TRUEBLOOD REPORT].
I use accurate rather than efficient to emphasize that the idea is that the
securities laws should further accuracy without regard to the cost of doing so. The
usage here parallels that of MAarcel Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costa of
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 1991 DUKE L.3. 977 (1992).
2 For an inventory of the ways in which more accurate prices confer benefits
see Kahan, supra note 1. Kahan reports: "the compliance effort is rationalized, to
a significant degree, by one principal goal of securities laws: to create stock mar-
kets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its fundamental value."
Kahan, supra note 1, at 979 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 US. 224, 246
(1988)); see also HT. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. at 11 (1934), reprinted in
5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 at 2 (J.S. Ellenberger et al. eds. 1973) [hereinafter TEP NO.
13831; and Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 802 (1985).
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responsibilities between the legal and accounting professions.
The laws, and the lawyers who interpret them, determine
when disclosure is required. Professional accounting standards,
and the accountants who interpret them, determine how the
"hard" numerical data that constitutes the core of the disclo-
sure itself is to be compiled and presented. The theoreticians of
the two professions follow the limits of these professional do-
mains. Lawyers writing about the policy objectives of the secu-
rities laws discuss why disclosure is required but pay little
attention to the substance of the required disclosure. On the
other hand, the accountants who write the theoretical ac-
counting literature address the substance of the required dis-
closure, but do not address why the statutes require disclosure.
They think of accounting not as a set of legally mandated prac-
tices but as an autonomous professional discipline, whose stan-
dards should not be shaped by the fact that the use of the data
compiled by accountants is required by a legal regime external
to the profession.3 This division of responsibility means that
neither profession is required to confront the question of why
the securities laws require the specific disclosures that are
actually made. Those few commentators who have undertaken
to speak to both professions have found their conclusions ig-
nored, even though many of the arguments made in their work
have been influential.4
' Thus the distinction between consensual and mandated accounting was not
considered part of the conceptual fiamework project of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, (the TASB"). For a recent work which explains accounting stan.
dard-setting in consensual terms with no attention to the legally mandated aspect
of GAAP, see Ronald R. King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting
Institutions and the Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 J. OF ACCT. & FIN. 579
(1994).
" Most notably, Homer Kripke and George Benston. Kripke, a professor of law,
argued that, since the content of required securities disclosure documents is gov-
erned by the controlling accounting rules, these rules are an important part of the
public regulation, and that the SEC rather than the accounting profession is the
appropriate authority to make the accounting rules. Benston, a professor of ac-
counting, argued that the parties to securities transactions could choose the suit-
able accounting rules, and that compelled disclosure is unnecessary and unwise.
Both had excellent arguments for their positions, none of which is seriously re-
sponded to in the literature. "Oversimplified" is the most common rejoinder. Yet
Benston, who first constructed arguments for required disclosure in order to refute
them, has seen his work mined for the arguments in favor of securities regulation.
And Kripke, who argued that accounting is too important to be left to the accoun-
tants, has seen his work cited for its influence on specific disclosure and account-
[Vol. 61:763
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Accuracy enhancement is distinct from the concept that
people who buy securities should know something about them,
and that some of that information should come from the issuer
in a form that makes the information credible and the issuer
responsible for it. The latter concept is based on the simple
notion that persons who put their capital at risk should know,
or their agents should know, what they are doing. I call this
the prudent-investor concept. The prudent-investor concept
says nothing about what the prescribed information should be
except to imply that (absent a paternalistic agenda) the infor-
mation should reflect what buyers want and are willing to pay
for. Even with a paternalistic agenda, the concept implies that
the information should be that which a sophisticated buyer
would require. Accuracy enhancement, on the other hand, has
much deeper implications.
The accuracy-enhancement concept in its supportive role
floats throughout the history of the securities laws like an
attractive genie, darting forward at critical moments to justify
securities disclosure, and then darting away. The concept has
ing changes. Typical are Loss and Seligman in their discussion of projections.
Homer Kripke is described as an influential critic. 2 LOUIS Loss & JOEL
SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 625 (1989). As to Benston, see the treatment of
his work in JOEL SELIGuAN THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET. A HISTORY
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE
564-65 (1982). Seligman attributes the formation of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to (among other things) the 'Benston critiques,' while reject-
ing Benston's conclusions.
r A paradigm is a much quoted passage from REP. No. 1383:
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the
exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgement
as to the value of the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and
open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgements
of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a
situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just
price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of
an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information ob-
structs the operation of the markets as indices of real value. There can-
not be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishon-
est practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy. The
disclosure of information materially important to investors may not in-
stantaneously be reflected in market value, but despite the intricacies of
security values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market.
That is why in many cases it is so carefully guarded. Delayed, inaccu-
rate, and misleading reports are the tools of the unconscionable market
operator and the recreant corporate official who speculate on inside infor-
mation. Despite the tug of conflicting interests and the influence of pow-
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now evolved from the role of simply justifying securities law
disclosure to determining an agenda for reform. As an impetus
for reform, accuracy enhancement influences those charged
with administering and interpreting the securities laws. If the
purpose of securities disclosure is to make stock prices accu-
rate, then it is necessary to examine the required disclosure to
ensure that it contributes to accuracy." Important reforms are
justified on the ground that they will contribute to more accu-
rate prices. Yet much remains to be done, for it turns out that
although the securities laws have been in force for more than
half a century, they have failed to require disclosure of most of
the information relevant to the accurate valuation of the
issuer's securities.7
erful groups, responsible officials of the leading exchanges have unquali-
fiedly recognized in theory at least the vital importance of true and accu.
rate corporate reporting as an essential cog in the proper functioning of
the public exchanges. Their efforts to bring about more adequate and
prompt publicity have been handicapped by the lack of legal power and
by the failure of certain banking and business groups to appreciate that
a business that gathers its capital from the investing public has not the
same right to secrecy as a small privately owned and managed business.
It is only a few decades since men believed that the disclosure of a bal.
ance sheet was a disclosure of a trade secret. Today few people would
admit the right of any company to solicit public funds without the disclo-
sure of a balance sheet.
REP. No. 1383, supra note 2, at 11.
If the culture of securities regulation were a religion rather than a profes-
sional culture, this passage, with its rolling cadences and omnipresent ambiguity
could be the religion's recitation of the faith. Note that the passage never actually
says "disclosure of all information materially important to investors," leaving it
unclear whether the objective is to require the disclosure of all, or only some. For
the historical antecedents of required securities disclosure see Paul G. Mahoney,
Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 1047
(1995).
' The pioneering work was that of Homer Kripke, who dissented from the
report of the Advisory Committee. His book, written over the 1970's, was an ex-
tended exploration of the implications of the accuracy enhancement goal. HOMER
KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PUiR -
POSE (1979). In his introduction he called the report of the advisory committee a
disaster. Id. at xviii.
The Journal of Accountancy recently reported that Walter P. Schuetze, the
new chief accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission, is fond of say-
ing, 'The profession needs to crawl before it can walk and walk before it can run."
The Journal explained that:
[h]e considers the use of current values for debt and equity securities the
crawling part and believes it will be much more difficult to apply current
values to fixed assets, such as property, plant and equipment, and to
intangibles.... Schuetze says "I think getting to market value on fixed
[Vol. 61: 763
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The rise of the accuracy-enhancement concept to a position
of influence is related to the rise of another concept in securi-
ties regulation: that effective prohibition of trading on inside
information is also an important objective of the securities
laws. Just as the accuracy-enhancement concept can be found
in the early rhetoric of justification, so can the concept that
insider trading is bad. But the securities laws as originally
passed did not prohibit trading on inside information. It was
not until 1961 that the prohibition emerged from the interpre-
tation of general language in the statute.8 To quote the 1968
Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion:
[The Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information....
The only regulatory objective is that access to material information
be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the
disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own
evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with
knowledge equal to that of the insiders?
In short, if those in the know can profit by withholding infor-
mation from the market, they will have an incentive to defeat
the accuracy-enhancing objective." Conversely, if the disclo-
sure system succeeds in forcing the disclosure of all informa-
tion relevant to accurate valuation in a timely fashion, there
will be no opportunity for insider trading. And if the disclo-
sure-system provides the information investors need to value
the securities, an argument that insider trading is desirable
because it is a way in which information can reach the market
assets is a long way away. We should concentrate on debt and equity
securities and on measuring loan impairment."
Gene R. Barrett, The SECs New Chief Accountant Sets Some Clear.Cut Goals, J.
OF ACCOUNT., June 1992, at 102. A more laconic statement is that of John C.
Burton & Patricia Fairfield- "Mhe evolution of financial reporting is not complete;
users still lack some information that management could provide them for makng
rational economic decisions." John C. Burton & Patricia Fairfield, The Role of
Financial Information, in HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 1 (John C.
Burton, et aL eds., 1981), and in HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 1
(Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss eds., 2d ed. 1989).
8 In re Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1968).
,o JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE & C. ROBERT MORRIS, CASES AND MATE-
RIAIS ON CORPORATIONS 463 (3d ed. 1989).
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becomes superfluous."
This Article argues that although the disclosures mandat-
ed by the securities laws have been justified by many commen-
tators on the ground that they serve the goal of enhancing the
accuracy of securities prices, and although the goal of accuracy
enhancement has had a significant impact on the disclosure-
reform agenda over the last quarter century, accuracy en-
hancement cannot be the only goal that must be served by a
rational disclosure system. Both the commentators and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission")
have failed to consider the impact of the liability scheme con-
tained in the securities laws themselves and the importance of
issuer concerns arising out of the value of information in com-
petitive markets.
Simply put, there are two basic reasons why accuracy
enhancement cannot be achieved, one internal to the statutes
themselves and the other inherent in the world in which issu-
ers do business. The internal reason is that the securities laws
themselves reduce the amount of information that is provided
by issuers because they impose significant liability for the
production of misinformation. Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 (the "Securities Act") imposes strict liability on issuers
for any misstatement in the prospectus; imposes liability with
a due diligence defense on a wide range of persons associated
with a public offering-the underwriters and the officers and
directors of the issuer; and provides that the recovery should
be for the difference between the offering price and the subse-
' Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 631 (1984) ("Comparatively [to mandatory disclo-
sure] speaking, derivatively [from insider trading] informed trading is an inefficient
capital market mechanism."). See also Joshua Ronen, The Need for Accounting
Objectives In an Efficient Market, in THE TRUEBLOOD REPORT, supra note 1, at 36,
42 ("Insiders possessing information not available to the public or superior fore.
casting ability are likely to cause the information to be impounded in market
prices with less efficiency than if they were to make the information immediately
available to the public."). The impact of insider trading on market prices is stud-
ied in Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J.
OF FIN. 1661 (1992). According to Meulbroek, "The results reveal that insider trad-
ing is associated with immediate price movements and quick price discovery, sup.
porting one component of Manne's and Carlton and Fischel's assertion that insider
trading is beneficial." Id. at 1663 (referring to HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) and Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regula-
tion of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983)).
[Vol. 61: 763
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quent market price, subject to a defense that the loss in mar-
ket value was not caused by the misstatement.2 Section
12(2), in turn, imposes negligence liability, with the burden of
proof reversed. 3 And the courts, through the private right of
action they have inferred from Rule 10b-5, have reached nearly
the same result for any buyer or seller." This strategy of re-
quiring that information be produced to a "gold standard" is at
the heart of the disclosure program as it is traditionally under-
stood. The insight, so accepted in the free speech area, that
2 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (liability for any
untrue statement of a material fact in a prospectus for, among others, the issuer,
signing officers, directors and underwriters); Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b](3), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(1994)(defense for persons other than issuer who sustain the bur-
den of proof that 'le had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true"); Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)(1994)(suit shall be to recover such damages as shall represent
the difference between the amount paid for the security and the value thereof as
of the time such suit was brought, subject to a defense that if "any portion ...
represents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from
such part of the registration statement... not being true" that portion is not
recoverable).
" Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)(1994) ("Any person who
offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact... " and &who did not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable.").
" The federal courts have inferred a private cause of action from Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995), which entitled any person injured by a misrepresen-
tation made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security to sue for dam-
ages resulting from the misrepresentation. In Ernst & Ernst u. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1975), the Court held that the misrepresentation must be made with
"scienter," an ambiguous requirement that has led to considerable confusion in the
lower courts, and which in some cases has seemed barely distinguishable from
negligence. See Paul S. Mlich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179, 180-181
(1986) ("[A] negligence-like standard has crept back into 10b-5 actions, and the
subjective focus of the scienter requirement imposed by Hochfelder has been un-
dermined."). A recent example is In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9
F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). A striking example
(not involving an issuer) decided shortly after Hochfdder is Rolf v. Eastman
Dillon, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd and remanded, 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir.), amended by No. 77-7104 & 77-7124, 1978 WL 4098 (2d Cir. May 22,
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Rule 10b-5 actions on behalf of all
transactors in the period of the misrepresentation have been greatly aided by the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which makes class certification automatic. The nu-
merous lower court decisions that adopted the fraud-on.the-market theory were
approved by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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high standards of liability for the production of erroneous in-
formation will, as one of its effects, reduce the production of
any information, is unacknowledged in the securities area. But
unacknowledged or not, the liability structure of the securities
laws reduces the production of information.
The second reason why accuracy enhancement cannot be
achieved-the reason inherent in the world in which issuers do
business-is that information is power, including the power to
compete effectively. In the hands of competitors and others
with interests adverse to the issuer, information relevant to
accuracy enhancement can be used to harm the issuer. Infor-
mation is a weapon, and issuers have strong incentives to
make disclosures consistent with their success in rivalry with
competitors and other adversaries rather than to enhance the
accuracy of the prices at which their publicly issued securities
are bought and sold. It is no accident that securities documents
are opaque. 5
Part I describes the arguments for accuracy enhancement
as the goal of mandated securities disclosure, and the history
of the concept's influence on issues of disclosure reform. The
issues whose history before the Commission and the courts are
traced are: (1) projections, (2) segmentation, (3) management's
discussion and analysis ("MD&A") and its application in the
SEC's Caterpillar decision, 6 (4) materiality and its interpre-
tation in the Supreme Court's Basic decision,' (5) market-
z' Nor is it because the Commission staff and securities lawyers are hidebound,
as A.A. Sommer, Jr. once suggested:
Through the years, there have grown up certain disclosure practices,
certain habits of mind, certain stereotyped habits of expression, both on
the part of the Commission staff and private practitioners. You could
virtually recite the typical prospectus language concerning, for instaneo,
competition. You always said that competition in this industry is inten.
sive and characterized by a large number of competitors, many of whom
have greater resources than those of the registrant, etc ..... You could
often predict with precision what a prospectus would say about various
problems.
A.A. Sommer, Jr. et al., New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offer.
ings-A Panel Discussion, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 505 (1973). You still can, and it is
not because securities lawyers do not have the imagination and intelligence to
challenge or evade Commission requirements successfully when their clients want
them to.
16 Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 33-30532, 1992 LEXIS (March 31,
1992).
" 485 u.S. 224 (1988).
[Vol. 61: 763
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value accounting and (6) disclosure of the identity of portfolio
managers by investment companies.'
Part H explains why the arguments for accuracy enhance-
ment are incomplete. This section illustrates how the imposi-
tion of liability for speech and the impact of disclosure on the
issuer explains the difficulties encountered by the SEC and the
courts in implementing the reforms needed to enhance accura-
cy. A final section recounts the "lost" history of concerns about
secrecy under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").19
Part HI then argues that evaluation of the disclosure ob-
jective of the securities laws and the Commission's implemen-
tation of that objective should be conducted with a more realis-
tic understanding of the fact that accuracy enhancement is
only one of a number of conflicting objectives which must be
considered: accuracy enhancement as a standard of perfection
only encourages, or at least serves as a convenient justification
for, costly and needless fine tuning of the disclosure require-
ments. Finally, the consequences of the arguments made here
are connected to other issues in securities regulation: the scope
of the prohibition of insider trading, the plausibility of Rule
10b-5 actions, the agenda of accounting and disclosure reform,
and the role of the SEC.
I. THE CONCEPT AND ITS INFLUENCE
The concept that accuracy enhancement should be the goal
of disclosure can be argued from a small number of proposi-
tions. First, it is socially desirable for securities markets to
"Those readers interested only in an overview may sample or simply ship the
description of the influence of accuracy enhancement on particular issues and pro-
ceed to the second section, again skipping the analysis of particular issues. Those
readers with an interest in, or a taste for, the details of securities regulation, are
the intended audience for the rest of the Article. Unfortunately, a full appreciation
of the difficulties which the accuracy-enhancement concept involves can be gained
only by an examination of the problems encountered in its implementation.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7866 (1994).
There is no place in the literature where the full argument is concisely
stated. The following summary contains a number of points that are usually ig-
nored because they are obvious, but they are necessary for a full appreciation of
the power of the argument. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for A Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717-753 (1984), is the
best known summary of the arguments in the legal culture, to judge by its use in
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accurately price securities.2 ' Second, the accurate price for eq-
uity securities is a price that is based on the value of the issu-
er, because equity securities are a proportional claim on the
residual value of the issuer's businesses.' Third, the valua-
tion of the issuer depends on correctly predicting future cash
flows.' Fourth, the public-policy objective of required disclo-
sure under the securities laws is to enable the markets to
perform their pricing function in a manner that optimizes the
trade-off between the benefits of accurate pricing and the costs
incurred by market participants 2' Fifth, there will tend to be
both underinvestment and overinvestment in the activity of
both RICHARD W. JENNINGS, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 229-238 (1992) and in JAMES D. Cox, IT AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 57-59 (1991). Coffee's paper is a comment on Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Inves-
tors, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). The papers were given at a conference sponsored
by the University of Virginia Law Review to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the
securities laws. The format was Easterbrook and Fischel (anti) and Coffee (pro),
although the antis were not very anti that day. As Coffee recognizes with some
glee, much of the conceptual structure of his argument can also be found in
Easterbrook and Fischel's. The respective arguments are more carefully developed
in two earlier documents written by accountants which are largely ignored in the
legal literature. See William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in
ADVISORY CO mITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 618; GEORGE J.
BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA 97-165
(1976).
21 "[I1f we view the securities market as the principal allocative mechanism for
investment capital, the behavior of securities prices is important not so much
because of their distributive consequences on investors but more because of their
effect on allocative efficiency. In this light, it is important not only that the game
be fair, but that it be accurate-that is, that capital be correctly priced." Coffee,
supra note 20, at 734-35. It is the goal of accuracy that Marcel Kahan celebrates.
Kahan, supra note 1.
' This point is assumed, not discussed, in the literature. The finance literature
assumes that the price per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding
plus the value of the firm's liabilities should equal the value of the firm, and
treats violations of this condition as an anomaly. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisi-
tion Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 906-07 (1988).
' 'Potential users of financial information most directly concerned with a par-
ticular business enterprise are generally interested in its ability to generate favor-
able cash flows because their decisions relate to amounts, timing, and uncertain-
ties of expected cash flows." FASB t supra note 1, at 11. "[Financial reporting
should provide information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the
amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related
enterprise." FASB I, supra note 1, at 17-18.
' Coffee emphasizes the need to include the gains from increased allocational
efficiency in any calculation of the tradeoffs. Coffee, supra note 20, at 736-37.
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predicting the accurate price. There will be underinvestment
because no actor is able to capture the full benefits of being
accurate. There will be overinvestment, in turn, because
each market actor will have to identify and analyze the same
information separately (and duplicatively) in order to make
estimates of value.' Sixth, since the universe of information
relevant to valuing a business is vast and includes factors as to
which the issuer has no clear comparative advantage,' and
since the process of disclosing information is costly to the issu-
er, the issuer's obligation to disclose should be focused on the
information as to which it does have a comparative advantage
-value-relevant information about the issuer's own busi-
ness.' Seventh, since management needs to collect and orga-
I Coffee, supra note 20, at 725-33.
At the collective level, legislation such as the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which requires continual disclosure of extensive current information
by public companies, eliminates the repetitive cost of individual acquisi-
tion of information by each analyst. This form of mandatory disclosure
collectivizes information acquisition by requiring the originators of infor-
mation to distribute it and, in some cases, even requiring them to create
it.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 601.
Coffee, supra note 20, at 733-34.
= Such factors include interest-rate projections, predictions of the level of eco-
nomic activity and exchange rate changes.
23
Mhe analyst searches for information obtainable from non-issuer rources
bearing on the value of a corporate security. Often, this information is
critical because the issuer's performance may be substantially dependent
on exogenous factors-e.g., interest rates, the behavior of competitors,
governmental actions, consumer attitudes, and demographic trends-about
which the issuer has no special Imowledge or the analyst has superior
access.
Coffee, supra note 20, at 723-24.
The final comment that the Committee would make about the informa-
tion in the Commission's system is that it should be firm-oriented. The
Advisory Committee is aware that much of the information which influ-
ences investment decision-making is macroeconomic in nature. Interest
rates, inflation, monetary policy, political issues, all influence the decision
to buy a particular security. Yet, for two reasons, little would be gained
by requiring Commission disclosure documents to contain this informa-
tion. First much of this kind of information is already available on a
timely basis, and in a reliable form from other sources. Secondly, the
corporation has neither the access to this information nor the expertise
in evaluating it to the degree that it materially adds to other sources. It
could at most be a disseminator of this information and it is plainly
inefficient to have 10,000 companies doing this.
ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 315-16. An in-
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nize the same information in order to manage the business,
the cost of requiring the additional step of disclosing it is
small.'
These propositions are used to argue for the conclusion
that the securities laws can and should correct the incentives
for both underinvesting and overinvesting in the production of
value-relevant information by requiring the issuer to produce
the value-relevant, firm-specific information useful to market
decisionmakers. It is further argued that this requirement will
impose relatively trivial costs on issuers. Beneath such con-
ceptual simplicity are heroic assumptions about the ability of
the SEC effectively to identify and induce the production of the
correct information, and about the inability of private parties
to address these problems through private arrangements."0
Thus it is important, in assessing their correctness, to examine
actual examples of the SEC's and the court's efforts to identify
and induce the production of the information which serves the
accuracy-enhancement goal.
Examples of subjects which the Commission or the courts
have considered in determining what information is relevant to
value, and where the influence of accuracy-enhancement can
be observed, include the following: (a) forward-looking state-
ments; (b) segmentation; (c) the enhanced requirements for
management's discussion and analysis in the annual report; (d)
the meaning of materiality; (e) market valuation of assets; and
(f) the identity of investment company portfolio managers.
vestor might, however, find it illuminating to know what the issuer's management
believes to be the case about such exogenous factors, so that she could compare
her own beliefs to those of the management.
22
Management is as interested in information about assets, liabilities, earn.
ings and related elements as external users and, among its other require-
ments, generally needs the same kinds of information about those ele-
ments as external users. . . . Thus, management is a major user of the
same information that is provided by external financial reporting.
FASB I, supra note 1, at 14.
" Ways in which private parties can address these problems are discussed in
Mahoney, supra note 5, at 1090-93. It is possible to use similar arguments to
reach the opposite conclusion, that is, speech should not be regulated because it is
underproduced, and regulation is a cost that will further reduce its production. See
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991).
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A. Forward-Looking Statements
The SEC's historic practice of requiring only the disclosure
of historical facts and prohibiting the disclosure of forward-
looking information was the first policy to appear distorted
when subjected to the lens of accuracy enhancement. The SEC
itself first acknowledged as much in 1973; yet, after twenty
years of effort, projections remain rare in securities disclosure
documents.
An ex-SEC staff member wrote in 1961: "The question will
be raised, if the determination of future earnings is the prime
task confronting the investor, why not require or permit a
direct prediction of such earnings?"3' The answer was confi-
dent:
The answer to this is that the Securities Act, like the hero of
'Dragnet' [a then popular detective series], is interested exclusively
in facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the future are left by the
Act to the investor on the theory that he is as competent as anyone
to predict the future from the given facts.
The question was raised again in the 1969 "Wheat Re-
port," a study of disclosure policies conducted by an internal
study group at the Commission. "A number of experienced
security analysts suggested to the Study that the Commission
should permit 'controlled' projections of sales and earnings in
prospectuses filed with the Commission."' The response was
again dismissive: "A real danger exists, in the Study's judg-
ment, that projections appearing in prospectuses and other
documents filed under the securities laws and reviewed by the
Commission would be accorded a greater measure of validity
by the unsophisticated than they would deserve.'
The principal focus of the Wheat Report, however, was not
31 Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation,
16 Bus. LAW. 300, 307 (1961). "The intrinsic value of the investment... will
depend upon the future earnings of the enterprise which will accrue to the aecuri-
ty under the terms of the contract which the security represnts. Id. at 304.
Heller cited among other authorities Thorsten Veblen, writing in 1904.
Heller, supra note 31, at 307.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COmmSSION, DISCLOSURE 'O INVEsTORS: A REAP-
PRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PoLicIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 95
(1969) [hereinafter "WHEAT PEPORT"I.
"WHEAT REPORT, supra note 33, at 96.
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the content of disclosure but the occasions when registration
was required under the Securities Act. The study had been
stimulated by Milton Cohen's article in the Harvard Law Re-
view' which had proposed relaxing the requirement for the
registration of securities under the Securities Act for issuers
already subject to the disclosure requirements applicable to
public companies. One relaxation of the Securities Act registra-
tion requirement that the Wheat Report proposed was to per-
mit the sale, without registration, of shares held by noncontrol
persons after a five-year holding period. 6
When the Commission itself considered the recommenda-
tions of the Wheat Report it was unwilling to go so far.3' The
Commission's unwillingness to endorse such a modest reform
offended Homer Kripke, who published The SEC, The Accoun-
tants, Some Myths and Some Realities in 1970 in response.'
Although the article denied that it was "intended... to criti-
cize the performance of the SEC in its duties"39 it was in fact
a wide ranging challenge to much of the received wisdom of
securities regulation. In a section entitled "To Perform Its
Functions Properly, the SEC Must Reverse Some Deep-Seated
Attitudes," Kripke discussed both the issue of current value ac-
counting and earnings projections. Responding to Harry Heller
(described as "a former stalwart of the SEC Division of Corpo-
ration Finance"), Kripke wrote:
The public is certainly not as able as the management of a corpora-
tion to understand the meaning, results and implications of the
Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340
(1966).
' WHEAT REPORT, supra note 33, at 25, and Proposed Rule 161(c), WHEAT
REPORT, supra note 33, at 13, App. VI-1.
' The recommendation of the Wheat Report was proposed in Proposal to Adopt
Rules Relating to Underwriters, Non-public Offerings and Brokers' Transactions
under Sections 2(11), 4(1), 4(2) and 4(4) of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Act Release No. 33-4997, 1969 WL 8934 (S.E.C.) (Sept. 15, 1969). An alternative
and more conservative proposal (the object of Kripke's ire) was proposed in Notice
of Proposed Rule 144 Relating to the Definition of the Terms "Underwriter" in
Section 2(11) and "Brokers' Transactions" in Section 4(4) of The Securities Act of
1933 and to Rescind Rules 154 and 155 under that Act, Securities Act Release No.
33-5087, 1970 WL 10572 (S.E.C.) (Sept. 22, 1970) [hereinafter "Release 5087"].
"Homer Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities,
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970). His discussion of Release 5087 is at 1153-54 and
1160-64.
' Kripke, supra note 38, at 1152.
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complex accounting events which have occurred in any dynamic
company or of different rates of improvement or decline in the sales
volume and profitability of different product lines.... The manage-
ment, which has the greatest stake in the matter, and which may
have spent months of labor in its projections, certainly is in a better
position than the public to forecast where the company is going, and
its current estimate rendered in good faith is a fact'
Kripke also argued that the Commission's policy of forbid-
ding projections hurt the nonprofessional investor. He argued
that, in fact, issuers do make projections, and investment pro-
fessionals learn of these projections and utilize them in making
investment decisions. The only people left out are the "little
guys" for whom the Commission has always professed a special
concern.
41
Although the thrust of Kripke's arguments was simply
that the Commission should permit projections in documents
filed with the Commission, he also made it clear that the Com-
mission could do something to improve their quality. He con-
cluded: "Management's estimates, administratively disciplined,
would be of more value to investors and professionals than the
raw facts in which the Commission now drowns them."'2
What this discipline might be he did not discuss.
In 1972 the SEC scheduled hearings to gather information
about "the use of estimates, forecasts or projections of earnings
and revenues and related subjects [to] develop information for
rule-making purposes."43 Then-Chairman William J. Casey
had apparently decided to respond to the critics. In the release
announcing the hearings he referred to the British practice of
using forecasts, without mentioning that the common law lia-
bility standards and procedures of the British law are what
" Kripke, supra note 38, at 1198.
41
The professionals get management projections informally through press
conferences, speeches to analysts' societies or press releases, and these
projections form the basis for professional judgments. Under its present
system the SEC precludes the giving of this information equally to all
investors through the documents filed with it, and does not subject them
to any of the liabilities of the statutes or of administrative ccrutiny.
Kripke, supra note 38, at 1199.
42 Kripke, supra note 38, at 1201 (emphasis added).
,' Public Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Perfor-
mance, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9844, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI) 9[ 79,075 (Nov. 1, 1972).
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makes the British practice possible."
In February 1973 the Commission issued a release an-
nouncing its "general conclusions."4 The arguments of the
critics were embraced by the Commission. The release stated:
[Oin the basis of the information obtained through the hearings and
on the basis of staff recommendations and its experience in adminis-
tering the securities laws, the Commission has now determined that
changes in its present policies with regard to use of projections
would assist in the protection of investors and would be in the public
interest. The Commission recognizes that projections are currently
widespread in the securities markets and are relied upon in the in-
vestment process. Persons invest with the future in mind and the
market value of a security reflects the judgments of investors about
the future economic performance of the issuer. Thus projections are
sought by all investors, whether institutional or individual. The
Commission is concerned, however, that all investors do not have
equal access to this material information.'
No implementing regulations were proposed. The Commis-
sion, however, did insist that it would not require projec-
tions.47
Proposed implementing regulations followed in 1975."8
Even now, twenty years later, one can imagine an SEC staff
member muttering as he fine tuned the proposal: 'They want
projections, we will give them projections. Reliable projections."
The projection proposal undertook to implement the same
approach to disclosure as is required for any other kind of
information by the securities laws. The information disclosed
" Id. Chairman Casey's reference to the example of British practice may have
been suggested by David C. Damant, A Note on Practice in the United Kingdom:
Financial Forecasting by Companies, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 44,
which reported that British disclosure documents did contain forecasts.
"Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 9984, 1973 WL 12099 (S.E.C.) (Feb. 2, 1973).
" Id. at 1.
"'The Commission has never required a company to publicly disclose its pro-
jections and does not intend to do so now." Id.
Notice of Proposed Rule 132 and Proposed Amendments to Rule 405 and to
Form S-1, S-7, S-8, S-9 and S-14 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Notice of
Proposed Rule 3b-6 and Proposed Amendments to Rules 124-2, 13a-11, 14a-9 and
15d-11; to Rules 14a-3 and 14c-3 Relating to Annual Reports to Security Holders;
and to Forms 8-K and 10-K, Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Imple-
ment the "Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance" and to Provide for a More Timely Filing of the Change of
Control Item of Form 8-K. Exchange Act Release No. 34-11374, 1975 WL 15455
(S.E.C.) (April 28, 1975).
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must be prepared with care, have a reasonable basis and must
be complete. Once disclosed, issuers are subject to a continuing
duty to update the information as circumstances change. Had
the proposal been approved, the practical effect would have
been to reduce greatly the number of projections provided to
the Commission, or to anyone else, since the proposal would
have had the real-world effect of sharply increasing the cost to
issuers of providing any projection to a third party. Somewhat
lamely, the Commission insisted that it "does not believe that
projections are per se misleading or fraudulent.""
True to its word, the Commission's proposal did not re-
quire issuers to provide projections. Instead, the Commission
proposed to amend Form 8-K to require that a registrant under
the Exchange Act file a projection with the Commission within
ten days of furnishing "a projection to any person, except a
government agency." A "projection" was defined as "a state-
ment made by an issuer regarding material future revenues,
sales, net income or earnings per share of such issuer, ex-
pressed as a specific amount, range of amounts or percentage
variation from a specific amount, or a confirmation by an issu-
er of any such statement made by another person."
The information required was extensive:
(1) A statement of the projection including the time period covered
by the projection. (2) A statement which i) discloses the material
assumptions underlying the projection; (ii) cautions that there can
be no assurance that the projection will be achieved since its ulti-
mate achievement is dependent upon the occurrence of the specified
assumptions; and (iii) indicates whether the projection has been
compiled on the basis of the specified assumptions and whether it is
consistent with the accounting principles expected to be used by the
registrant. (3) A statement of the circumstances in which the projec-
Id. at 5.
Proposed Form 8-K, Item A, (a), id. at 19. As to government agendis, Pro-
posed Form 8-K, Item A, (c), provided
If the registrant has furnished a projection to any government agency,
foreign or domestic, other than the Commission, give the nae and loca-
tion of such agency and describe the circumstances under which the
projection was furnished. If the projections furnished to such agency are
materially different from any projection filed with the Commission, briefly
describe such differences.
Id. at 20.
" Proposed Rule 12b-2--Deflnition of 'Projection,* id. at 16, Propond Amend-
ment to Rule 405-Definition of 'Projection." Id. at 23-24.
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tion was furnished including the date it was furnished and the man-
ner in which it was communicated. (4) If the registrant has repre-
sented to any person, other than in connection with a transaction or
to a person described in Instruction 1, that a projection furnished in
response to this item has been reviewed by any person other than
an officer, director or employee of the registrant, give such person's
name and address, and file such person's report, if any, as an exhib-
it to this report. 2
That was just the beginning. Once a registrant had filed a
projection, it then had a continuing duty to file another Form
8-K if it came "to believe that any projection previously filed or
required to be fied with the Commission no longer has a rea-
sonable basis."'3 Moreover, when it came time to file its annu-
al form 10-K, registrants were required to "[flurnish all projec-
tions filed or required to be filed with the Commission covering
the year-end results for the fiscal year covered by this report
[and include] a statement of the material assumptions under-
lying each projection, if not previously filed."' If any projec-
tions were revised, registrants were also required to "briefly
describe the reasons for each material revision."
That was not all. The instructions went on:
The most recent projections for the fiscal year covered by this report
should be presented in comparative form with the corresponding
historical results. Where a projection differs from the corresponding
historical result by a factor of 10 percent or more, set forth the ma-
terial reasons for such difference. If the projection was expressed as
a range, the percentage difference shall be measured from the end-
points of such range.6
Finally, the proposed form provided:
' Proposed Form 8-K, Item A. (a), Id. at 19. The proposal also required ex-
hibits: "1. Copies of any published statements containing the information furnished
in answer to Item A of Part I together with any related material submitted in
connection with the particular publication; and] 2. Copies of any report furnished
pursuant to Item A(a)(4) of Part L" Proposed Form 8-K, Exhibits, Id. at 21.'
Proposed Form 8-K, Item A(b) "Revision of Projection," id. at 19. The regis-
trant would be required to file a revised projection. If the registrant could not
provide a revised projection, it had to set forth an "explanation of the reasons for
its inability to furnish the revision together with a brief description of material
changes, if any, in the material assumptions underlying such projection." Id. at 14.
" Proposed amendment to Form 10-K, Item 2A. Projections, (a), Id. at 22. It
would have been a violation of 8-K not to have previously filed a statement of the
material assumptions.
6Id.
"Id.
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(b) If the registrant made projections for the last fiscal year, the
current year or any future period that were filed or required to be
filed with the Commission, and has not determined to cease disclos-
ing projections, the registrant shall furnish projections for at least
the first six months of the current fiscal year or for the full fiscal
year, whether or not previously filed. Include at a minimum projec-
tions of sales or revenues, net income and fully diluted earnings per
share. Also include a statement which a) discloses the material
assumptions underlying the projections; (ii) cautions that there can
be no assurance that the projections will be achieved since their
ultimate achievement is dependent upon the occurrence of the speci-
fied assumptions; and (iii) indicates whether the projections have
been compiled on the basis of the specified assumptions and whether
they are consistent with the accounting principles expected to be
used by the registrant. If the registrant has determined to cease
disclosing projections, set forth the reasons for such determina-
tion."
The proposal was softened somewhat by providing some
exemptions from the requirement that projections made to
"any person" must be filed. Exceptions were provided for pri-
vate placements of securities, commercial loan transactions,
negotiations with underwriters, preliminary negotiations re-
garding a proposed business combination, disclosure to govern-
ment agencies "which has afforded the related projections non-
public treatment," and the registrant's accountants or coun-
sel's Then, lest these exemptions prove too broad, they were
all qualified by a provision that the exceptions would not apply
where the projection was "made as part of a plan or scheme to
evade the requirements of this paragraph."9 Thus, projections
made to a potential executive, to a business consultant, or to a
major customer, for example, were not exempted. The excep-
tion closed with a cautionary "NOTE: Registrants should cau-
tion persons who receive non-public projections about the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, particularly
Rule 10b-5 under the Act' ° The implicit message, of course,
is that persons in receipt of projections that were not filed with
the Commission could be considered in possession of material
inside information and subject to the insider trading rules.
"Proposed amendment to Form 10-K, Item 2A. Projections, (b), id.
"Proposed Form 8-K, Item A., Instruction 1, id. at 20.
Note to Instruction 1, Proposed Form 8-K, id. at 20.
CDIL
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The proposal meant that each registrant would be required
to have an internal system for determining when an employee
of the registrant had made a projection to a person not exempt-
ed, for having that projection reported to the employee respon-
sible for SEC filings and getting it filed within ten days, for
thereafter keeping track of all the projections that had been
made, and for each year compiling and comparing the projec-
tions. Once a projection had been made, the registrant would
then be required when filing their 10-K each year to prepare
new projections for the first six months of the next fiscal year,
which would then require that it do the same the following
fiscal year, and so on.6'
The proposal also contained a safe harbor to protect the
registrant from liability for having made the required projec-
tions. It provided that a projection would not be deemed to be
in violation of the Exchange Act even if the projected result
"1 The Commission gave the following illustration:
Example I - Mandatory Filing Requirements
A. Facts
Y Company is subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 of the
Exchange Act. In response to an analyst's telephone inquiry on April 16,
1975, the financial vice-president of the company states that Y Company
expects to have earnings of $6.00 per share for the year ended December
31, 1975.
B. Filing Requirements
1. This- statement triggers the filing requirements of Item A of Part I of
Form 8-K. Accordingly, Y Company must file a report on Form 8-K with.
in ten days (before April 25, 1975) containing a statement of the projec-
tion, the material assumptions underlying the projection, and the circum-
stances in which the projection was disclosed.
2. Y Company has now entered the disclosure system for projections and
has these obligations:
(a) It must file a report on Form 8-K when it has reason to believe that
the projection no longer has a reasonable basis.
(b) It must include the projection in its 1975 annual report on Form 10-
K, and compare it with actual results for the year.
(c) It must also include projections for the first six months of 1976 or for
the entire year in its 1975 annual report on Form 10-K unless the com-
pany chooses to exit from the disclosure system for projections.
(d) It must include the projection in any registration statement on Forms
S-1, S-7, S-8, S-9 or S-14 filed during 1975 or 1976; provided that if such
registration statement is filed during 1976, the projection must be com-
pared with actual results for 1975.
(e) It must include the projection information required by Form 10-K in
its annual report to shareholders if the company is subject to the proxy
rules.
Id. at 13-14.
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was not achieved, if certain exacting requirements were met.
The requirements included that the registrant have been an
Exchange Act registrant for three years; that the registrant
had "prepared budgets for internal use for its last three fiscal
years;" that the projections had "been prepared with reason-
able care by qualified personnel and carefully reviewed and ap-
proved by management at the appropriate level?; that the
projections have "a reasonable factual basis and represent[ ]
management's good faith judgment"; that the projections "re-
late[ I at a minimum to sales or revenues, net income and fully
diluted earnings per share"; and that it be "expressed [in] exact
figures, a reasonable variation from an exact figure, or a rea-
sonable range of figures."62 Finally, the proposal provided a
mechanism by which a registrant could exit from what the
Commission called the "disclosure system for projections.'
Registrants could file notice that they had determined to cease
disclosing or revising projections, but had to describe "the
reasons for such determination.'
Uncharacteristically, both issuers and analysts vigorously
opposed the proposal.' Typically, issuers oppose extensions of
the reporting requirements because they are the ones who bear
the costs, while analysts welcome them because they are the
ones who can use the information (and do not have to pay for
it). In this case, the analysts saw that the effect of the proposal
would be to cut them off from projections,.. that they would
get less, not more, information. Analysts, therefore, closed
ranks with the issuers. Their reaction made it clear beyond
dispute that Kripke was right: analysts did have access to
management projections and they were not going to give them
' Proposed Rule 3b-6(a)(2), id. at 17. There were additional requirements if
the registrant had represented to any person that a projection had been reviewed
by any outsider. Proposed Form 8-K, Item A, (a)4, id. at 19.
'3 Id. at 9.
" Proposed Form 8-K, Item A(d) "Determination to Cease Diclosing or Revis-
ing Projections," id. at 20.
"The arguments against the proposal made by commentators are summarized
in ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, Appendix A, at
A-291 to A-293. There apparently was an Appendix B to the Report summarizing
the comments, but I have not seen a copy.
"1V lirtually all of the commentators opposed the proposals because they felt
such proposals would be counterproductive, leading to a 'blachout' of projection
communications between management and the investment community." ADVISORY
COmmITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at A-291.
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up without a fight.
The next spring the Commission retreated. It first an-
nounced the formation of an "Advisory Commission on Corpo-
rate Disclosure." The news was presented as if the Commission
was above the fray, simply trying to keep up with the state of
the art through objective examination of available data. The
implication was that the formation of the Committee had noth-
ing to do with any particular issue before the Commission:
Substantial questions concerning the substance and effective-
ness of the corporate disclosure system continue to be raised. In
some measure, these questions reflect the intensification of forces
identified by Commissioner Wheat, such as the increasing institu-
tionalization of the markets. Moreover, since the time of that Report,
an increasing body of scholarly work examining the economics and
structure of information systems has evolved; increasing consider-
ation has been given to the "random-walk theory" and the efficient-
market hypothesis; new techniques of portfolio management are
being utilized and penetrating questions have been asked concerning
the costs and benefits of the current system. In addition, the Presi-
dent and Congressional leaders have urged all units of government
to examine their practices and procedures to determine whether
they are cost effective, whether they impose inordinate burdens on
business and the public, and whether competitive forces, among
other factors, might be substituted for governmental regulation."'
Homer Kripke, a member of the Advisory Committee ap-
pointed by the Commission to undertake the study, reports
that he took this seriously.' He thought the Committee was
going to undertake the kind of serious investigation he had
been urging of the way investors actually make investment
decisions. Martin Lipton, another member of the Committee
and a prominent practicing attorney, led the Committee back
to the "real world."69 Although the Committee reported the
"Announcement of Appointment of Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclo-
sure, Release No. 33-5673, 34-12064, 1976 WL 15973, February 2, 1976, at 1.
' "Because I took for granted that a fundamental weighing of the usefulness
and performance of the mandatory disclosure system would eventually be under-
taken, pursuant to the Committee's charge, I set aside a book on the SEC and
disclosure that I had been working on for some time." KRIKE, supra note 6, at
303. Kripke details how he was isolated by the Committee in his dissent to the
report. ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at D-49 to
D-56. His isolation was inevitable, given that Kripke never had a program except
more research.
"I was the first person on the Disclosure Advisory Committee who, after a
half hour of random talk of efficient market or whatever, would say, 'Let's get
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results of surveys of issuers, analysts, investment
decisionmakers, information disseminators, registered repre-
sentatives and individual investors, its recommendations were
pragmatic recommendations directed to specific issues con-
fronting the Commission and bearing no relationship to the
information it collected."
Three months after the formation of the Committee, the
Commission abandoned its proposal for a "disclosure system
for projections." Announcing that it would no longer hamper
the inclusion of projections in filings, the Commission empha-
sized that it was "neither encouraging or [sic] discouraging the
making and filing of projections because of the diversity of
views on the importance and reliability of projections." Fur-
thermore, the Commission innocently added: "This issue, along
with the question of the need for a safe-harbor rule for projec-
tions, may be among those appropriately considered by the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure." S
The Committee recommended that the Commission en-
courage but not require projections, and that it should provide
a safe harbor for projections unless the projections were either
prepared without a reasonable basis or disclosed in other than
good faith. 4 The Commission did so for projections in docu-
ments filed with the Commission. 5 Since the safe harbor did
back to the real world." Remarks of Martin Lipton in Boohs for the Bar: Diccus-
sion of the SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Scarch of a Purpose, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1285, 1295-96 (1981) (reviewing ERIPHE, supra note 6).
7As Kripke pointed out, "I do note, however, how little the Committee's cen-
clusions rest on the field study. Indeed, examination of the Committea'a minutes
will show that all of the Committee's important conclusions except the Introduction
were reached before the results of the field study were available.' ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at D-54.
7' Notice of Adoption of An Amendment of Rule 14a-9 Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Withdrawal of the Other Proposals Containead in Re-
lease No. 33-5581 . . . , Securities Act Release No. 33-5699, 1976 WI 16007
(S.E.C.) (April 23, 1976). See also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMSSION, ANNUAL
REPORT [FISCAL YEAR] 1976 at 27-28 (undated, prob. 1977).
7SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT, cupra note 71, at
2.
73 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at
2.
74 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 364.
Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1995), and Rule 3b-6, 17 C-F.R. § 240.3b-6
(1995) (originally promulgated in Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6084, 1979 WL 16388 (S.E.C.) (June 25, 1979)). The Commission
limited the safe harbor to projections in filing with the Commission, while the
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not protect projections from being deemed fraudulent if made
without a reasonable basis or made other than in good faith,
however, it provided little more protection for projections than
did the Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder standard of scienter adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court for 10b-5 actions four years earlier in
1975.76
In 1994, still faced with the reluctance of issuers to make
projections, the Commission returned to the issue, scheduling
hearings for early 1995 on the subject." The theme of the re-
lease announcing the hearings was the possibility that fear of
liability under the securities laws discourages the release of
projections."s
B. Segmentation
The issue of segmentation is much more difficult than the
issue of projections. It was thrust onto the Commission's disclo-
sure agenda prior to the projections issue. Like the projections
issue, it remains an unresolved problem today.79
Segmentation was forced onto the Commission's agenda as
a byproduct of antitrust concern about conglomerate mergers.
Advisory committee had recommended a safe harbor for all projections, whether or
not made in a filing with the Commission.
7' 425 U.S. 185 (1975). For a discussion of the Hochfelder standard, see note
14 supra.
" Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements: Concept Release, Securities
Act Release 7101, 1994 WL 562021 (S.E.C.) (Oct. 13, 1994) [hereinafter "1994 Con.
cept Release"]. Section 205 of H.R. 10, 104th Cong. 1st Sess., requires the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to adopt a new safe harbor for predictive state-
ments meeting specified statutory criteria. Section 206 provides for a stay of dis.
covery pending a ruling on a summary judgment motion to dismiss a case on the
ground that a forward-looking statement was protected by the safe harbor. H.R.
10, introduced January 4, 1995, titled A Bill to Reform the Federal Civil Justice
System; to Reform Product Liability Law, is part of the legislative package popu-
larly known as "the Contract with America."
78
Some have suggested that companies that make voluntary disclosure of
forward-looking information subject themselves to a significantly increased
risk of securities anti-fraud class actions. Recent surveys suggest that
this threat of mass shareholder litigation, whether real or perceived, has
had a chilling effect on disclosure of forward-looking information.
1994 Concept Release, supra note 77, at 8.
" The Financial Accounting Standards Board released PAUL PACTER, RESEARCH
REPORT: REPORTING DISAGGREGATED INFORMATION (1993), designed as a background
paper for consideration of further initiatives in this area.
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The industrial-organization economists complained that one
consequence of conglomerate mergers was that they blurred
the available statistics on particular industries.s The then-
prominent Senator Philip A. Hart (for whom the Hart Senate
Office Building is named) chaired the Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. He was opposed to
increasing industrial concentration achieved through conglom-
erate mergers, even when those mergers were not in violation
of the antitrust laws. An economist who shared this view, Dr.
Joel Dirlam, posed the issue as one of investor protection in
testimony to the committee. Dr. Dirlam testified:
I would speak also on behalf of the average investor who does not
know what he is buying into when he purchases one of these large
diversified firms. He has only the overall statement to go by. He
judges then not the industry but the behavior of the firm itsel; and
he stakes his money on the management with a minimum of infor-
mation... I do think that an amendment to the Securities and
Exchange Act could require that corporations disclose on a fuller
basis than they do now their sales and operating income from differ-
ent activities in which they may be engaged. Such knowledge should
be available both to the average investor and the antitrust authori-
ties.81
The implicit argument is that segmented data provides
investors better information for evaluating the accuracy of
securities prices than unsegmented information. The argument
proceeds from the idea that investors need information rele-
' Joel Dirlam put it this way:
I might conclude by saying that as a student on the problems of indus-
trial organization, I feel myself faced by technological obsolecence. Auto-
mation may destroy my job. As these large firmas become more and more
diversified, the material which has been made available by this commit-
tee and which has been so useful in the past in the shape of concentra-
tion ratios, values of shipments, numbers of companies and plants in
various four-digit industries and five-digit product class groups becomes
of less and less significance, and one has to concentrate more and more
upon the individual firms.
Economic Concentration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 745, 770 (1965) (testi-
mony of Dr. Joel Dirlam). The implicit argument that Congress should impose
reporting requirements in order to enable academic industrial organization econo-
mists to continue to use their methodologies is breathtaling. Of course the econo-
mists are not alone. High-energy physicists argue that the government should
spend tax revenue in order to build expensive facilities so that they can have new
data to analyze.f1 Id. at 769-70.
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vant to predicting future cash flows. Issuers are involved in
many different activities. If their accounting results are report-
ed on a consolidated basis, the accounting information will
combine the revenues and costs of different activities. If, for
instance, the issuer has an aerospace subsidiary and a steel
subsidiary, the future that each subsidiary faces could be dif-
ferent. When the results are consolidated, it is impossible for
outsiders to determine the relative profitability of each seg-
ment, the historical trend of profitability in each segment, or to
understand how changes in each industry will affect the over-
all profitability of the issuer. Analysis of a "steel-air" business
is analysis of a fictional and nonexistent business whose re-
sults are reported only because two quite different businesses
have a common owner. Similar problems of interpretation and
analysis exist concerning results combined from parts of the
business operating in different geographic areas. A steel busi-
ness in Brazil may have very different prospects than a steel
business in Europe.'
Since more information is always better than less, if the
objective is to make predictions that are as accurate as possi-
ble, there is no clear stopping place as to the amount of detail
that should be reported. Even a steel business located in a
single geographic area may, in fact, be many different busi-
nesses-say the production of construction steel for the build-
ing industry, the production and fabrication of steel parts for
the automobile industry, the production of specialty steel for
the aerospace industry, and so on. So too, an analyst would
like to know the identity of important customers, the amount
of their business and the extent they contribute to profitability.
After all, profits earned from an important but financially
marginal customer are much less likely to continue than prof-
its from a thriving and growing one. Because there is no obvi-
ous stopping point, the debates about segmentation have not
reached equilibrium. No matter how much segmentation there
is, it can always be argued that accuracy enhancement re-
Daniel W. Collins, SEC Product-Line Reporting and Market Efficiency, 2 J.
OF FIN. ECON. 125 (1975). Collins uses segment reporting data for 1968-69 first
reported by issuers in response to revised SEC requirements in 1970 to study the
impact of segment reporting. He reports, as the argument in the text suggests it
would, that segment reporting improves the ability of traders to predict future
warnings. See also note 88, infra.
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quires greater segmentation. '
While Senator Hart was never able to get Congress to pass
legislation to stop firm growth through conglomeration, he was
able to pursue the "conglomerate issue" in other ways. Some-
how, Senator Hart enlisted to his cause Manuel Cohen, then
the Chairman of the Commission. By the fall of 1966, Cohen
was making speeches containing not very subtle threats that if
the accounting profession did not do something about segmen-
tation, the Commission would. Cohen said:
I must admit that some of the initial presentations to us do not
communicate the sense of urgency which I believe should pervade
our discussions. I hope that the same attitude Will be applied to your
work on conglomerate companies [whose new prominence had raised
the importance of the segmentation issue] and other current prob-
lems, and that you will continue to fulfill your obligations to the
public in such a way that we will not be required to consider the
need for us to fill a gap.'
Almost three years later the Commission acted.' It
One stopping point is the meaningfulness of the segmentation. At come point
the revenues are attributable to so many jointly incurred costs that the notion of
segmentation loses its meaning. Not even management could toll exactly which is
the profitable product line, the profitable customer, or the profitable geographic
area. But if the point is to require the disclosure of the best available information,
then why not require the disclosure of highly segmented information and let the
users of the information determine what it is worth?
Another stopping point is the cost of segmenting the information into finer
and finer categories. But management needs to know which activities are profit-
able and which are not, in order to plan investment decisions. Managements
should not want to expand unprofitable activities, and they should want to expand
profitable activities. So to make good investment decisions, manngemont needs to
develop methods of analysis that enable it to separate profitable from unprofitable
activities. Once management develops that analysis, the further costs of sharing it
with investors are minor.
" Manuel F. Cohen, The SEC and Accountants: Co-operative Efforts to Improue
Financial Reporting, J. OF ACCT., Dec. 1966, at 56, 59-60. Thee events as of the
end of 1966 are reviewed in A.A. Sommer Jr., Conglomerate Dicdoure: Friend or
Foe, 22 BUS. LAW. 317 (1967) and Seligman, supra note 4, at 432-36. In another
speech, Chairman Cohen favorably cited the British (as well as other foreign) prac-
tice, just as his successor, Casey, was to do later in connection with projections.
See supra text at accompanying notes 43-46. Manuel Cohen, Analyt s, Accountants
and the SEC-Necessary Joint Efforts, J. OF ACCT. Aug. 1966, at 57, 60-6L
' Adoption of Amendments to Forms S-1, S-7 and 10, Securities Act Release
No. 334988, 1969 WL 8926 (S.E.C.) (July 14, 1969) [hereinafter Teleara 4988].
The Commission had proposed the amendments in Securities Act Release 4922
(Sept. 4, 1968) and Notice of Revision of Proposed Amendments to Forms S-1, S-7
and 10, Securities Act Release No. 334949, 1969 VJL 8894 (S.E.C.) (Feb. 18, 1969)
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amended the registration forms to require that:
Where a registrant and its subsidiaries are engaged in more
than one line of business, the amendments require the disclosure for
each of a maximum of the last five fiscal years subsequent to De-
cember 31, 1966, of the approximate amount or percentage of total
sales and operating revenues and of contribution to income before
income taxes and extraordinary items attributable to each line of
business which contributed, during either of the last two fiscal
years, a certain proportion [which for companies with sales in excess
of $50 million was to be 10 percent] to (1) the total of sales and reve-
nues, or (2) income before income taxes and extraordinary items."
The only important change from previous Commission require-
ments was that the threshold proportion was reduced from
fifteen to ten percent. The Commission refused to impose any
requirements as to how a line of business was to be defined or
how revenues and overhead costs were to be allocated to any
one line of business." The resulting information was of no use
[hereinafter "Release 4949"]. In the meantime the Accounting Principles Board
(predecessor to the FASB had issued Statement No. 2, Disclosure of Supplemental
Financial Information by Diversified Companies (September 1967). "For the pres-
ent, the Board urges diversified companies to review their own circumstances care-
fully and objectively with a view toward disclosing voluntarily supplemental finan-
cial information as to industry segments of the business." The WHEAT REPORT,
which was issued between the date of the proposals cited above and their adop-
tion, stated that "the conferences held by the Study strongly substantiated the
need for this additional information in the prospectus." The WHEAT REPORT, supra
note 33, at 89. The Study recommended that the segmentation requirement be
extended to annual reports on Form 10-K. The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 33, at
89. See also The WHEAT REPORT, supra note 33, at 338. This was done in 1970.
Adoption of Revised Form 10-K, Exchange Act Release No. 34-9000 at 5, 1970 WL
9841 (S.E.C.) (Oct. 21, 1970).
Release No. 4988, supra note 85, at 1-2.
The Commission explained its refusal as follows:
Various suggestions were made for more specific indications of the mean-
ing of "line of business." However, in view of the numerous ways in
which companies are organized to do business, the variety of products
and services, the history of predecessor and acquired companies, and the
diversity of operating characteristics, such as markets, raw materials,
manufacturing processes and competitive conditions, it is not deemed
feasible or desirable to be more specific in defining a line of business.
Management, because of its familiarity with company structure, is in the
most informed position to separate the company into components on a
reasonable basis for reporting purposes. Accordingly, discretion is left to
the management to devise a reporting pattern appropriate to the par-
ticular company's operations and responsive to its organizational concepts.
Adoption of Amendments to Forms S-1, S-7 and 10, Release No. 4988, supra note
86, at 1.
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to the industrial-organization economists, both because there
would be no comparability in the data between firms, no corre-
spondence between the SEC disclosure data and the standard
industrial classifications, and only fragmentary information on
changes over time.' At that point, industrial-organization
economists gave up on the SEC as a vehicle for collecting the
information they wanted.
The subsequent history of the segmentation issue divides
into two distinct branches: one the history of a data-collection
program conducted by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
the other the continuing evolution of financial reporting. The
industrial-organization economists were able to enlist the as-
sistance of the FTC in 1970 to collect lines of business data.
1. The FTC Line-of-Business Program
The FTC's experience with its line-of-business program, as
it came to be called, is instructive because it turned out to be a
failure. In the end, the FTC collected only four years of com-
plete data, 9 in spite of the fact that the FTC was the perfect
' Collins, supra note 82, at 125-64. Collins studied whether additional infor-
mation was made available as a result of the SEC's segmentation requirements in
spite of these limitations. Collins exploited the fact that firms implemented the
SEC requirements at different times. Surprisingly (given the bluntness of the
SECs segmentation requirement), Collins found that the SEC segmentation data
improved the ability of a simple predictive model to predict security prices. The
results were not statistically significant. See Collins, supra note 82, at 138-39, 146-
47. His data set, derived from the short transition period, generated a small num-
ber of observations. Others have also attempted to exploit this event to study the
relationship between increased information disclosure and market price behavior.
See generally, Siva Swaminathan, The Impact of SEC Mandated Segment Data on
Price Variability and Divergence of Beliefs, 66 ACar. REV. 23-41 (Jan. 1991), and
articles cited therein.
' Years and date of publication of aggregate reports: 1973 (incomplete data
sample), March 1979; 1974, September 1981; 1975, September 1981; 1976, May
1982; 1977, April 1985. David J. Ravenscraft & Curtis L. Wagner I, The Role of
the FTC's Line of Business Data in Testing and Expanding the Theory of the Firm,
34 J. OF L. & ECON. 703, 731 (1991). Failure is my evaluation. The data set pro-
duced does not cover a long enough period to enable it to be used to illinate
important economic cause-and-effect relations, which unfold over periods longer
than four years. Ravenscraft and Wagner suggest that cross-sectional analysis can
be used to solve this problem. Id. at 716. Their article collects the basic materials
for judging the success or failure of the program. See particularly the comprehen-
sive bibliography of publications and papers using data from the program. Id. at
732-39. The program had the problems of defining industries and allocating joint
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agency to conduct the program.0 First, a statutory purpose of
the FTC is to study the economy.91 Second, the FTC has broad
statutory authority to require the production of information
relevant to the economy. Third, unlike the SEC, the FTC's
power to compel the production of economic information is not
tied to making the information public. Rather, it could collect
information for its own study purposes without making some
or all of it public, thus overcoming concerns based on claims of
confidentiality.92
The FTC first proposed that it collect information orga-
nized on a line-of-business basis93 in 1971. It was required to
submit the forms which were to be used to collect the informa-
tion to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") under
the Federal Reports Act.94 The Nixon OMB refused to approve
the forms. In 1973 OMB's power was curtailed when the au-
thority to approve forms of the independent regulatory agen-
costs that the SEC refused to confront. The choices (and compromises) involved in
the design of such a program are discussed by Frederic M. Scherer, Segmental
Financial Reporting: Needs and Trade-Offs, in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE:
GOVERNMEN'WS NEED TO KNOW 3 (Harvey J. Goldschmid ed., 1979).
" I remember a discussion with Professor Frederick Scherer, just before he
went to the FTC as its Chief Economist, that the exciting thing about working for
the FTC would be the opportunity to participate in path-breaking research using
unique data never before available. His expectation that the line of business data
would be produced in due course was a reasonable one given the powers of the
Commission and its support for the line-of-business program. In fact, the FTC was
unable to collect any data before he had resigned. Frederick Scherer was Chief
Economist of the FTC from 1974 to 1976. WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 1994.
"The history of the FTC's broad mandate to study the economy, along with a
retrospective overview of the corporate patterns survey and the line-of-business
program, is described in Frederick M. Scherer, Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal
Trade Commission, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 461 (1990).
As long as the information could be characterized as a trade secret under
the Freedom of Information Act, 15 U.S.C. § 552(bX4)(1988).
This meant, in this context, in categories aligned with the standard indus-
trial classification system.
" Federal Reports Act of 1942, ch. 811, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3511 (1988). The
purposes were
(1) to minimize the federal paperwork burden for individuals, small busi-
nesses, State and local governments, and other persons; (2) to minimize
the cost to the Federal Government of collecting, maintaining, using, and
disseminating information; (3) to maximize the usefulness of information
collected, maintained, and disseminated by the Federal Government; [and]
(4) to coordinate, integrate and, to the extent practicable and appropriate,
make uniform Federal information policies and practices.
44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988).
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cies was transferred to the General Accounting Office.95 The
General Accounting Office proved more accommodating," and
the FTC's program was launched.
Firms required to produce the information struck back. In
Congress they successfully lobbied to obtain amendments to
the FTC appropriations acts that restricted the availability of
the data.97 In the courts they filed massive litigation3 which
' Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act § 409(b), Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87
Stat. 576 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.JN. 639, 658-59. The President sup.
ported the bill so that the oil industry could proceed to build the Trans-Alaskan
Pipeline in the face of environmental challenges. The amendment of the Federal
Reports Act was attached, along with a number of other miscellaneous items, in
the Senate, and accepted by the Conference Committee. See HR Rep. No. 624,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 US.C.C.A.N. 2523, 2525.
"George J. Benston, The FTCs Line of Business Progr=m: A Benefit-Coat
Analysis, in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO KNOW 58, 58-59
(Harvey J. Goldschmid ed., 1979), reports that the General Accounting Offica con-
cluded that the "data 'would be unreliable at best and may be seriously mislead-
ing," and that the FTC had underestimated company compliance costs, but ap-
proved the program on the ground that these considerations were not within its
authority (citing PILIP S. HUGHES (ASSIsrA 'T COMPrROLLER GENERAL), REPORT
To THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVALUATION OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMSSION'S PROPOSED ANNUAL LINE OF BUSNESS REPORT
(FORM LB) 15 (1974)).
' These year-to-year restrictions were finally codified in the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1994). The restrictions
as codified provide that:
No officer or employee of the Commission or any Commissioner may pub-
lish or disclose information to the public, or to any Federal agency,
whereby any line-of-business data furnished by a particular establishment
or individual can be identified. No one other than designated sworn offi-
cers and employees of the Commission may examine the line-of-business
reports from individual firms, and information provided in the line-of-
business program administered by the Commission shall be used only for
statistical purposes. Information for carrying out specific law enforcement
responsibilities of the Commission shall be obtained under practice3 and
procedures in effect on the date of the enactment of the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, or as changed by law.
Id. A Senate Report by the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
explained. "The section has specific protections to prevent harm to companies that
supply the data." S. REP. NO. 500, 96th Cong. 1st Sees. 12 (1979), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.AN. 1102, 1114. Ravenscraft and Wagner report that the FTC has
been able to mitigate the impact of this restriction to some extent by making
interested researchers "uncompensated special consultants to the FTC's Bureau of
Economics. Data processing must be conducted at the FTC, using the FTC com-
puter facilities." Ravenscraft & Wagner IM supra note 89, at 709. This practice
was challenged unsuccessfully in Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 589 F. Supp.
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
" Perhaps a better term is crowded. The main action was In re FTC Corporate
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managed, in spite of its specious basis,9 to put the program
under a cloud until 1978 and helped delay completion of the
data collection.' In 1984 the Reagan FTC,' with the 1977
Patterns Report Litigations, 432 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1977), 432 F. Supp. 291
(D.D.C. 1977); affd sub no., Appeal of FMC Line of Business Report Litigation,
595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978), mandate denied, In re FTC Line of Business Report
Litig., 647 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978). Twelve compa-
nies also filed a class action in New York seeking to enjoin the program. Their
motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. Aluminum Co. v. FTC, 890 F.
Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The list of counsel in the D.C. Circuit decision shows
more than 30 law firms. There were two programs, the line-of-business program,
which is the subject of the discussion in the text, and the corporate patterns sur-
vey. The latter program was designed to minirie the burden on the reporting
firms by requesting data already reported to the census bureau.
Scherer, supra note 91, at 479, reports that "guerilla attacks" continued after
the main litigation was resolved.
9 As evidenced by the fact that the FTC's motion for a summary judgment
was granted. Here was the best argument, directed to the corporate patterns sur-
vey, as summarized in the opinion of the D.C. Circuit:
We next consider whether the Corporate Patterns Report Program
impermissibly affronts the Census Act. Specifically, appellants contend
that the CPR survey violates the confidentiality provision of the Census
Act, which safeguards company-retained copies of census reports from
compelled disclosure to any government agency. Appellants insist that
this provision protects not only the actual file copy of the census report,
but also the company's statistical data that has been prepared in an
assertedly "unique fashion" for the purpose of reporting to the Census
Bureau. The corporations argue that the Census Act's protection of re-
tained census report copies insulates companies from any future require-
ment to respond to questions similar to those which the company has al-
ready answered in reports to the Census Bureau. Since the CPR survey
includes a question essentially identical to an item on the Census
Bureau's 1972 Annual Survey of Manufactures, appellants contend that
the FTC is demanding information which the Census Act protects from
compelled disclosure.
Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 697 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 690 n.1 (record references omitted):
Pursuant to the final order and judgment of the District Court entered
July 15, 1977, the corporate parties were required to file their Line of
Business reports within 150 days of the date of the order and the Corpo-
rate Patterns Reports within 90 days. A motion for stay of the enforce-
ment order pending appeal was denied by the District Court on July 22,
1977 and by this court on October 21, 1977. Petition was made to the
Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal in this court of the Corporate
Patterns Report orders. Justice Brennan granted the petition on Novem-
ber 11, 1977. Following several extensions of the compliance date in the
Line of Business program, we issued an order on April 26, 1978 staying
enforcement of the LB orders pending our further consideration of the
matter.
"0x Scherer, supra note 91, at 480-83, attributes the demise of the program to
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survey not yet completed, dropped the program."°
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission, Continued
When the Financial Accounting Standards Board succeed-
ed the Accounting Principles Board in 1973, one of the first
issues it addressed was segmentation. This resulted in FASB
14, issued in December 1976. FASB 14 adopted the same ten
percent criteria as the SEC had, but it differed from the SEC's
requirements in many details. For instance, the SEC had ad-
dressed customer disclosure as follows:
If a material part of the business of the registrant and its subsidiar-
ies is dependent upon a single customer, or a very few customers,
the loss of any one of which would have a materially adverse effect
on the registrant, the name of the customer or customers and other
material facts with respect to their relationship, if any, to the regis-
trant and the importance of the business to the registrant shall be
stated.
10 3
FASB 14, on the other hand, provided that "[i]f 10 percent or
more of the revenue of an enterprise is derived from sales to
any single customer, that fact and the amount of revenue from
each such customer shall be disclosed.""' In subsequent
years the Commission conformed its segmentation require-
ments to those of FASB 14."
the "inauguration of a President pledged to get government off the backs of busi-
ness." He also reports that Congress returned authority over FTC information
gathering to 0MB in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94
Stat. 2812 (1980)(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §3501 (1995)), before Reagan
took office. Id. at 479.
11 Ravenscraft & Wagner II, supra note 89, at 706 (citing FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT- 1977 ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT 1
(1985)). They report that the FTC in 1984 agreed with the GAO finding of 1974
that the benefits of the program did not exceed its cost
I Release 4949, supra note 85 at 6.
,, FINANcIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS No. 14, FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE 9 39 (1976) [hereinafter "FASB 141.
115 For instance Item 101(b) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F!. § 229.101(b)(1995),
provides that:
To the extent that financial information included pursuant to this para-
graph (b) complies with generally accepted accounting principles, the
registrant may include in its financial statements a cross reference to
this data in lieu of presenting duplicative information about its segments
in the financial statements; conversely, a registrant may cross reference
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The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure approved
of these developments.' It urged the Commission to expand
and extend its requirements for segmentation by management,
and include a requirement for segmentation in both the annual
and quarterly disclosure forms."° The Advisory Committee
was of the opinion that:
Those who perform investment analysis evaluate the different indus-
tries, product lines, markets, etc. of an enterprise individually in
order to develop an estimate of the future earnings power of the
enterprise as a whole. Accordingly, it makes little sense that invest-
ment decision-making information-narrative or financial state-
ment-is presented on an enterprise-wide basis."'
The Advisory Committee also noted objections to segmented
reporting:
[Oipposition to the requirement centered on the competitive costs of
such a reporting obligation. It was generally feared that suppliers,
employees, customers and foreign governments would use the fig-
ures to extract concessions from the company and that competitors
would use the information to invade the registrants profitable mar-
kets. Such disclosure would be particularly dangerous for small
companies which might have to disclose relatively more information
about their operations than their larger competitors since the line in
question might not be significant for the larger company. It might
also encourage takeovers."
The Committee Report did not explain why these concerns
were unimportant, but it treated them as if they were.
In 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board pub-
lished a research report that "is the first step in an FASB
to the financial statements.
ADVISORY COMIBTTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 380-890.
107 When the SEC integrated this disclosure form for the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, the narrative segmentation requirement was incorporated in Form
10-K through its reference to Item 101 of S-K. The quarterly forms still do not
require segmentation. Indeed, the accountants expressly exempted interim financial
statements from the segmentation requirements of FASB 14. FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 18,
FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR SEGMENTS OF A BUSINESS ENTERPRISE-INTERI FINAN-
CIAL STATEMENTS (1977) [hereinafter: "FASB 181]. The Commission proposed inclu-
sion of segment information in interim reports in Proposals Regarding Industry
Segment and Other Interim Financial Reporting Matters, Management's Discussion
and Analysis, and Off Balance Sheet Financing Disclosures, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6514 (1984), a proposal never adopted.
10s ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 388.
109 ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 1, at 383.
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project to reexamine the existing standards for reporting
disaggregated information.""
C. Managements Discussion and Analysis
At the end of the 1960's a new disclosure strategy began to
emerge in the Commission's disclosure guides-documents
designed to push issuers in the direction of good disclosure
practices. The strategy, as it finally emerged, is to place on
management the responsibility for identifying those aspects of
an issuer's operations and accounting results which should be
important to investors. Rather than struggling with the prob-
lem of identifying with meaningfil precision the important
information for valuing an issuer, the Commission requires the
management of each issuer to struggle with the problem. This
strategy involves the same basic issues raised by the
Commissions efforts to formulate disclosure policies on fore-
casting and segmentation. The issues, however, have to be
faced firm by firm, rather than in the relative sunlight of the
Commission's rule-making procedure. The strategy is now
implemented in a section of the disclosure regulations called
"Management's Discussion and Analysis."
In 1968, Release 33-4936 promulgated guidelines for the
preparation of disclosure documents. The Commission cau-
tiously and without explanation advised:
The necessity of disclosing items in addition to those specified in
such instructions [relating to the summary of earnings] will depend
upon the circumstances. These instructions cannot, of course, cover
all situations which may arise nor is it practicable to set forth a
statement of policy dealing specifically with all possible situations.
The existence of any unusual conditions affecting the propriety of
the presentation and the necessity for the inclusion of an additional
previous period should be considered [by management in determin-
ing whether to provide supplemental information related to earn-
ings].'
Six years later, the idea that it is management's responsi-
bility to help investors understand the relevance of financial
statements to the future performance of the company was
U" PACTER, supra note 79, at iii.
m Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Socurities Act
Release No. 33-4936, 1968 WL 3988 (S.E.C.) (December 9, 1968), at 9.
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articulated, and a section called "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of the Summary of Earnings" ("MD&A") was created.
In 1974, the Commission revised the guidelines relating to the
summary of earnings:
To enable investors to understand and evaluate material periodic
changes in the various items of the summary of earnings, a sepa-
rately captioned section (entitled "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of the Summary of Earnings") immediately following such
summary should include a statement explaining (1) material chang-
es from period to period in the amounts of the items of revenues and
expenses, and (2) changes in accounting principles or practices or in
the method of their application that have a material effect on net
income as reported. The purpose of this statement is to provide in-
vestors with management's analysis of the financial data included
on the summary through a discussion of the causes of material
changes in the items of the summary and of disclosure of the dollar
amount of each such change and the effect of each such change on
the reported results for the applicable periods. This discussion is
necessary to enable investors to compare periodic results of opera.
tions and to assess the source and probability of recurrence of earn-
ings (losses). The analysis should include a discussion of material
facts, whether favorable or unfavorable, required to be disclosed or
disclosed in the prospectus which, in the opinion of management,
may make historical operations or earnings as reported in the sum-
mary of earnings not indicative of current or future operations or
earnings.1
In 1980, the Commission substantially reorganized and
recodified its disclosure forms as part of the integration re-
forms."' Disclosure requirements for both the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act were placed in one common, master
form, form S-K. Item 303 of S-K, which became "Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
"2 Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Guide 22 of the Guides for Prepara-
tion and Filing of Registration Statements under the Securities Act of 1933 and
Adoption of Guide 1 of the Guides for Preparation and Filing of Reports and Reg-
istration Statements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Textual Analysis
of Summary of Earnings or Operations), Securities Act Release No. 33-5520, 1974
WL 13616 (S.E.C.) (August 14, 1974).
13 Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and
Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6231, 1980 WL 20863 (S.E.C.) (Sept. 2, 1980). The reforms are called into-
gration reforms because their purpose was to "integrate" the disclosure require-
ments of the Securities Act (governing a public offering) and the Exchange Act
(governing the periodic disclosures required of issuers). These reforms implemented
the ideas advanced by Milton H. Cohen in 1966. Cohen, supra note 35.
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Operations," remains the same today.
The requirements of Item 303 are more extensive and
complex than its predecessors. The disclosure requirements
focus on three subjects: (1) liquidity, (2) capital resources and
(3) results of operations. The instructions provide that: "The
purpose of the discussion and analysis shall be to provide to
investors and other users information relevant to an assess-
ment of the financial condition and results of operations of the
registrant as determined by evaluating the amounts and cer-
tainty of cash flows from operations and from outside sourc-
es."" Item 303 of S-K also introduced the concept of "known
trends." As to liquidity, Item 303 requires registrants to
"[ildentify any known trends or any known demands, commit-
ments, events or uncertainties that will result in or are reason-
ably likely to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or
decreasing in any material way."" As to capital resources
the instruction states: "Describe any known material trends,
favorable or unfavorable, in the registrant's capital resources."
Finally, as to the results of operations the item provides: "De-
scribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that
the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favor-
able or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income
from continuing operations."
In 1986, Coopers & Lybrand submitted to the Office of the
Chief Accountant of the SEC a proposal to expand the MD&A
disclosure, and make it subject to review by the issuer's inde-
pendent accountant."6 A similar proposal was endorsed by
all of the "Big Seven" accounting firms.' In response, the
U, 17 C.F.R. § 229, Item 303, Instruction 2 to 9I 303ta) (1995).
n' 17 CF.R. § 229, Item 303(a)(1)(1995).
"In 1986, Coopers & Lybrand submitted to the Commiissions Office of the
Chief Accountant a proposal recommending increased IkED&A disclosure of business
risks and the performance by the independent auditor of specified review proce-
dures with respect to these disclosures." Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Dis-
closures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, 1989 WL 258977 (S.E.C.) (May 18,
1989), at 2 [hereinafter 'Release 6835"].
U? "Mhe managing partners of seven accounting firms issued a white paper
entitled The Future Relevance, Reliability, and Credibility of Financial Information;
Recommendations to the AICPA Board of Directors, which also called for increased
risk disclosure, but contemplated that such disclosure would be separate from
MD&A and would be subjected to audit coverage." The seven wore: Arthur
Andersen & Co.; Arthur Young;, Coopers & Lybrand; Deloitte Haskins & Sells;
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Commission issued a concept release asking for comment on
these proposals. Virtually all of the 196 commentators opposed
the proposal of the accounting profession, and the Commission,
instead of adopting the proposal, responded with a release
discussing the purposes of Item 303 and providing detailed
examples of how to comply."'
The concept release is notable for some of the language it
used to explain Item 303. In an act of historical reconstruction,
the Commission claimed that it "ha[d] long recognized the need
for a narrative explanation of the financial statements, because
a numerical presentation and brief accompanying footnotes
alone may be insufficient for an investor to judge the quality of
earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative
of future performance.""' Turning metaphorical, the Commis-
sion explained: "MD&A is intended to give the investor an
opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of man-
agement by providing both a short- and long-term analysis of
the business of the company."2 '
The Commission has not been pleased with issuer compli-
ance with Item 303. In Release 33-6835, issued in May 1989,
the Commission reported that the staff had undertaken "a
special review of the MD&A disclosures to assess the adequacy
of disclosure practices and to identify any common areas of
deficiencies." 2' This "MD&A Project" involved a review of fil-
ings by 218 companies. The Commission reported the results of
the project thus:
Of the 218 registrants reviewed, 206 received letters of comment,
many of which related to more than one report. Three different
categories of comments were issued: (a) requests for amendment; (b)
requests for supplemental information; and (c) requests for compli-
ance in future filings ('futures' comments). Amendments were filed
by 72 registrants in response to staff comments.l"
Ernst & Whinney; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; and Touche Ross & Co. Release
6835, supra note 116, at 2.
U8 Release 6835, supra note 116.
. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Con-
dition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33-6711, 1987 WL 112322
(S.E.C.) (April 17, 1987), at 3 [hereinafter "Release 6711].
no Release 6711, supra note 119, at 3.
1 Release 6835, supra note 116, at 2.
" Release 6835, supra note 116, at 3.
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The Commission also reported that:
Work on a second phase of the MD&A Project commenced in October
1988. A total of 141 companies in a second set of 12 industries were
selected for review, resulting in 139 comment letters being issued in
December 1988. To date, amendments by 53 registrants have been
filed in response to staff comments.'
The Commission treated this high level of deficiency as a
problem of lack of understanding by registrants, and proceeded
to discuss what disclosure was required and to give examples
of adequate disclosure. The Commission concluded that the
distinction between forward-looking or prospective information
that was required to be disclosed under Item 303 and such
information that can (but does not have to) be disclosed was
one area of confusion. Speaking as if it were making the point
clear, it said:
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of pres.ently
known trends, events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking
information may involve some prediction or projection. The distinc-
tion between the two rests with the nature of the prediction re-
quired. Required disclosure is based on currently known trends,
events, and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have ma-
terial effects, such as: A reduction in the registrant's product prices;
erosion in the registrants market share; changes in insurance cover-
age; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract. In contrast,
optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known
event, trend or uncertainty ... A disclosure duty exists where a
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently
known to management and reasonably likely to have material effects
on the registrant's financial condition or results of operation. Reg-
istrants preparing their MD&A disclosure should determine and
carefully review what trends, demands, commitments, events or
uncertainties are known to management."
As it turned out the Commission had had enough of
preaching. It was time for a test case, and the object of the test
case turned out to be the Caterpillar Corporation. As its in-
strument the Commission chose to use new powers conferred
by the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990.' The case became In re Caterpillar
Release 6835, supra note 116, at 3.
"' Release 6835, supra note 116, at 5.
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
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Inc.26 The decision reports a negotiated settlement in which
Caterpillar agreed to cease and desist from violating the Ex-
change Act and to "implement and maintain procedures de-
signed to ensure compliance with Item 303 of Regulation S-K.-"M
In the spring of 1990, the Caterpillar Corporation was
involved in developing forecasts for Caterpillar's 1990 earn-
ings.' The Commission opinion does not explain the purpose
for which these forecasts were being developed, but it does
imply that the forecasts were made available to stock ana-
lysts.'s The forecasts were also discussed with Caterpillar's
Pub. Law 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990), which greatly increased the power to the
Commission to proceed directly against alleged violators of the securities laws
rather than having to proceed in court or by requesting the Department of Justice
to bring a criminal charge. Prior to the statute, outside the area of insider trad-
ing, the Commission's direct enforcement authority was limited to persons subject
to the licensing powers of the Commission. The Commission used new Securities
and Exchange Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994), which conferred power on the
Commission to bring a cease and desist proceeding against "any person who is
violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this title." The Com-
mission, no doubt, had in mind the following language from the Report of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce: "[Clease-and-desist authority would
also provide the Commission with an alternative remedy against persons who
commit isolated infractions and present a lesser threat to investors." H.R. REP.
No. 101-616, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1990). The Commission's law-building
strategy in Caterpillar is reminiscent of its strategy in relation to insider trading,
where its first enforcement action was also a direct administrative proceeding. In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Later the Commission brought
civil proceedings in the courts, which were in turn followed by criminal proceed.
ings.
" Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 1992 SEC LEXIS 786
(March 31, 1992) [hereinafter. "Release 305321.
'r The following account is based on the Commission opinion only. Since the
principal purpose of the opinion in Caterpillar is to instruct registrants on their
Item 303 disclosure duties, the facts as recounted in the opinion are the relevant
ones for the analysis here. Readers familiar with the Caterpillar Corporation no
doubt consider the Commission's account incomplete.
128 The opinion never discloses who was preparing the forecasts, why they were
being prepared, or whether there were one or more forecasts in existence. Fore-
casts can, of course, serve many different purposes. They can be an analytic tool
designed to identify changes that need to be made in the conduct of the business.
They can be a device to test managements understanding of the business. They
can be tools to identify potential future threats to the business. They can be a
way of convincing stock analysts that the management understands the business.
The opinion does at one point refer to "its 1990 forecast," referring to the ac-
counting department. Release 30532, supra note 126, at 2. The reason for prepar-
ing a forecast affects the methodology, reliability, and relevance of the resulting
forecast.
"' This can be inferred from Caterpillar's press release on June 25, 1990, which
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board of directors. 1'o
The forecasters had a problem: Caterpillar's operations in
Brazil. During 1989 Brazil had experienced hyperinflation, and
Caterpillar's operations there had benefitted. Brazilian con-
tractors, eager to convert their rapidly depreciating cruzados
into hard goods, had bought a large number of the big yellow
machines for which Caterpillar is renowned. Additionally,
Caterpillar was benefitted by a favorable exchange rateY As
a result, the earnings of Caterpillar's Brazilian subsidiary,
Caterpillar Brazil SA ["CBSA'], amounted to twenty-three
percent of Caterpillar's worldwide 1989 profits of $497 million,
although only five percent of Caterpillar's worldwide reve-
nues.
132
The forecasters were apparently quite aware that periods
of hyperinflation never last very long, and are always followed
by a crash. Along with the deflationary crash would come the
probability that CBSA's stellar profit performance would come
to an end. The chances that things would change in Brazil had
been increased by the fact that a new President, Fernando
Collar de Mello, had been elected and a new administration
stated that "anticipated results for 1990 would be substantially lower than previ-
ously projected." Release 30532, supra note 126, at 4. That statement implies that
previous projections were known to persons outside the company.
" Again, the opinion does not explain why. It is possible that the Board of
Directors required management to prepare forecasts to help it evaluate
management's performance by comparing actual results against forecasted results.
'" The Commission's opinion says that "the dollar-cruzado exchange rate lagged
behind inflation." Release 30532, supra note 126, at 2. Mly interpretation of this
statement is that Caterpillar's Brazilian subsidiary was able to purchase
equipment from the parent company at dollar prices and resell the equipment at
favorable prices as stated in cruzados. It may also have been the case that Cat-
erpillar was subject to exchange controls which made it unable to uce the profits
outside Brazil.
- The Commission says that this was "without accounting for the effict of
integration." Release 30532, supra note 126, at 3. It does not say what the effects
of integration would have been, although the opinion is written on the assumption
that CBSA made an equivalent contribution to Caterpillar's consolidated worldwide
earnings. It is possible, of course, that the earnings at CBSA were ofiet by loss
in other parts of Caterpillar's operations. This could happen, for instance, if the
rest of the Caterpillar organization shipped components (or even machines) to
Brazil at money-losing prices in order to enable CBSA to meet the surge in de-
mand it was experiencing. Following the Commission, the discussion in the text
assumes that analysis of the accounting data would ishow that the CBSA was the
origin of more than 20 percent of Caterpillar's consolidated worldwide net income
reported for 1989.
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would take office in March 1990. Caterpillar's board of direc-
tors "was told in February 1990 that Brazil was 'volatile' and
that 'the impact of Brazil is so significant to reduced 1990
projected results, [management] felt it was necessary to ex-
plain it [to the directors] in some detail."'
Collar took office in March and immediately took drastic
action to deal with Brazil's economic problems. Brazil and
CBSA tanked. At the April 11 board meeting, management
discussed the effects on Caterpillar.
At our last meeting, we reviewed the impact that [CBSA] is expected
to have on our 1990 results.... Brazil is volatile and difficult to
predict. Their recently announced economic reforms have made the
situation even more uncertain. The impact of these reforms is not at
all clear, so we have made no attempt to change the forecast. How-
ever, it's difficult to see any short-term positives, so there is consid-
erable risk that Brazil's new economic plan could bring additional
pressure on our 1990 profit. [Management]... also noted.., that
the profit in Brazil will be substantially lower than in 1989.'
Meanwhile, Caterpillar was in the process of preparing its
form 10-K for 1989 and its form 10-Q for the first quarter of
1990." The 10-K was filed on February 28 and the 10-Q was
filed some time after March 31. Under neither the applicable
SEC segmentation requirements nor FASB 14 was Caterpillar
required to report earnings attributable to Brazil separate-
ly."'36 Both the 10-K and the 10-Q mentioned the situation in
Brazil, but only in a context that positioned Brazil as one of
the many countries in which Caterpillar does business."
I Release 30532, supra note 126, at 2. The opinion does not explain why the
subject of developments in Brazil were reported to the Board of Directors. The
Board of Caterpillar was unlikely to have much ability to influence events in Bra-
zil. Perhaps management was laying the foundation for a possible future explana-
tion if earnings for the year turned out to be disappointing.
"' Release 30532, supra note 126, at 3.
'" Caterpillar's timetable for reporting was typical of companies using a calen-
dar fiscal year. Because the financial statements in the 10-K must be audited and
the audit can only begin after the close of the year, 10-Ks take several months to
complete. The 10-K is required to be filed, however, within 90 days of the end of
the fiscal year, Form 10-K, General Instruction A, and must be completed before
the solicitation of proxies for the annual meeting. Meanwhile, with the close of the
first fiscal quarter on March 31, companies must also prepare and file the 10-Q,
which is unaudited.
3' As the Commission explains, because CBSA constituted less than 10 percent
of either the total revenues or assets of Caterpillar. Release 30532, supra note
126, at 7, n.9.
' The Commission quoted the following statements about Brazil:
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On June 25, 1990, before the beginning of trading, Cater-
pillar issued a press release explaining that the results for
1990 would be substantially lower than previously projected.
The press release noted that "more than half of the decrease in
forecasted 1990 profit is due to a dramatic decline in results
for [CBSA]. "ls The stock opened twenty minutes late at 61
3/8, down 2 1/8. That afternoon, management held a telephone
conference with stock analysts beginning at 1:00 pan. During
the telephone conference, with the stock trading at 59 1/4,
"Caterpillar revealed CBSA's importance to the company's
1989 earnings."' 9 The next day, the stock opened at 51
3/4.140
There are many different interpretations that can be of-
fered for these skeletal facts. The facts can be interpreted, for
instance, as a case of a failure to correct a previous statement
that had become false when the speaker knew that the ad-
Sales Outside the United States.... Dealer machine sales rose in most
selling areas, with demand especially strong in Europe, Brazil, Australia,
and the Far East .... Latin America Sales rose 14% in 1989, the sixth
consecutive year of improvement. The biggest gain was in Brazil, where
very high inflation rates increased demand for hard goods, including
earth moving equipment. (Given the extraordinarily high rate of inflation
in Brazil, many contractors preferred to own hard assets, such as equip-
ment, rather than depreciating cruzados.) Toward year-end, however,
sales growth in Brazil moderated as interest rates ror.... OUT-
LOOL ... Latin American countries continue to be plagued with debt
problems. However, debt rescheduling; stable profitable commodity prices;
and increased privatization should help business in some countries. Sales
in Brazil, however, could be hurt by post-election policies which Will
likely aim at curbing inflation. (10-K). Demand also rose in a number of
Latin American countries. In Brazil, demand increased over one year ago
despite the uncertainty of the Brazilian economy... The Company
hasn't changed its outlook from what was stated in its 1989 annual re-
port. Caterpillar Chairman George Schaefer said: irst-quarter sales were
somewhat stronger than anticipated. Nevertheless, the company continues
to be concerned about tight monetary policies in major industrial coun-
tries; the recent weakening of the Japanese yen; and the uncertainty of
the economic situation in Brazil. (10-Q).
Release 30532, supra note 126, at 9, n. 4.
"'Release 30532, supra note 128, at 4.
Release 30532, supra note 126, at 4.
'"Release 30532, supra note 126, at 4. The Commission did not criticize Cater-
pillar for providing stock analysts preferred access to this information, disfavoring
the public, nor did it bring proceedings on an insider-trading theory against any-
one who sold as a result of the information revealed in the telephone conference.
See Paul B. Bountas Jr., Note, Rule lOb-5 and Voluntary Corporate Dicclooures to
Securities Anmlysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517 (1992), for an analysis of those issues.
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dressees of the statement were relying on it as still true. Cat-
erpillar had made its forecasts available to stock analysts.
Those forecasts were that the 1990 earnings would be at least
as high as the 1989 earnings. The analysts believed the projec-
tions and their belief accounted for the stock price. Caterpillar
knew that the projections would not be met, possibly as early
as March, certainly by April, and it did nothing to correct the
beliefs of the analysts based on the forecasts it had provided.
The June press release and the conference call surprised the
analysts, and caused many of them to recommend selling. That
recommendation, in turn, caused the sharp drop in price. Some
analysts, no doubt embarrassed by their earlier recommenda-
tions based upon the projections, complained to the SEC. The
"failure to correct" interpretation, however, was not the theory
of the proceeding which the Commission brought against Cat-
erpillar.
141
Rather, the theory of the proceeding was that Item 303 of
S-K, the MD&A section, required Caterpillar to disclose in its
10-K and 10-Q that the past trend of higher earnings in Brazil
might not continue, that Caterpillar knew this to be the case,
as evidenced by management's communications to the board,
and that management knew that a fall in the Brazilian earn-
ings would be material to its overall results.4 '
" There would be good reasons not to. The stock analysts regularly obtain
knowledge of management's internal earnings projections through contacts with
management, and through the analysts the information is impounded in the mar-
ket price. Earnings projections, however, are not provided in Commission filings
and written documents, no doubt because of lawyers' fears of lOb-5 liability and
managements' fears of leaving a public record of their mistakes. If the Commission
took the position that an issuer acquired an obligation, whenever it supplied earn-
ings projection information to persons outside the company, to update those projec-
tions continually, that would probably dry up the flow of information about projec-
tions altogether. See Bountas, supra note 140, for a discussion of these problems.
A similar concern about suppressing the flow of information arose in connection
with the SEC's 1975 proposal on projections, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 48-67. The simple defense to the "failure to correct" interpretation would be
that Caterpillar simply provided the correct forecasts as of the date they were
provided and never suggested that they would remain correct as the year proceed-
ed or undertook to update them when they became obsolete.
1 Release 30532, supra note 126, at 6-9. The opinion points to numerous parts
of Item 303 in support of its position, without analyzing or explaining any of
them. Three passages in Item 303 and the instructions are most clearly relevant.
Item 303(3)(ii): 'Describe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that
the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable
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The facts, as recited in the Commission opinion, support
an interpretation consistent with the Commission's theory. In-
deed, the case seems easy. Quoting the metaphor from Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6771 that "ID&A is intended to give the
investor an opportunity to look at the company through the
eyes of management,"' the Commission concluded that
Caterpillar's board minutes showed that its disclosures had
failed to give investors the required "look." But other inter-
pretations are also possible. Earnings of an enterprise are only
an artifact of two other figures: revenues and expenditures.
Consolidated earnings reflect the difference between these two
figures, and it is artificial to say that the difference came from
any one place. In 1989, Caterpillar had earnings not only be-
cause of the difference between revenues and expenditures in
Brazil, but because of the differences elsewhere. To put it an-
other way, the profits in Brazil became earnings for the enter-
prise only because the other parts of Caterpillar did as well as
they did. Further complicating the analysis is that the profits
in Brazil may have been an artifact of accounting conven-
tions.' A sophisticated analysis would have suggested that
impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations." 17 C.F..
§ 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (1995). Caterpillar knew, as evidenced by the Board Minutes,
that the situation in Brazil was uncertain, and that a shift in the results in Bra-
zil was likely to have an unfavorable impact on income from continuing opera-
tions. The discussion in the text following this note addresses why this might not
have been the case.
Item 303(a): "Where in the registrant's judgment a discussion of segment
information or other subdivisions of the registranfs business would be appropriate
to an understanding of such business, the discussion shall focus on each relevant,
reportable segment or other subdivision of the business and on the registrant as a
whole." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1995). Caterpillar presumably had made a judg-
ment that such a discussion would not be appropriate.
Item 303 Instruction 3: 'The discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on
material events and uncertainties known to management that would cause report-
ed financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating re-
sults... ." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303, Instruction 3 (1995). Caterpillar could argue that
this instruction cannot mean what it says, since reported financial information is
never "necessarily indicative of future operating results," and that the contingen-
des and uncertainties in Brazil were no different in quality than the thousands of
other contingencies and uncertainties facing a complex, world-wide business.
I, Release 6711, supra note 119, at 3.
1,, It is impossible to analyze the role that accounting conventions may have
played in the results which Caterpillar had for Brazil under U.S. GAAP without
more complete information about the nature of the operations, how Caterpillar
conducted them, and any hedging strategies it might have employed. Foreign cur-
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the 1989 Brazilian results were being achieved at the expense
of future profits-that the company would inevitably suffer a
post-inflationary hangover. While it would have been economi-
cally reasonable to set up a reserve and charge the current
earnings against the perfectly predictable after effects, such
adjustments are not permitted by the accounting rules.
The real question for Caterpillar in the spring of 1990 was
not what would happen in Brazil in 1990. As to Brazil, events
would take a course that Caterpillar could neither predict nor
control. The question Caterpillar was asking itself in the
spring of 1990 was: "What will our reported earnings be in
1990?"
A forecaster attempting to address that question should
immediately notice that small changes in the relationship
between revenues and costs elsewhere in Caterpillar's business
would be far more important than any change that might take
place in Brazil. As an example of how the numbers work, con-
sider an enterprise that consists of two components: Compo-
nent A, accounting for ninety-five percent of the revenues, and
Component B, accounting for five percent of revenues. In year
rency translation is governed by FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATE-
MENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 52: FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSLA-
TION (1981) [hereinafter "FASB 52"]. Under that standard, operations in an infla-
tionary economy (defined as an economy with inflation over three years in excess
of 100 percent, FASB 52, supra, at 5, 11) such as Brazil's was in the relevant
time period, are to be reported by using the dollar (the currency of the reporting
entity) as the functional currency. FASB 52 supra, at 5, 11. This is essentially
the same approach as was previously taken under FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 8: ACCOUNT-
ING FOR THE TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS AND FOREIGN
CURRENCY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1975) [hereinafter "FASB 8"]. "Lmplicitly, [in
FASB 8] the dollar was designated the functional currency for all foreign opera-
tions." FASB 52, supra, at 47, App. C 9 83. FASB 8 provided generally for the
conversion of income and balance sheet figures at the exchange rate of the date of
the transaction. It was revised in part because of
the perception that the results of translation under the Statement fre-
quently do not reflect the underlying economic reality of foreign opera-
tions. The perceived failure of accounting results to portray the underly-
ing economic circumstances is underscored heavily in two respects: (a) the
volatility of reported earnings and (b) the abnormality of financial results
and relationship. The sources of both problems are attributed to the
requirements for (a) current recognition of unrealized exchange adjust-
ments and (b) that inventories and fixed assets are translated at histori-
cal rates under Statement 8, whereas debt is translated at current rates.
FASB 52, supra App. D at 71-72, 53.
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one, component B experiences unusually positive results:
Year One
Component A Component B Enterprise
Revenues $10,000 $500 $10,500
Expenses $9,600 $400 $10,000
Earnings $400 $100 $500
In year two, Component B suffers a large drop in sales due
to external factors, but Component A does slightly better
Year Two
Component A Component B Enterprise
Revenues $10,200 (2%) $300 (-40%) $10,500
Expenses $9,600 $400 $10,000
Earnings $600 -$100 $500
These illustrative numbers have the same characteristics
as the Caterpillar numbers. In year one, component B (Brazil)
accounts for about five percent of the gross revenue of the
enterprise, but produces twenty percent of the profit. In year 2,
component B experiences a severe loss in revenue and a signif-
icant loss as a percentage of its revenue. Yet it takes only a
two percent increase in the revenues of the rest of the company
for the earnings of the entire enterprise to remain the same.
Small changes in the rest of the enterprise can make severe
disturbances in one component unimportant for the earnings of
the enterprise as a whole.
The second thing a forecaster should realize is that the
variability of results for components of Caterpillar is greater
than the variability of results for Caterpillar as a whole."'
1, One way to illustrate this point is to view Caterpillar at the beginning of
1990 as a portfolio of different securities whose composition will not be changed
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The fact that Brazil had unusually positive results in one year
is likely to be offset the next year by unusually positive results
somewhere else.
For these reasons, it was reasonable for Caterpillar to
make the forecast it did at the beginning of 1990, even given
the early signs that the business in Brazil would deteriorate.
However, it appears to have become clear a few months into
the year that there was no identifiable operation that could be
counted on to produce a positive surprise in 1990 to offset the
negative developments in Brazil. Of course, that surprise
might have appeared later. Should Caterpillar have altered its
forecasts at that point? That question brings up a great un-
mentionable: the ability of registrants to manage reported
earnings." It is likely that there were a number of possible
discretionary decisions that could have been made by Caterpil-
lar during the course of 1990 that would have had the effect of
offsetting the negative events in Brazil. Thus, before revising
its forecast, Caterpillar had to decide not to meet it.'47 If Cat-
erpillar did not decide until June 25 that it would not, or
would be unable to, take steps sufficient to meet its forecast,
then it was not timely to make a public statement about a
revised earnings forecast before that date.
The most troubling aspect of Caterpillar is the use of the
management's communications with the board of directors as a
measure of what is known by management, and what is mate-
rial.'48 After Caterpillar, registrants are wise to review
during the year. An observer of such a portfolio would predict that the variation
in the value of the individual securities in the portfolio will be greater than the
variation in the value of the portfolio as a whole, because to some unknown ex-
tent the securities will offset each other.
"" Of course the social convention is that managements do not admit managing
earnings, they only make discretionary decisions in light of business considerations.
A defense along the lines suggested in the remainder of this paragraph would
have been embarrassing both to Caterpillar and the Commission, to the probable
detriment of Caterpillar.
I' One possibility is that is exactly what Caterpillar was planning to do, but
deteriorating performance elsewhere in the business meant that the available dis-
cretionary decisions would no longer have a large enough effect to meet the fore-
cast.
1s The Commission's approach here parallels that of the Supreme Court in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988), where the Court said:
Whether merger discussions in any particular case are material therefore
depends on the facts. Generally in order to assess the probability that
the event will occur, a fact finder will need to look to indicia of interest
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managements communications with the board of directors to
insure that they correspond to the company's SEC filings. If
the information fits within Item 303, it will also have to be
disclosed to shareholders. One way to prevent communications
with the board from flowing immediately to the public-disclo-
sure documents would be for management to adopt a guarded
and obscure style with the board: "Management thought the
Board might be interested to learn about the unusual develop-
ments in Brazil, which have been hard on the Brazilian econo-
my. Caterpillar, of course, has an operation in Brazil, and
these developments are hard on the members of the Caterpil-
lar family in Brazil. Management is sure that the Board joins
us in extending expressions of sympathy and concern to all
Brazilians. Just in passing, you might also be interested to
learn that some of the many analyses of our operating results
show Brazil as having made an important contribution to our
profits last year, so you know that Caterpillareans in Brazil
are important members of our family. It looks like they wont
be able to help us as much this year, but of course we know
that the other worldwide members of the Caterpillar family
will be striving to make up the difference. By the way, did you
guys see that show on television last night with the talking
parrot?" Such a style of communication would address the con-
cern that direct and forceful communication would require
disclosure of the information so communicated, but it would
not serve the needs of effective board governance. Even more
troubling, some managements may be tempted not to commu-
nicate with the board at all in order to avoid the public disclo-
sure requirement of Item 303.
Caterpillar made two mistakes. First of all, its communica-
tions to the market resulted in a sharp drop in the stock price,
an event likely to bring trouble from either the Commission or
private litigants.' Second, in its conference call to analysts
in the transaction at the highest corporate levels. Without attempting to
catalog all such possible factors, we note by way of example that board
resolutions . .. may serve as indicia of interest.
" David S. Ruder, a former Chairman of the Commission, has made it clear
that an issuer should have a securities disclosure oompliance program designcd to
prevent unusual trading activity in its stock.
What are the potential negative consequences of poor disclosure policies.
Consider only a few... Unusual trading activity in a corporation's
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after the press release, Caterpillar mentioned the importance
of Brazil to the company's 1989 earnings. No doubt the thought
was to downplay the significance of the earnings decline,
10
but when it had reported the 1989 earnings, it had not
downplayed their significance by noting that the earnings had
been significantly boosted by odd developments in Brazil that
were unlikely to continue. In other words, Caterpillar was
happy to take advantage of the Brazilian explanation when it
suited its purpose, but had ignored it when it did not. If
Caterpillar's legal position was to be that the Brazilian factor
was unimportant, then it needed to adhere to that position for
better and for worse.
Caterpillar agreed as part of its settlement to "implement
and maintain procedures designed to ensure compliance with
Item 303 of Regulation S-K.""'5 What these procedures might
be the opinion does not say. The opinion does say, however,
that the procedures which Caterpillar had been following were
insufficient. 52 The Commission described them as follows:
The MD&A sections of the 1989 10-K and 10-Q for the first quarter
of 1990 were drafted by employees in Caterpillar's accounting de-
partment. Prior to the issuance of those reports, the language of the
MD&A was reviewed by the Controller, Financial Vice President,
Treasurer, and the company's legal, economic, and public affairs
departments. After that, the language of the MD&A was reviewed
by the top officers of the Company.
The board of directors reviewed the final draft of the 1989
shares may occur, with resulting inquiry by the SEC of whether company
insiders were engaged in trading securities in violation of insider trading
restrictions. Even if the corporation itself is not the target of the investi-
gation, the time and emotional involvement of corporate executives can
be enormous.
David S. Ruder, Securities Disclosure, 6 INSIGHTS 3, (June 1992). The suggestion
that intelligent compliance with the securities laws requires that the issuer manip-
ulate the price of its shares so that market action is "normal" is as true as it is
ironic.
" To judge by the eight-point drop the following morning, this backfired. Per-
haps the analysts went home, put on their thinking caps, and said "if this much
of Caterpillar's earnings in 1989 were just because of hyperinflation in Brazil, then
their real 'core' earnings were more than twenty percent less than they reported,
in which case Caterpillar is really worth twenty percent less than it appeared,
since the Brazilian earnings were a fluke. Let's see, twenty percent off of 60
is .... 48. Sell!"
Release 30532, supra note 128, at 9.
,' Release 30532, supra note 128, at 9, n.8.
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Form 10-K, including the MD&A, at the February 1990 board
meeting. At that time, the board, including top management
who were members of the board, received a written opinion of
the company's independent auditor indicating that the finan-
cial statements complied with the rules and regulations of the
Commission, and also an opinion of the company's general
counsel to the effect that the Form 10-K complied with all the
rules and regulations of the Commission.
The Commission did not say what more Caterpillar was to
do. Perhaps it is to form an interdepartmental oversight com-
mittee for Item 303, or hire another lawyer specifically to ad-
vise on Item 303 compliance.' Caterpillar received a slap on
the wrist;1 still, serious questions were raised: Will the SEC
I In remarks at the 13th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities
Law Institute, Caterpillar General Counsel Rennie Atterbury recommended "the
formation of a disclosure compliance committee to which potentially material infor-
mation would be reported as received." L.wyer Advises Teling Firm to Prest
Balanced Financi Picture, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 662, 662 COty 7,
1993).
3" Caterpillar and certain of its officers and directors were sued in July 1990
in two class actions filed in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of Illinois "on behalf of all persons (other than the defendants) who pur-
chased or otherwise acquired common stock of Caterpillar and certain options
relating to common stock of Caterpillar, between Jan. 19, 1990 and June 26,
1990.... The complaints allege that the defendants fraudulently ismed public
statements and reports during the class period which were misleading in that they
failed to disclose material adverse information relating to Caterpillar's Brailion
operations, its factory modernization program and its reorganization plan." Form
10-K for the Caterpillar Corporation for the Year Ending Dec. 31, 1992, at 7, Item
3, filed March 3, 1993. The class actions are pending. See Kas v. Caterpillar, Inuc,
815 F. Supp. 1158 (CM. Ml. 1992); Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150
(CD. I11. 1991).
The impact of the SEC action on the class action (which may result in the
payment of substantial sums by or on behalf of Caterpillar) is unclear. The class
action was filed within weeks of the June 25 announcement. At that point the
SEC proceeding could only have been at a preliminary stage. It is not uncommon
for a securities fraud action to follow any rapid change in the price of an issuer's
stock, particularly a decline. The SEC settlement order is based only on a viola-
tion of the reporting requirements contained in Securities and Exchange Act §
13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1995). The class plaintiffs, on the other hand, will have
to show a violation of Securities and Exchange Act § 1O(b), 16 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1995), and a resulting loss from the violation. At the very least, the fact that
Caterpillar has agreed that its disclosures were in violation of the Act will assid
the "atmosphere" of the lawsuit in a manner favorable to plaitiffs. More likely,
the plaintiffs might allege a theory of a continuing but misleading representation
that Caterpillar's disclosures were in compliance with the requirements of the
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continue to engage in a low-level wrestling match with issuers,
or will it escalate its campaign to ensure that security holders
are able to "look at the company through the eyes of manage-
ment?"'55 What further consequences might be in store for an
issuer that fails to identify the known trends required by Item
303? The SEC could proceed directly against the issuer and the
responsible officers and directors, 15 6 or recommend the matter
for criminal prosecution. 57
D. Materiality and the Basic Case
Basic Inc. v. Levinson" was a class action under Rule
10b-5 by sellers complaining that they had sold for too little.
They had sold just before the issuer agreed to a merger that
gave shareholders a premium over the market price. They sued
on the theory that they had lost the premium because the
Exchange Act, and that their failure to comply caused the plaintiff harm. See In
re Compaq Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. Tex. 1993). For purposes of per-
spective, members of the plaintiff class who purchased Caterpillar stock in the 60's
during the spring of 1990 (the high in 1990 was 68 V2 in June, in 1989 it was 69
in January) and who have since held the stock now own stock trading (as of Sep-
tember 22, 1994) at a price equivalent to 108. The stock split 2-1 on September 6,
1994. Any recovery in the class action will be in addition to this gain. The low in
1990 was 38 118 in October, and any member of the plaintiff class who was swift
enough to sell when trading opened on June 26 (at 51 3/4) and repurchase in
October will have an even larger gain. All price data are from the historical
quotes (//HQE) file of Dow Jones News Retrieval.
"' Release 6711, supra note 119, at 3. Other SEC enforcement actions involving
failure to comply with the MD&A requirement are discussed in Bruce A. Hiler &
Roger M. Freeman, Management's Discussion and Analysis: Known Trends in SEC
Enforcement, 8 INSIGHTS, December 1994, at 11.
"s Under Securities Exchange Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1995), or Securi.
ties Exchange Act § 15(c)(4) (1995), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1995). The SEC made
an officer a party in In re Salant Corp. & Martin F. Tynan, Exchange Act Re-
lease, 1994 WL 183411 (S.E.C.) (May 12, 1994).
" Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78fl(a) (1995). The penalty for a
violation is a fine of not more than $1,000,000 and imprisonment of not more than
10 years for natural persons, and a fine of not more than $2,500,000 for other
than natural persons. Id. A private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 for a failure
to comply with Item 303 (and any other SEC disclosure requirement) could be
advanced on the theory that a company registered under the Exchange Act makes
a continuing representation that it will comply with the SEC disclosure require-
ments, and that a failure to comply with any of those requirements makes that
continuing representation a misrepresentation in violation of Rule 10b-5. See also
supra note 154.
8" 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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issuer misled them.
During the period that the class was selling, the merger
was the subject of on-again and off-again negotiations. The
company's stock (listed on the New York Stock Exchange)
experienced unusual trading activity. Traders had either
guessed or learned of the possibility of a merger at a premium,
and were taking positions in the stock. Partly in response to
inquiries from the Exchange, 9 the company stated that it
knew of no reason for the activity in its stock. The statements
were true in a literal sense because the company did not know
who was buying its stock, or why, and no negotiations were
taking place or were scheduled at the time the statements
were made. On the other hand, the company did know that
merger discussions had taken place, that merger remained a
real possibility, and that it was likely one or more traders had
figured that out.16
0
One of the many defenses in the case was that the state-
ments of the defendant were not material, as required for an
action under 10b-5. 61 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendant on this issue, relying on circuit authori-
ty that the fact of merger negotiations prior to an agreement in
principle is not material. 62 The Sixth Circuit reversed. The
Court reasoned that once the issuer made the statement that it
knew of no reason for the activity in its stock, information that
negotiations in fact had taken place became material and,
I' Id. at 227, n.4. Statements were also made in filings required by the Ex-
change Act.
11 The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the
ground that the statements were not misleading. See Brief for Petitioners at 11-12,
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (No. 86-279). This was reversed by the
Sixth Circuit without analysis of the record. Basic v. Levinzon, 786 F.2d 741, 747
(6th Cir. 1986). The reversal by the Supreme Court of the decision of the Sixth
Circuit can be interpreted as a reversal of the grant of summary judgment on the
ground that the issue of the misleading nature of the statements could not proper-
ly be resolved by summary judgment That was the position argued in the amicus
brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Brief of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as Amicus Curiae at 19, No. 86-279. Basic v. Lovinzon, 485
U.S. 224 (1988) [hereinafter "SEC Amicus Brief'].
11 Rule 10b-5(2) requires either (1) the malking of any untrue statement of a
material fact or (2) the omission of a material fact that would render statements
made not misleading.
12 E.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2a 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985). See also Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)decidea after the district court decision in Basic).
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thus, had to be disclosed. According to the Sixth Circuit:
When a company whose stock is publicly traded makes a statement,
as Basic did, that "no negotiations" are underway, and that the cor-
poration knows of "no reason for the stock's activity," and that "man-
agement is unaware of any present or pending corporate develop-
ment that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity,"
information concerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes
material by virtue of the statement denying their existence. The
"reasonable investor," having been informed that Basic knew of no
corporate development that would result in the high trading activity,
would, without doubt, have thought that disclosure of the fact that
acquisition was being discussed "significantly altered the 'total mix
of information made available."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
with the Third Circuit." Once the case was in the Supreme
Court, the Court's instinct to make law,'" rather than to de-
1' Basic, 786 F.2d at 748.
" Greenfield, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984). The conflict with the Third Circuit
had to do, however, with whether the statement that "management knows no
reason" was false or misleading. See Basic, 786 F.2d at 748. This issue was ad-
dressed only briefly in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Court stated, "We
accept the Court of Appeals' reading of the statement [rather than that of Basic
Inc.] as the more natural one, emphasizing managements knowledge of develop-
ments (as opposed to leaks) that would explain unusual trading activity." Basic,
485 U.S. at 240 n.20. Although the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the
statement was misleading, it nevertheless vacated the circuit court judgment and
remanded for reconsideration "because the standard of materiality we have adopted
differs from that used by both courts below." Id. at 240-41. Since the district court
had applied a different standard a remand was appropriate. I cannot detect any
difference between the standard used by the Sixth Circuit and that announced by
the Supreme Court. On remand, the Sixth Circuit observed, "Based upon the facts
of this case, it is difficult for us to see how Basic's multiple public statements
denying merger talks which substantially affected the activity of the stock were
not material." Levinson v. Basic, 871 F.2d 562, 564 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989).
11 In Basic this effort resulted in a shambles, as Victor Brudney patiently and
politely explains. According to Brudney: "In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme
Court entered the thicket of doctrine that governs disclosure of soft, or future-
oriented, information to investors under the federal securities laws, but regrettably
did not take advantage of the opportunity to remove any of the brambles or to
make the thicket more penetrable." Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and
Soft Information under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 723-24
(1989). A less tactful statement would be: "failed to remove any of the brambles or
to make the thicket more penetrable in spite of writing an opinion that sounded
as if it were." It should be added that the opinions of the lower courts, which
might have provided some assistance to the Court, also tended to be quite con-
fused. The opinion correctly observed that "In some of these [lower court] cases it
is unclear whether the court based its decision on a finding that no duty arose to
reveal the existence of negotiations, or whether it concluded that the negotiations
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cide cases, took over. An opinion that simply relied on the
Sixth Circuit's rationale would have said little more than: "lies
about significant matters violate the securities laws." The
opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice Blackmun, howev-
er, addressed the general question of when information about
merger negotiations becomes material, regardless of whether
the issuer makes any statement at all. The Court noted that
the approach of the Sixth Circuit "fails to recognize that, in
order to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show
that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is
not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the mis-
represented fact is otherwise insignificant."1"
The opinion in Basic is best understood by describing four
different contexts in which the issue of materiality is relevant
to the issues discussed in the opinion. The four contexts are:
(1) disclosure defining;, (2) insider-trading defining;, (3) implied-
cause-of-action defining; and (4) free-standing.
1. Materiality Defines The Scope of Required Disclosures:
Rule 408
This definitional function of materiality is described in
Rule 408. Rule 408 provides that:
In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a
registration statement [under the applicable regulations], there shall
be added such further material information, if any, as may be neces-
sary to make the required statements, in the light of the circum-
were immaterial. Basic, 485 U.S. at 233 n.10. Bnrdney, whose conclusions are (I
think) congruent with those offered here, undertakes to explain the difficulties
with the opinion in a quite different way. The way he makes the point is to argue
that there are normative considerations buried in the application of the materiality
doctrine that the Court ignores. Brudney, supra.
" Basic, 485 U.S. at 238. This view of the issue in the case was argued in the
amicus curiae brief filed by the SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 160 at 18-19. The
Court did not explain why any reasonable investor would not consider it important
to learn that the issuer lies when making public statements, aince the credibility
of the issuer's communications is of central importance to any inveator. It is pos-
sible to read Rule 10b-5 as not requiring that a misleading statement be material.
It provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person... (2) to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necesary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading." 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5(b)(1995) The issue is whether
'the statements made" refers only to material statements, or to any statement.
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stances under which they are made, not misleading."
The point here is that the responses provided in disclosure
forms should disclose the full truth. The telling of half-truths
by failing to mention additional information which affects the
meaning of the information that is disclosed is prohibited.
This standard can be generalized to apply to any state-
ment. In fact, that was what the Sixth Circuit was doing in
Basic. Basic had made a disclosure, and the question was
whether that disclosure was misleading because of the failure
to disclose the additional material information necessary to
make the statement, in light of the circumstances under which
it was made, not misleading.
2. Materiality Defines the Scope of the Insider Trading
Prohibition
This is the "disclose-or-abstain" insider trading rule of
Texas Gulf Sulphur: persons who possess material inside infor-
mation about the issuer cannot trade unless the material infor-
mation has been disclosed. Insiders can, however, trade while
in possession of nonmaterial inside information.
3. Materiality Defines the Scope of the Implied Right of
Action Under Rule 10b-5.
In this context, the concept of materiality as a definition of
the implied right of action under Rule 10b-5, has a function
like that of the concept of materiality in the common law ac-
tion for misrepresentation.1" This was the context actually at
1*1 17 CYF.R. § 230.408 (1995), which applies to prospectuses filed under the
Securities Act. Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1995), applies the same re-
quirement to filings under the Exchange Act. Note that this standard echoes the
second clause of Rule 10b-5(2), except that "required statements" (whether or not
material) replaces "statements."
18' The Restatement (Second) of Torts 2d § 538 (1977) provides:
(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless
the matter misrepresented is material. (2) The matter is material if (a) a
reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or (b)
the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in deter-
mining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so
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issue in Basic: can these plaintiffs bring an action for losses
caused by the failure to disclose the merger negotiations?9
It is the only context which makes sense of prior circuit court
decisions holding that the existence of merger negotiations
prior to an agreement in principle is not material. Those deci-
sions implemented the judgment that, on the whole, it would
be better to let issuers faced with a demand from the Exchange
that they make a statement about unusual activity in their
stock equivocate rather than disclose merger negotiations
when the effect of the disclosure might be to reduce the chance
that the negotiations would succeed, to the benefit of all the
shareholders. 170
This third context of materiality was argued implicitly in
the Basic case. The idea that the scope of the implied cause of
action under Rule 10b-5 can be narrower than the prohibition
of Rule 10b-5 itself is only now beginning to emerge as a pos-
sibility in the Supreme Court's Rule 10b-5 decisions. The
Court's 10b-5 cases have tended to insist that it is doing noth-
ing more than reading the text of the statute and the rule. In
the Central Bank of Denver 7' decision, the Court distin-
guished between the scope of the prohibition of 10b-5, which is
resolved by the text of the statute, and "determining the ele-
ments of the 10b-5 private liability scheme," which is resolved
by asking 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the
issue[s] had the 10b-5 act been included as an express provi-
sion of the [Exchange] Act."
regard it.
Id.
" 'In this context, the issue of materiality was fundamentally the same as the
second issue considered by the Court in Basic: whether a class could be certified
as the result of presuming reliance by all members of the class under the fraud-
on-the-market theory. The fundamental issue in both parts of the opinion is
whether it would further or hinder the purposes of the securities law to pormit
actions of the type brought in Basic to proceed to trial. For an analysis of the
class certification issue in these terms, see Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and
the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992).
'I This was the most persuasive justification. See the discussion by Judge
Frank Easterbrook in Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 US. 853 (1987). The courts also expressed concern that specula-
tors would misunderstand accurate information about merger negotiations. They
also worried about the practicalities for the issuer of attempting to comply with an
unclear legal rule as to when negotiations become material
11 Central Bank of Denver, NA v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N., 114
S. Ct. 1439, 128 LEd.2d 119 (1994).
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In both of the formulations the Court insists that it is not
itself shaping the scope of the implied right of action. Yet the
Court makes reference to policy considerations based on con-
cerns about contemporary 10b-5 litigation that have nothing to
do with the 1934 Congress. As Joel Seligman has noted, "This
is legal fiction."" The strongest argument for the defendants
in Basic was that even if their statements about merger nego-
tiations violated Rule 10b-5, it would be contrary to the pur-
poses of the Exchange Act-to shareholder welfare-to permit
an implied private right of action to proceed based on the
statements. The Court could have held that the statements
were not material solely for purposes of the implied right of
action, without addressing questions with any larger implica-
tion for the administration of the securities laws."
4. Materiality is Defined Without Regard to Any
Disclosure Obligation, the Presence of Insider Trading,
or the Scope of the Implied Cause of Action
This is the context that the Court said it was addressing
in Basic.' 4 In Basic the Court noted that it was analyzing
17 Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 BUS. LAW. 1429, 1432
(1994). The Court's insistence that it is only reading the text of the statute cre-
ates other problems. Not only is there the issue of the application of the lob-5
decisions to Commission enforcement actions, discussed by Seligman, id. at 1434-
35, but there is also its impact on the other rules, for example 10b-6, promulgated
under § 10(b). See Fred N. Gerard & Michael L. Hirshfeld, The Scienter Require-
ment Under Rule lob-6, 46 Bus. LAW. 777 (1991). Rule 10b-6 does not require sci-
enter, although the Supreme Court construed the statute as requiring scienter in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). For persuasive arguments (to
this author) that the Court's avowed literal reading of 10b-5 is simply wrong, see
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
171 Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1013 (1994),
argues that the SEC could "redefine 'materiality' to require a stronger market ef-
fect than the courts currently mandate." Surely, in the absence of SEC action the
Court, whose decisions provide the foundation for the 10b-5 implied right of action,
could also adopt a definition of materiality applicable to the implied right of ac-
tion.
17' See supra text accompanying note 166. In another passage the opinion
seemed to define the issue in the disclosure-defining context: "[Tihis case does not
concern the timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness."
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988). The way the opinion poses the issue
is shaped by the lower court decisions, which discussed the issue of whether there
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the free-standing context, ignored the implied cause-of-action
context, and asserted that the meaning of materiality in the
free-standing context was the same as the meaning of materi-
ality in the disclosure and insider-trading contexts.
In the insider-trading context, it is inconceivable that the
Court would hold that merger negotiations were not material.
The issue is whether an insider, knowing that merger negotia-
tions were underway and looking to the consummation of a
merger at a significant premium over the price of the issuer's
stock, could proceed to purchase shares of the issuer on the
market. Obviously not, because the fact of merger negotiations
is the kind of confidential material that insiders should not be
permitted to exploit for their own gain. 75
Similarly, in the disclosure context, it is inconceivable that
the Court would hold that an issuer could fail to disclose the
fact of merger negotiations when such a failure would render
the information provided misleading.
The important difference between materiality in the free-
standing context as addressed by the Court and materiality in
the disclosure and insider-trading contexts is that in the latter
contexts materiality has meaning.
In the disclosure context, the disclosure forms or the state-
ment made provide the context for application of the materiali-
ty test. Is something material in relation to the information
that the SEC requires, or the statement that is being made,
that must be included in order to keep the answer or the state-
was a duty to disclose merger negotiations without identifying the source of the
duty. Quite correctly, the Supreme Court opinion reasoned that the duty did not
arise unless it was imposed by some provision of the securitie3 lawa. I&L at 236.
The lower courts were probably thinking of a continuing representation theory
under Rule lob-5. For instance, the statement that 'we are not involved in merger
negotiations" becomes false once serious merger negotiations begin. If the obliga-
tion to file a 1O-Q or a 1O-K itself creates a duty to disclose, however, then the
timing differences between a duty to disclose based on a continuing representation
and a duty to disclose based on the Exchange Act filing requirements is not of
great significance.
"'This presented the defendants in Basic with their central strategic problem.
Since 10b-5 prohibits transactions based on material inside information, and 10b-5
clearly prohibits insiders from trading based on inside information relevant to the
ex-ante probability that a merger will take place, then surely information relevant
to the ex-ante probability that a merger will take place is material. They did not
undertake to counter this argument until their reply brief See Reply Brief for
Petitioners at 3-7, Basic v. Levinson, No. 86-279, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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ment from being misleading? In this context, materiality sim-
ply prohibits lying.
In the insider-trading context, materiality has to do with
the bar against insiders profiting from inside information. It
deals with the question: When has enough information been
disclosed so that insiders are free to trade?
In both the disclosure and the insider-trading contexts, the
test for materiality can be quite expansive without creating
obvious problems; in the disclosure context because the concept
is limited operationally by the content of the disclosure form or
statement involved; in the insider-trading context because the
problem of insider trading can be avoided altogether if the
insiders abstain from trading.
The Basic Court asserted, "We find no authority in the
statute, the legislative history, or our previous decisions for
varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings
the action or whether insiders are alleged to have profited.""'
Authority aside, there are good arguments for varying the
standard. First of all, insider trading presents a conflict-of-
interest situation. Insider trading suggests that management
has incentives to make a decision to serve its own interests by
telling too little. In that context it makes sense to require that
management's disclosure meet a more exacting standard, an
approach that would be congruent with many other doctrines
in corporate law. Second, insider trading does provide a context
in which to ask the materiality question. After all, as the court
pointed out in Texas Gulf Sulphur, if disclosure would harm
the corporation, all the insiders have to do is refrain from
trading. In the absence of insider trading there is no conflict of
interest, and there is no time-specific and'situation-specific
context in which to ask the question.'"
When the Court comes to defining materiality, it draws
276 Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n.18.
, The only reason the Court gives for its insistence that there must be "one
standard" is as follows: "Devising two different standards of materiality, one for
situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their duty to disclose or
abstain (or for that matter when any disclosure duty has been breached), and
another covering airmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose
(but under the ever-present duty not to mislead), would effectively collapse the
materiality requirement into the analysis of defendant's disclosure duties." Id. I
am unable to make sense of that sentence.
[Vol. 61: 763
19951 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECURITIES DISCLOSURE 825
upon definitions developed under the disclosure context and
the insider-trading cases. In both of these contexts, the stan-
dard of materiality can be more expansive; in the disclosure
context because it is constrained in practice by a particular
disclosure, and in the insider-trading context because its appli-
cation is limited. In Basic, the Court asserted that "materiality
depends on the significance the reasonable investor would
place on the withheld or misrepresented information."78 The
Court, however, says nothing about the characteristics of the
reasonable investor. The accuracy-enhancement concept (to
return to the main theme), however, hovers just off stage to fill
the gap: the reasonable investor is an investor who attempts to
identify undervalued securities (to buy) and overvalued securi-
ties (to sell). In short, the information a reasonable investor
would consider significant is information relating to the value
of the security. That idea is certainly present in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, on which the Basic Court heavily relies. According to
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Court, "material facts include not only
information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a com-
pany but also those facts which affect the probable future of
the company and those which may affect the desire of investors
to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities."" Significantly,
however, the Basic Court's reasonable investor appears to have
no concern for the costs involved in producing the information,
or in the possibility that the production of the information
might harm the issuer.
The unresolved issue after Basic thus becomes whether,
given the fact that the Court thinks materiality is a single
concept, the Court's definition of materiality is now the defi-
nition for the disclosure context. If so, are all the SEC forms
now to be read as requiring registrants to disclose to investors
all the information the SEC asks for, plus everything that the
reasonable investor would like to know? More specifically, does
Basic mean that every time an issuer is required to file a 10-K
or a 10-Q it must disclose all ongoing merger negotiations?
Can Basic, together with the MD&A disclosure requirements
as interpreted in Caterpillar, be read as a call, even a require-
Id. at 240.
'9 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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ment, for implementation of the accuracy-enhancement concept
each time a filing is required? If it can be so read, will either
the Commission or the Court read it that way?'
E. Market Valuation of Assets
Efforts to require the disclosure of the market value of
assets promote accuracy enhancement. One way for a business
to generate cash flow is to sell its assets, and the amount of
those cash flows depends on the price that the assets would
bring if sold. Yet balance sheets disclose historic costs, not
current values. That makes the accounting disclosures an un-
reliable guide to predictions of the possible cash flows that
could be generated by sales. Homer Kripke listed the SEC's
insistence on cost-based accounting as the first example of a
deep-seated attitude that the SEC "must reverse." 8' This is-
sue remained dormant until the late 1980's.
That the SEC has become a champion of current-value
accounting is ironic. Cost-based balance sheets have been one
of the central items of faith in the Commission's historic insis-
tence on "objective" accounting,'82 on the theory that if assets
can be revalued, and management is in charge of that process,
then management can use revaluation to affect reported re-
sults. The SEC has now abandoned that objection to the use of
current values. Since the arrival of Richard Breeden in 1989,
the Commission has insisted that the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB") adopt standards that require in-
' A recent statement by one SEC Commissioner suggests that he at least
understands the disclosure system in this way. MTe full disclosure system requires
disclosure of all known factors that would influence an investor's decision to buy
or sell securities. Richard Y. Roberts & Kurt R. Hohl, Environmental Liability
Disclosure and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 50 BUs. LAw. 1, 14 (1994). Rob-
erts was sworn in as a Commissioner of Securities and Exchange on Oct. 1, 1990,
for a term expiring June 5, 1995. Roberts Sworn in as New Commissioner; SEC
Returns to Full Five-member Lineup, 22 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1417 (October
5, 1990), and Bush Nominates Richard Roberts, Former Senate Aide, to Be SEC
Member, 22 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1159 (August 10, 1990).
I1 Kripke, supra note 38, at 1188-97.
1 For the history of the development of the SEC's policy against use of current
values in accounting statements and documents filed with the Commission in the
period between its formation and the early 1940's see R.G. Walker, The SEC's Ban
on Upward Asset Revaluations and the Disclosure of Current Values, 28 ABACUS 3
(Mar. 1992). See also KRIPKE, supra note 6, at 179-84.
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creased use of current value. The SEC has justified this change
of position on accuracy-enhancement grounds.
The concept of income as the difference between the value
of assets at the opening of the period and the closing of the
period is one long accepted by economists. They commonly
refer to a definition offered by John Hicks: "A man's income is
the maximum value which he can consume during a week, and
still expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was
at the beginning."' This definition of income can only be cal-
culated and reported if the value of the issuer's assets is deter-
mined at both the opening and ending of the accounting period.
There are two important problems in translating the
economist's definition of income into a workable accounting
system. One is that the business does not have a need, in the
normal course of its business, to collect information on the
current value of assets. If the asset is necessary to carrying on
the business, management need not regularly determine at
what price the asset could be sold. Thus value accounting im-
poses significant additional costs.
The second important problem arises if accounting is
thought to serve as a gauge of management's performance, as
management's "report card." Management can take the posi-
tion that it did not acquire the asset in order to sell it at the
end of any particular accounting period. Management may
claim that it acquired an asset to use in the business; that it
was needed. Accordingly, management may assert that buying
the asset was a good decision, even though there was some
chance that its value might suddenly decline, because it has
been a productive asset for the company. Even as to securities,
management can argue that particular securities were bought
because of management's assessment that they would be a
good investment over the long run. The truth or falsity of that
n3 JOHN R. HIcKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL 172 (2a ed. 1939). This is also what is
widely known as the Haig-Simons definition of income, developed for purpozs of
analysis of the income tax. HENRY C. SBIONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE
DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FIsCAL POLICY (1938) and Robert M.
Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOMIE TAX (Robert LL Haig, ed.
1921). Academic accountants recommended that the accounting profession work
from this concept of income in the early 1960s. The profession rejected this sug-
gestion. See Kripke, supra note 38, at 1190 & 1190 n.161 and KHIME supra note
6, 191-98.
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assessment will only be known when the security is sold, even
if prices fluctuate in the interim.
Whatever role current value should play in a system of
accounting, the FASB -at the SEC's explicit urging- has now
ended up with a mixed system in which a few items on the
balance sheet are valued at market. To the extent that the
purpose of a balance sheet is to arrive at an estimate of net
worth, it is odd to use current value for only a portion of the
balance sheet. To mix value accounting and cost-based account-
ing in the same balance sheet is to end up with a hybrid net
worth whose meaning is very unclear. That is exactly what has
happened.
The SEC sent a clear signal to the FASB that something
was to happen through testimony in 1990 by its then-Chair-
man, Richard Breeden, before the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The hearings were entitled
Banking Regulators' Report on Capital Standards, but their
real subject was the savings-and-loan crisis, a matter on which
Breeden had worked in his previous position in the White
House. Breeden (and apparently the Commission)"8 used his
prepared testimony as a call for market-value accounting.
Breeden testified that:
Steps currently being taken to clarify the accounting treatment for
investment portfolios should be part of a broader move in the direc-
tion of mark-to-market accounting. The benefits of market-based
accounting warrant consideration of a broader shift in this direction.
The presumption that market-based information is the most rele-
vant financial data attribute should be recognized. It may be appro-
priate to utilize historical cost only where specifically justified by the
circumstances in the future."
In his oral testimony, he was more colorful:
I do have some comments later on the general subject of mark-to-
In an interview, Breeden asserted that "the testimony that I gave before the
Senate was the unanimous testimony of the Commission, so let that speak for the
record. We do have the final authority over what must be disclosed in accounting
statements by public companies." Dana Wechsler Linden, If Life is Volatile, Ac-
count for It, FORBES, Nov. 12, 1990, 114 at 114-21.
' Banking Regulators' Report on Capital Standards: On Capital Requirements
and Accounting Rules that Determine What Counts as Capital in our Banking
System, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 101st Cong, 2nd Sess. 97, 155 (1990) [hereinafter "Capital Standards Hear-
ings"].
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market accounting, but I think that, particularly in financial insti-
tutions, whose portfolios consist of financial instruments that have,
in many cases, a readily ascertainable value, certainly in the securi-
ties portfolios, it would be regrettable if we continued to have ac-
counting statements that essentially needed to have at the top of the
balance sheet the phrase "once upon a time."... And maybe "in the
galaxy far, far away." I mean, we know that whafs important is the
economic worth of this institution and not what it once looked like
whenever it made investment decisions for its portfolio-perhaps
many, many years ago. That really, other than to historians, is of
relatively little importance."
Breeden was not subtle about why the accounting profession
should pay attention. He added:
The Chairman [Senator Donald W. Riegel, Jr. of Michigan]: Why
shouldn't the SEC set the accounting rules? What is the rationale
for allowing the Financial Accounting Standards Board to [do] that
in effect for you?
Chairman Breeden: Well, we have ultimate authority over the ac-
counting principles that are promulgated.... [We] think we...
have to realize... that we have a responsibility, that we cannot
necessarily just stand back and say that we will wait until the prin-
ciples are presented to us. There are areas, such as the issue of
whether we should be moving toward market value accounting at a
more brisk pace1 ' than has occurred in recent years, where I think
the Commission needs to consider appropriate policies and at least
make sure that those issues are being fully considered by the profes-
sional accounting bodies."m
Breeden's testimony suggests that his commitment to market-
value accounting reflects the belief that if market-value ac-
counting had been in effect in the 1970s, the savings-and-loan
crisis would have been prevented.
The theory that market-value accounting would have pre-
vented the savings-and-loan crisis is as follows: the fact that
I Capital Standards Hearings, supra note 185, at 109.
287Question: "What time frame do you have in mind? I dont se any particular
obstacles to having the year-end 1991 financial statements include market values."
Linden, supra note 184, at 121. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, EXPO-
SURE DRAFT, PROPOSED STATEAMNT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: DIS-
CLOSURES ABOUT MARKET VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, FASB NO. 093-E
(Dec. 31, 1990) became FASB 107 in December, 1991. FINANCIAL ACCOUNING
STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMNT OF FINANCIAL ACcOuNTING STANDARDS No. 107,
DISCLOSURES ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUIENS (1991) [hereinafter
"FASB 107"].
Capital Standards Hearings, supra note 185, at 109.
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the thrift industry had become insolvent in the early 1970's
was hidden from the regulators and the public because their
assets (almost entirely fixed-rate home-mortgage loans) were
carried on their books at cost, which was higher than their
value because of rising interest rates. Under market-value
accounting, the insolvency of each thrift would have become
apparent, one at a time. As the insolvency became apparent,
the thrift would have been forced either to close or to raise
more capital. Instead, the problem quietly mushroomed until it
became too big to confront. At that point, Congress and the
regulators were conscripted into a scheme to hide it even lon-
ger by permitting the industry to use accounting rules even
more unrelated to reality than cost-based accounting, among
other things.8 '
This argument requires a sophisticated and complex theo-
ry which relates the degree of visibility of an issue to the for-
mation of the agendas of politicians. That theory, however,
involves a leap in logic. Although the savings and loans did not
publicly report their insolvency in the 1970s, it took only a
back-of-the-envelope calculation to realize that the thrifts were
already insolvent.' At that time they held fixed-rate home-
' The most extraordinary departure from GAAP was in 1981, when the regu-
lators (with Congressional urging) decided to allow the savings and loans to defer
the recognition of losses on the sale of assets, and to write them off over a period
of ten years. This episode is discussed in Chairman Breeden's testimony. Capital
Standards Hearings, supra note 185, at 100-01, 137-39. This accounting change
and other changes, including a tax benefit, gave the thrifts strong incentives to
sell their existing mortgage portfolio and replace it with another mortgage portfo-
lio, even though the economic return on the two portfolios was the same. That
meant that all of the thrifts then wanted to sell their own mortgage portfolios and
buy someone else's. The scene when the demand for these transactions hit the
trading floor at Salomon Brothers, and the resulting profit to Salomon, is por-
trayed in MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON
WALL STREET 103-09 (1989). LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC
POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 82-87 (1991) describes all of
the accounting changes made by the Congress and the regulators designed to fur-
ther "conceal" the condition of the thrifts.
"' Retrospective estimates are provided in EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSUR-
ANCE MESS: How Dm IT HAPPEN? 75-76 (1989). Kane estimates that the industry
had a negative net worth as early as 1971. Lawrence J. White provides an over-
view of the series of economic and regulatory events lying behind the S&L prob-
lem. Of the position of the thrifts in the late 1970's he says:
Accordingly, as the thrift industry entered into the late 1970s the thirty-
year fixed-rate mortgage was still the standard asset for the industry,
and the industry was still borrowing short and lending long. The recom-
[Vol. 61: 763
19951 THE THEORYAND PRACTICE OF SECURITES DISCLOSURE 831
mortgage loans which they had made, and interest rates had
risen since the mortgages had been issued. Necessarily, their
value had fallen. The industry knew it was economically insol-
vent. Commentators knew the industry was insolvent. But how
would the situation have been different if this insolvency had
appeared on market-value balance sheets? Would not the same
political pressures which led the regulators and Congress to
shove the problem under the rug in the hope of some better
day have also been at work then? Wouldn't they have been just
as likely to permit a deviation from market-value accounting
principles as they were to ignore the problem with cost-based
balance sheets? 1
Whatever the accuracy of the diagnosis, market-value
reform was to be. The first result was FASB 107, Disclosures
about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, issued in December
1991.' FASB 107 requires the disclosure, in gross catego-
ries, of the fair value 93 of all financial instruments either
mendations of a number of study groups and commissions during the
1970s-that Regulation Q be phased out, that thrifts be allowed to offer
ARMs [adjustable rate mortgages], and that they be allowed to diversify
into other activities-were ignored. The industry, its regulators, and the
Congress clung to Regulation Q [which limited the interest payable on
deposits] as the solution to the industrys problem.
Regulation Q, however, only delayed the day of reckoning for the
thrift industry. In the late 1970s, as interest rates again roz9--this time
much more sharply-the thrifts again faced a set of choices that meant
unavoidable losses, but Regulation Q could no longer save them.
WHITE, supra note 189, at 65.
11 Breeden in his testimony reported that the regulators permitted deviations
from GAAP in order to strengthen thrift balance sheets in 1972. The same episode
is described in WHITE, supra note 189, at 83-84. Capital Standards Hearings,
supra note 185, at 127-28. White joins Breeden in recommending current value
accounting, although only for financial institutions. WHITE, supra note 189, at 225-
29. He seems to envisage an accounting system that would have sufficient
strength to withstand short-run political and regulatory incentives to change it.
"By making insolvencies more transparent, market value accounting would make
politicians and regulators! efforts to delay closure more difficult, or at least re-
quire them to offer better explanations to justify their actions." WHITE, supra note
189, at 229.
11 FASB 107, supra note 187. Just in time to meet Chairman Breeden's dead-
line. See supra note 187. FASB 107 has now been extended by FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATIENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
NO.119, DISCLOSURE ABOUT DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUmENtS AND FAIR VALUE
OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (1994).
m FASB reluctantly adopted the term "fair value" because not all the valua-
tions required are based on market prices:
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held by the firm or issued by the firm, whether or not they are
traded or even transferable. Financial instruments for which
market prices are available are to be valued at market price.
FASB 107 further provided that
If quoted market prices are not available, management's best esti-
mate of fair value may be based on the quoted market price of a
financial instrument with similar characteristics or on valuation
techniques (for example, the present value of estimated future cash
flows using a discount rate commensurate with the risks involved,
option pricing models, or matrix pricing models).1'
"Financial instruments" is defined broadly.'95 FASB 107 does
not require that net changes in the value of the assets and lia-
bilities that are financial instruments be reflected either in the
balance sheet or income statement of the entity. Rather, FASB
107 requires a separate disclosure which can be made in the
Some respondents to the 1990 Exposure Draft suggested that use of the
term market value did not reflect adequately the broad range of financial
instruments covered by this Statement. Those respondents associate the
term market value only with items that are traded on active secondary
markets (such as exchange and dealer markets). As highlighted by the
discussion in paragraph 19 of this Statement, the Board does not make
that distinction. The term market value, as defined in paragraph 5 of the
1990 Exposure Draft, is applicable whether the market for an item is
active or inactive, primary or secondary. The Board decided, however, to
use the term fair value in this Statement to avoid further confusion and
also to be consistent with the terminology used in similar disclosure
proposals made recently by other national and international standard-
setting organizations. The concept of fair value is the same as that of
market value in the 1990 Exposure Draft; those who associate the term
market value only with items that are traded in active secondary mar-
kets may however prefer to consider fair value as a broader concept that
includes prices and rates obtained from both secondary and primary
markets.
FASB 107, supra note 187, at 37.
'4 FASB 107, supra note 187, at 5.
a6 A financial instrument is defined as
cash, evidence of an ownership interest in an entity, or a contract that
both:
a. Imposes on one entity a contractual obligation (1) to deliver cash
or another financial instrument to a second entity or (2) to exchange
other financial instruments on potentially unfavorable terms with the
second entity
b. Conveys to that second entity a contractual right (1) to receive
cash or another financial instrument from the first entity or (2) to ex-
change other financial instruments on potentially favorable terms with
the first entity.
FASB 107, supra note 187, at % 3 (footnotes omitted).
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notes to the financial statements.
The FASB confronted the problem of what impact changes
in the net value of the assets and liabilities reported at fair
value should have on the income statement and balance sheet
in FASB 115, issued in May 1993." s The answer equity and
debt securities (a much smaller universe than the "financial
instruments" of FASB 107) should be valued at market on the
asset side of the balance sheet if they are available for sale.
The changes in their value, however, should not flow through
to the income statement, but rather to a special subaccount in
the shareholder's equity section of the balance sheet.1 Equi-
ty and debt securities held to maturity would continue to be
carried at cost. A large part of FASB 115 is designed to define
strictly the "held-to-maturity" category and to limit the reasons
for which securities can be reclassified,"'8 with the purpose of
11 FINANIL ACCOUNTNG STANDARDS BOARD, STATmE=T OF FINANcILm Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS NO. 115, ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT
AND EQUITY SECURITIES, (1993) [hereinafter "FASB 115".]. At the same time FASB
issued FINANCIAL AcCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENrT OF FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS NO. 114, ACCOUNTING BY CREDITORS FOR IMPAIRmENT OF A
LOAN (1993) [hereinafter "FASB 114"]. FASB 114 rejected any requirement that
impaired loans be valued at fair value. It did, however, permit market valuation
to be used as "as a practical expedient." Id. at 9 13. Two members (Leisenring
and Swieringa) of the Board dissented from FASB 114 on the ground that it did
not use the fair value approach. Two members (Sampson and Swieringa) dissented
from FASB 115 for similar reasons.
"' Thus avoiding the heated complaints of the banking industry that fair-value
accounting would lead to misleading and harmful volatility in bank income (al-
though, of course, there still is an impact on the volatility of equity capital).
Banks also complained that fair-value accounting only for assets would fail to take
into account the extent to which asset risks were offset by the issuer through the
use of appropriately matched liabilities. The FASB said that it "believe[dl] it would
be preferable to permit certain related liabilities to be reported at fair value," but
the FASB was unable to develop a workable approach. FASB 115, supra note 196,
at 21 5[ 51. Although FASB 115 applies to all for-profit entities, its biggest impact
is on financial institutions, which tend to hold a large percentage of their assets
in the form of debt securities. Lawrence White answers the concerns about the
volatility introduced by market value accounting as follows: 'But over time, man-
agers would restructure those portfolios and adopt hedging and smoothing strate-
gies; in the interim, the regulators need to know about those market value fluctu-
ations (not all of which may be cyclical)." WMTE, supra note 189, at 228. Those
'hedging and smoothing strategies! will themselves have costs and create risks.
1' FASB 115, supra note 196, at 3-4, 2I 7-1L It is notable that FASB 114 and
FASB 115 would not have affected either the income statements or the balance
sheets of the savings and loans during the 1970s, since their mortgage assets were
not impaired (because principal and interest were paid on time), their mortgages
were not securities (defined in FASB 115 as being obligations evidenced by a
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ensuring that the "held-to-maturity" category not undermine
the objective of requiring issuers to account for equity and debt
securities on a mark-to-market basis.
F. Identity of Investment Company (Mutual Fund) Managers
A simple idea for reform of mutual-fund disclosures is that
mutual funds should identify the person or persons who cur-
rently are making decisions about what securities the fund will
buy or sell. The traditional mutual fund disclosure has focused
on the results of its past investment activities, but an investor
wants to know who has been (and is now) making the deci-
sions. He or she is looking for someone who appears to have
the ability to make good decisions in the future. Past success-
ful results have no relevance if a different person is now mak-
ing the investment decisions. Most mutual funds have been
promoted without disclosure of who that person is. Why
shouldn't the SEC require disclosure of the identities of the
responsible decisionmaking people? After all, they are of great-
er importance to a mutual-fund investor than the identities of
the board of directors, all of whose identities must be disclosed.
It has taken the SEC twenty years to implement this re-
form. Even though proposals to amend the disclosure forms to
require such disclosure were made in 1972,199 1982. and
1984,21 not until 1993 was the requirement adopted.0 2
The proposal finally adopted was proposed in 1989. It was
transferable instrument or a book entry for which the issuer maintains a transfer
facility, FASB 115, supra note 196, at 137), and in any case they were held.to-
maturity assets. FASB 107, supra note 187, however, would have required disclo-
sure of the fair values in the notes to the financial statement.
"' Proposed Guideline for the Preparation of Forms S-4 and S-5 Relating to
Prospectus Disclosure of a Management Investment Company's Investment Adviser,
its Organization and Personnel, Securities Act Release No. 33-5258, 1972 WL
17489 (SEC) (June 9, 1972).
'0 Registration Form Used By Open-End Management Investment Companies;
Proposed Guidelines, Securities Act Release No. 33-6447, 1982 WL 35957 (SEC)
(Dec. 27, 1982).
2" Semi-Annual Report Form for Registered Investment Companies, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-21208, 1984 WL 52029 (SEC) (Aug. 6, 1984).
202 Registration Form for Closed-end Management Investment Companies (Adop-
tion), Securities Act Release No. 33-6967, 1992 WL 348440 (SEC) (Nov. 20, 1992);
[hereinafter "Release 6967"]; Disclosure of Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio
Managers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6988, 1993 WL 101994 (SEC) (April 6,
1993).
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one of a number of initiatives whose objective was to make
mutual-fund disclosure documents more relevant to the
investor's decisionmaking process.2's The new item requires
mutual funds to
[d]isclose the name and title of all persons who make or are expect-
ed to make significant contributions to the investment advice pro-
vided to the Registrant and describe each person's business experi-
ence and the length of time he or she had been employed by or asso-
ciated with the investment adviser (or Registrant).P
The rationale for the new item was explained by the Commis-
sion as follows:
The disclosure of this information is intended to make investors
aware of the individuals who... may have a significant impact on
the fund's investment success. This disclosure will permit investors
to assess the background and experience of such person and evalu-
ate the extent of this person's responsibility for the previous invest-
ment success (or lack thereof) of the fund before making an invest-
ment decision.2
The industry opposed this proposal, as it had its predeces-
sors."6 The Commission reported:
Investment company commenters expressed two principal concerns
about the proposed item. First, they asserted that requiring informa-
tion about persons who make "significant contributions" to the in-
vestment advice received by the fund could require disclosure about
numerous professionals, e.g., analysts and traders, who participate
in providing advisory services. This type of disclosure would signifi-
cantly lengthen the prospectus and impose unnecessary costs on
funds and their shareholders. Second, several commenters were
concerned that the proposal would be difficult to comply with in the
context of advisory organizations that incorporate team, committee
or multi-manager structures.se
21 Registration Form For Closed-end Management Investment Companies, Secu-
rities Act Release No. 6842, 1989 WL 257682 (SEC) (July 28, 1989) [hereinafter
'Release 6842"]. Other notable changes relate to a MID & section in which man-
agement is to disclose its investment strategies, a requirement that funds compare
their past results with an index, and a requirement that closed-end funds disclosa
that closed-end funds often trade at a discount to their net asset value.
2' Release 6842, supra note 203, at 56.
21 Release 6842, supra note 203, at 14.
21' Dean Foust, Mutual Fund Show and Tell, BUS. WK., June 28, 1993, at 130,
reported that "[Clompanies have been loath to identify-much less promote--the
movers behind the funds."
" Release 6967, supra note 202, at 7.
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In response to these objections, the Commission simplified the
proposal to require the disclosure only of those who are "pri-
marily responsible for the day-to-day management of the fund's
portfolio."
20 8
G. A Look at the Future
These six foregoing examples are offered to show that
accuracy enhancement is not just a plausible normative objec-
tive for disclosure regulation, but that its influence can be seen
in regulatory actions taken and cases decided. Donald C.
Langevoort, in an article in the Harvard Law Review, has
taken the concept of accuracy enhancement one step further.
His project, in an article entitled Information Technology and
the Structure of Securities Regulation,20 9 was to envision the
impact that information technology will have on securities
regulation. Drawing upon the legal-policy literature, he identi-
fies disclosure practices as one area that should change.21
"08 Release 6967, supra note 202, at 41 (Item 9.1.c of Form N-2). The same
requirement was adopted for open-end investment companies in Disclosure of Mu-
tual Fund Performance and Portfolio Managers, Securities Act Release No. 33.
6988, at 13, 1993 WL 101994 (SEC) (April 6, 1993) (Item 5(c) of Form N-1A). The
requirements for open-end investment companies were proposed in Disclosure and
Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance Information; Portfolio Manager Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6850, 1990 WL 309771 (SEC) (Jan. 8, 1990).
" Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985).
310 Another article in the visionary (if not apocalyptic) mode is by Robert
Mednick, a partner in Arthur Andersen & Co., and chairman of its worldwide
committee on professional standards. Robert Mednick, Reinventing the Audit, J. OF
AccT., August 1991, at 71. Mednick says:
The accounting profession desperately needs a process for completely
reengineering the audit function and regaining the public's confi-
dne.... I believe CPAs can, by virtue of the training, history and
orientation, best serve society as the premier suppliers of worthwhile
information to managements, boards of directors and stakeholder groups.
With the explosion of affordable information in recent years, a significant
premium has been placed on the work of those professionals who can
analyze, organize, validate and present information in useful and timely
ways.... I believe investors and others want and expect more: more
predictive and value-based information; more of the whys-not simply
whats-of financial data; and more early warning that a company is
making poor decisions or may be nearing the brink of financial collapse.
Id. at 71-74. A similar statement comes from KPMG Peat Marwick.
The U.S. financial accounting model . . . is broken and needs to be fixed.
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The present practice of discrete, periodic paper filings can
easily be replaced by a system of continuous electronic filing in
which issuers transmit, in nearly real time,"' all material
information to the markets. According to Langevoort:
Implementation of such a system could lead to an even more signifi-
cant policy change: the imposition on issuers of a genuinely continu-
ous duty to update, one that would require virtually immediate
disclosure of any highly significant investment information ....
For information to be valuable, however, it must be current.
The purpose of the disclosure system is to give investors relevant
data on which to base decisions to buy or sell. That purpose is not
served when the profile of the company made available to investors
has become outdated as a result of new developments. Under a pa-
per-based filing system, practical concerns may justify a reluctance
to impose an obligation to update information continually. But once
an on-line database is established, furnishing issuers with instanta-
neous access to the fie, investors should be able to expect the mate-
rial in the fie to be both current and complete.
Even without an updating requirement, many issuers would
use the system voluntarily in order to correct and amend their files.
In short, the electronic file would be a useful vehicle for instantly
communicating to investors information that the company wants
disclosed, in a manner that avoids questions of selective dissemina-
tion or illegal tipping. Mandatory updating is needed, however, to
ensure that all material information is incorporated into the file in a
Its periodic, historical, cost-based financial statements served the bygone
industrial era well but are not sufficient for evaluating information-era
companies .... Today's periodic, historical, cost-basis financial state-
ments do not provide as complete a set of relevant entity-specific data as
is feasible to enable potential investors to understand the economic risk
of investing; this undermines the spirit of management's discharge of its
fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders.
Robert K Elliott & Peter D. Jacobson, U.S. Accounting: A National Emergency, J.
OF AcCT., November 1991, at 54-56.
Some of the legal policy literature relied upon by Langevoort is abstracted at
the outset of this article, which uses the efficient markets arguments to support
normative conclusions about securities regulation.
21 Langevoort realizes that the disclosure cannot for practical reasons ba imme-
diate.
An issuer must have enough time to frame the disclosure in language
that will not create misleading impressions. A useful presumption might
be that material information must be placed in the system within one
business day of a determination of materiality. That time period could be
shortened or extended depending on such factors as the significance of
the information, the size of the issuer, and the difficulty of accurately
formulating the disclosure statement.
Langevoort, supra note 209, at 791.
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timely fashion."
II. THE FLAWS OF AccuRAcY ENHANCEMENT AS THE SINGLE
GOAL OF SECURITIES DISCLOSURE
The first section of this Article set out the argument for
accuracy enhancement as a normative goal for securities dis-
closure and gave examples of the importance of the idea in the
context of specific regulatory and legal issues. In fact, however,
the disclosure system does not require issuers to disclose all
"information materially important to investors." '13 If an in-
vestor concludes that an issuer's securities disclosures really
have provided an "opportunity to look at the company through
the eyes of management" then the investor may be well ad-
vised to short the stock, because the perspective of manage-
ment is complacent and self-satisfied and ignores the hostile
and unpredictable world.214 Even the disclosure regulations
212 Langevoort, supra note 209, at 786-88. Interestingly, Langevoort concludes
that his proposal would actually decrease the amount of information that issuers
would provide. This is because he would remove the requirement for filing all of
the fluff currently found in the forms. Issuers would electronically file only materi-
al information, and he would be willing to require only the filing of material ad-
verse information. Langevoort, supra note 209, at 789. Langevoort also recognizes
the existence of a business confidentiality problem. See infra note 230.
"' H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 2. The "all" is not in the original quote.
Langevoort, supra note 211, at 786 describes the disclosure requirement as "the
basic requirement that issuers disclose all material information relevant to their
risk/return characteristics." Even more expansive is Comizio, who describes the
disclosure obligation as one that requires issuers "to publicly disclose all material
corporate information, financial and otherwise, in order to provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate commerce." V. Gerard
Comizio, Keeping Corporate Information Secret: Confidential Treatment Under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 NEW ENO. L.
REV. 787, 787 (1983). And see 2 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 4, at 27: "Then,
too, there is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again
disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But 'The
truth shall make you free."
The rejection of the proposition that "a corporation has an affirmative duty to
disclose all material information even if there is no insider trading, no statute or
regulation requiring disclosure, and no inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior
disclosures" and the assertion that "[tjhe prevailing view . . . is that there is no
such affirmative duty of disclosure" in cases such as Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,
910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), quoted in and followed by Glazer v.
Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 1992), does not address the question of
what the statute and the implementing SEC regulations in fact require.
' As Homer Kripke reported: "Since 1967, I have tried with my classes to see
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themselves provide for nondisclosure in the event of competi-
tive harm in a few isolated instances.W
what could be learned about a company from a prospectus which we studied to-
gether intending to make a securities decision from it. I have realized how the
SEC's mandated disclosure fails to accomplish its avowed purpose." KRIPKE, cupra
note 6, at 274. 'The prospectus is a somewhat schizophrenic document, having two
purposes which often present conflicting pulls. On the one hand, it is a selling
document.... From this point of view, it is desirable to present the best possible
image. On the other hand, the prospectus is a disclosure document, an insurance
policy against liability. With the view toward protection against liability, there is a
tendency to resolve all doubts against the company and to make things look as
bleak as possible." Carl W. Schneider, et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1931). The popular business press has re-
cently discovered that much important information is omitted from securities dis-
closure documents. See Barry Vmocur, The Ground Floor: Some Potential Investors
Fault Disclosure As Office RE!T Barrage Continues, BARRON'8, May 2, 1994 at 50
(Office REIT IPO's fail to disclose the inevitable fall in office rents as leases come
up for renewal); Kurt Eichenwald, Market Place: At a Rail Car Maker, Lawsuits
Test the Importance of Being Earnest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at D6 c.3 (Pro-
spectus of Johnstown America Industries, Inc. failed to mention pending patent in-
fringement case against key competitor;, patent covers important product); Viliam
Power, Heard on the Street, In 1POs, Some Data Seem to be Overlooked by Issuers
as in Case of Santa Cruz Operation, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1993, at C2 (Chairman
of Santa Cruz Operation dies after an initial public offering, his illness undis-
closed; sexual harassment lawsuit also undisclosed). As to mutual funds, see
James B. Stewart & James J. Cramer, The Secret Society: Why Don't Mutual
Funds Do a Better Job of Providing You with Information about 3our Investments?
The Answer Is Simple: They Don't Want To, SMIART MNONEY, Nov. 1994, at 98, 100.
An unusually candid, detailed and readable account which reveals the discontinuity
between the marketing of the initial public offering of Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
in July 1991 and business reality is BARRY WERTH, THE BILLION DoLiAR M OLE-
CULE: ONE COMPANY'S QUEST FOR THE PERFECT DRUG (1994). The only profession-
als who displayed embarrassment were the scientists. 'The scientists, understand-
ably, saw another view. They saw unproven science, unmet expectation-, uncertain
goals--a story lunging out of touch with reality." Id. at 35L Vertex went public at
9, traded at a high of 20 in January 1994, and as of December 1994 traded at 11
V2. Because Vertex never traded below its offering price, there was no occasion for
a Securities Act lawsuit. Readers who are skeptical of the characterizations in the
text are invited to read a few prospectuses and try to decide whether or not they
wish to invest in the issuer based on what is disclosed about the issuer's business.
Annual reports (although not prospectuses which, due to the wider net of Securi-
ties Act liability are written by the lawyers, nor quarterly reports, which are too
short) do in some cases provide evidence that the management has an active intel-
ligence. Warren Buffett's annual reports written as Chairman of Berkshire
Hathaway are famous for actually saying something.
216 See Item 101(c)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c}ii)(1995) (a de-
scription of a product or segment that would require the investment of a material
amount of the assets of the registrant or that otherwise is material and has baen
publicly announced) ('This paragraph is not intended to require disclosure of other-
wise non-public corporate information the disclosure of which would affect ad-
versely the registrants competitive position."); Item 402(e), Instruction 2, 17 C.F.R.
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In spite of the fact that the securities laws require disclo-
sure of only a small part of all material corporate information,
there is no explanation in the tradition of the securities laws to
explain why this should be the case. Questions remain as to
whether the present disclosure requirements are simply naive
and defectively implemented, or whether they in fact reflect
important but unarticulated considerations.
Analysis reveals that the present disclosure practices do
reflect important considerations. The first consideration is the
risk of liability created by the securities laws themselves, a
risk that makes the disclosure more costly the more likely it is
to be relevant to, and therefore affect, the market price of
securities. The second consideration is the need for issuer se-
crecy in an environment where information in the hands of
third parties, particularly competitors, can be used to harm the
issuer.
A. Liability Risk
The securities laws impose a risk of liability on anyone
who makes a statement relevant to the market price of a secu-
rity. Disappointed security holders who buy or sell after the
statement may sue on the grounds that the statement was
misleading or incomplete, thereby causing their loss. One way
for issuers to respond to this risk is to reduce the number of
statements they make, and the definiteness of those they do
make. Issuers are likely to respond in this way as their ability
to predict whether any given statement will lead to litigation
or liability decreases. Their difficulty in prediction may result
from their own inability to determine whether the statement is
misleading or incomplete, their inability to predict when litiga-
tion will occur, or their inability to predict the outcome of liti-
gation when it does occur. Saying less means litigating less
and being held liable less often. Liability is a cost of the activi-
§ 229.402(e)(1995) (relating to disclosure of long term incentive plans) (Registrants
are not required to disclose any factor, criterion or performance.related or other
condition to payout or maturation of a particular award that involves confidential
commercial or business information, disclosure of which would adversely affect tho
registrant's competitive position."). It is odd that the Commission has singled out
these two items for an express competitive harm exception from the disclosure
obligation.
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ty of making statements, and will reduce the level of that ac-
tivity
2 16
The impact of the risk of liability on the cost of the produc-
tion of information is an example of the problem of over-deter-
rence by the legal system. Liability rules can affect the overall
level of an activity-in this case the production of informa-
tion-in ways that are socially harmful. It is of particular
concern in the securities area for two reasons: first, because
the losses suffered by parties who trade after information that
turns out to be misleading is released can be large and easily
quantified; and second, because much "information" is pro-
duced as the result of an estimating process, and may or may
not turn out to be correct. An important virtue of the tradition-
al, historic fact-based disclosure system is that it required the
production of discrete facts that can be identified, verified,
recorded, retrieved and reported by nonmanagement person-
nel-for example, the reported, audited gross revenues for the
last fiscal year, or the name of the chief executive officer. The
required disclosures involved no representation, implicit or
otherwise, that the disclosures were relevant to the value of
the firm, much less the market price of its securities.
The same cannot be said of "known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact. 7 When is
a trend "known," and by whom? When does a series of num-
bers become a trend?"' Does management not only have to
I" Easterbrook and Fischel used this insight in their analysis of optimal dam-
ages in securities cases.
It is easy to see that there may be an "optimal level of breach' in ordi-
nary contracts. It is not so obvious that this is so with securitie3 con-
tracts. Nevertheless, the same principles apply. 'uth,' like all good
things, is costly to produce. The person selling securities must investigate
the business venture at hand and package the information in a form that
investors can understand. The process of acquiring and packaging infor-
mation can be exceptionally expensive. Whole industries-accounting, in-
vestment banking, much of the bar, much of the financial press--are the
embodiments of the costs of investigation and certification of information
about firms and their securities. For any complex business, it is impossi-
ble to find and present "everything material! in a space less than that of
a decent-sized library.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel M. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Sccurities Cases,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611, 613 (1985).
1 17 CFR. 229.303(a)(3)(ii)(1995).
2,s The beguiling notion that one can profit by identifying and then investing in
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work at acquiring and analyzing information and deciding on
appropriate business responses, but also continuously partic-
ipate in the collection and analysis leading to the filing of
disclosure documents, which must contain those trends that
management has determined it knows, and reasonably expects,
will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact? Where
and when did the Caterpillar corporation get it wrong?
For example, suppose the company has an old product
whose sales have been declining for years. The trend in sales is
clearly known, and expected. The product, because all its de-
velopment costs have been amortized and the company has
gotten very good at making it efficiently, enjoys a high profit
margin and makes a significant contribution to the company's
earnings. This might seem to be a clear indication that the
company's earnings will fall except for the fact that the compa-
ny has developed and introduced newer products whose sales
are rising, although the profit margins are not as high. The
company hopes that the new products will eventually take the
place of the old product line, and that the company's net profits
will continue to rise. Does the company need to disclose and
reveal the decline in sales of the old product? Who decides, and
how? The decline is a known trend, and because of the high
profit margin the trend will have a material unfavorable im-
pact on earnings. How much detail does the issuer have to
give? Can it say: "during the year, declining sales of older
product lines were offset by increasing sales of new product
lines"? Whatever the answer to these questions, does the com-
pany have any assurance that, whatever it says, it will be able
to establish in subsequent litigation that that was what it
should have said, particularly if the litigation occurs (as it
probably will, if at all) in the aftermath of a distinctive move
in the price of its stock?
It is ironic that in the past SEC Chairmen have so easily
recommended aspects of English disclosure practice without
pausing to wonder whether those practices don't depend on the
lack of meaningfiul exposure to civil liability in the English
a trend lies behind charting methodology, whose usefulness has never been proven.
Although in retrospect a series of numbers will evidence clear trend patterns, that
does not mean that a presently known series contains information about the fu-
ture.
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system 9 In the U.S. legal culture, the insight that the pro-
duction of information can be deterred undesirably by exces-
sive risk of liability has been treated as persuasive in the area
of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech. The Su-
preme Court said in New York Times v. Sullivan:
Allowance of the defense of truth with the burden of proving it on
the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred
... under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so....
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public de-
bate.... 22
2" Chairman Cohen, endorsing British practice relating to segmentation, cupra
note 84, and Chairman Casey, endorsing British practice relating to forecasts,
supra text accompanying note 44. Civil actions comparable to those available in
the United States exist in other countries, but as a result of procedural and cul-
tural barriers such litigation rarely occurs. See NORMAN S. POSER, IrERNATIONAL
SECURITIES REGUIATION, §§ 3.7.6.1, 3.7.6.2, at 293 (1991).
IThe American rule with respect to the awarding of attorneys' fees, and
the greater ease of bringing derivative suits and class actions all militate
in favor of bringing investors' suits in the United States. In these re-
spects, an American firm is far more exposed to liability in civil suits
than a British firm, although this may change as investors, lawyers, and
judges gain more experience under the new UK. regulatory system.
Id. §3.7.62 at 300-01.
Change, unrelated to the Financial Services Act which Porer discusses, may
be indicated by the recent success of the "names" at Lloyd's, whose lawsuits re-
semble an American class action securities case. The Lloyd's names, who invested
in unlimited liability insurance syndicates on the Lloyd's exchange, face not only
the loss of their investment but substantial additional liability. This threat so
motivated some of them that they were able to overcome the barriers to success-
fully litigating their claims in the UK. courts. Compare Robert Rice, L.oyd's Ball
Bounces in the Solicitors' Court: A Look at the Complex Collection of Caces Being
Prepared on Behalf of Anxious Names, FIN. TImS, March 3, 1992, at 12 ('Many
lawyers in the City feel that fr Freeman's action is unlikely to do more than
delay the inevitable--but this may not matter') with Jim Kelly & Ralph Atkn,
The Gooda Walker Judgment Jubilant Names Hail 'Justice and Salvation, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 8 and Richard Lapper, The Gooda Walker Judgment.
Group Led by Cool Chairman, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 8. The name3 had to
proceed as a collection of individuals and work out cost sharing among themselves
in the absence of an available class action device. The group of names who invest-
ed in the Gooda Walker syndicate won a favorable judgment based on a theory of
mismanagement from the British High Court on October 4, 1994. Ralph Atkins &
John Mason, Lloyd's Names Win Battle Against Gooda Agency: Court Ruling Gives
3,000 Members Prospect of Record Pounds 504m Compensation, FIN. TBES, Oct. 5,
1994, at 1.
2" 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23 Id. at 279. See also Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
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Concern about over-deterrence has not been entirely ab-
sent from the culture of U.S. securities regulation.' Indeed,
one could imagine recasting the literalist interpretive style of
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder into the New York Times case of
securities regulation. Just as New York Times imposed a re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove actual malice, Hochfelder
imposed a requirement that the plaintiff prove scienter. And
the SEC itself has recognized, most recently in its 1994 Con-
cept Release: Safe Harbor For Forward Looking State-
ments,' that the threat of liability has something to do with
the reluctance of issuers to provide information. Yet it is strik-
ing how seldom concerns about over-deterrence are even voiced
in the legal culture of securities regulation. For instance in the
Basic case the defendants asserted in their reply brief only
that, "[any other standard [than the agreement in principle
standard of materiality] would impose sanctions on corporate
managements which, with salutary motives, choose to speak,
whereas, if they had chosen to remain silent under identical
conditions, they would not be subject to claims for damag-
es.
"22
This single sentence was then bolstered with a quote from
Judge Henry Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf Sulphur:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent
and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not
legally required, at the risk that slip of the pen or failure properly to
amass or weigh the facts-all judged in the bright gleam of hind-
sight-will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers,
most corporations would opt for the former.2
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 705-711 (1985); Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment,
105 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1991).
m For instance Brudney, supra note 165, at 733 n.31, is sensitive to this prob-
lem: "Another source of injury to the corporation from disclosure is the possibility
that the disclosure is more or less innocently inaccurate, and especially if tho
corporation's proffered soft information turns out to be unfulfilled and exposes the
enterprise to litigation and potential liability in the light of hindsight." See also
sources cited infra note 230.
1994 Concept Release, supra note 77.
" Reply Brief of Respondents at 6, No. 86-279 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
i"' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cfr. 1968) (Friendly,
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In the aftermath of Basic, the phrase, "[n]o comment" has be-
come the mantra of issuers who are asked about merger nego-
tiations.
The problem of over-deterrence is increased by the logic of
materiality. Materiality is judged (under the Rule 408 stan-
dard) by whether or not the information is necessary "to make
the... statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading." The more that is dis-
closed, the more that becomes material, the more that must be
disclosed, and so on, which can only be escaped by not disclos-
ing much in the first place. 6 Suppose, for instance, that one
is preparing a disclosure document about a biotech start-up
company. One comes to the management section, surely one of
the most important areas of interest to an intelligent investor.
Who are the people who will be making the key decisions
about this company, and what reasons are there to think that
their decisions will be profitable? One looks at the form, and
finds that it requires the disclosure of the names and ages of
all executive officers, and their business experience during the
last five years. But gee, that sounds pretty dull. Wouldn't it be
a good idea to mention that the Vice President for Research
already holds patents for several important inventions and was
described at a dinner in his honor last year "as the leading
intellect in his field?" And what about the President? What
about the fabulous job he did turning around the Zeta Corpora-
tion seven years ago, and the fact that he is man of enormous
energy, who sleeps only four hours a night, and was mentioned
in Fortune Magazine as "a business genius." But if we provide
information about the officers other than the details required
by the forms, do we need to provide such information about
every officer? How about the Treasurer, who was fired from his
J., concuring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
"' This is the principal reason why in the aftermath of Baoxc, issuers prefer
not commenting to saying something of substanceo. This effect of materiality doc-
trine operates both within the framework of the disclosure regulations and in
relation to whether an issuer should say anything at all. A recent example of this
logic at work in the latter context is In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,
9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994), where the Second
Circuit held that statements by Time-Warner that it was seeing additional fi-
nancing through "strategic partnerships" created an obligation to subzequently dis-
close that it was considering a rights offering.
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job at another company three years ago? And gee, the Vice
President for Manufacturing sometimes sneaks in late. And,
well, why don't we drop the whole thing?
B. The Issuer Interest in Secrecy
Secrecy is difficult to document.' The most effective
strategy for preserving secrets is to conceal their existence
from those who could benefit from learning about them. One
does not keep a secret, as children quickly learn, by saying: "I
have a really important secret that you would like to know but
I won't tell you." The thesis here depends upon the proposition
that issuers have important secrets that they successfully
conceal, and therefore there is no proof of their existence.
In Congressional testimony in 1934, the New Deal brain
truster Thomas Corcoran asserted that there is no important
secrecy in business. Corcoran stated:
Parenthetically, every one who has ever dealt with industrial engi-
neers knows that the system of commercial espionage that exists at
the present time in the United States is so perfect that normally the
directors of a corporation know much more about their competitors'
business than they do even about their own; that any competent
engineer for a manufacturing concern, for example, who knows the
location of that plant, the prevailing rate of wages for labor, the cost
of raw materials, railroad rates to the nearest market and other
costs of transportation, all now on almost a uniform basis, can, ac-
cording to one of the best engineers I know who [I] sat with the
other night, compute the cost of production and the cost of selling of
any competitor's product down to 1 percent!'2
The argument that there are no secrets in business echoes
down through the history of discussions about disclosure. Of
course, if all managements already know everything about
their competitors, it is hard to understand why some are able
to operate their businesses more profitably than others. The
most important defect in this line of argument is that it is
' As I first became aware doing research for Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
"' Stock Exchange Practices, Part 15: National Securities Exchange Act 1934,
Hearings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong. & S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., Before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6533 (194),
reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 AND SECURI-
TIES EXCHANGE AT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen Mahar eds., 1973).
[Vol. 61: 763
1995] TRE THEORYAND PRACTICE OFSECURITES DISCLOSURE 847
based on a simple binary model of knowledge: either competi-
tors know or they do not. In fact, of course, firms know and
should know a lot about their competitors. Furthermore, in
many cases, firms want their competitors to believe certain
things about them, things that may or may not be entirely
true. But most of what firms know about their competitors is
what their competitors did yesterday, not what they plan to be
doing tomorrow. Tommy Corcoran's friend, the engineer, may
have been overconfident about his knowledge-perhaps the
firm, unbeknownst to him, had changed and improved its pro-
duction technology, reducing its costs. And everything firms
know about their competitors that is relevant to competition is
known with differing degrees of certainty. Required securities
disclosures, when put together with information from other
sources, can change the degree of certainty attached to what
one "knows."
Further complicating any effort to evaluate the importance
of secrecy objectively is the reality that often the best strategy
for protecting information is to protect all information, or at
least to protect that which would suggest the existence of im-
portant secret information. It is difficult visibly to expend re-
sources to protect information without giving away the fact
that the information is important, and thereby increase the
incentives for others to invest in acquiring it. One defense
against this is simply to protect all information.
Finally, although the arena in which secrecy is most im-
portant for businesses is the competitive one, disclosure can
also cause harm to the corporation from third parties. For
example, one significant risk from financial disclosure is that it
will lead to tax liabilities. When profits are reported for finan-
cial disclosure purposes, taxes may follow.
The Internal Revenue Code § 446(a), 26 U.S.C. § 446(a)(1994), provides *Tax-
able income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of
which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books. Thus a
system of accounting used for fiancial reporting can affect tax issues. See Commir
of Internal Revenue Service v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974):
Although agency-imposed compulsory accounting practices do not news-
sarily dictate tax consequences, they are not irrelevant and may be ac-
corded some significance. The opinions in American Automobile Ass'n u.
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961), and Schiude v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), urged upon us by the taxpayer hare,
are not to the contrary. In the former case it was obzerved that merely
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1. The Argument
The problem with accuracy enhancement as the normative
goal for securities disclosure is that the very information that
will enable investors to value the corporation is information
that can and will be used by competitors and others to de-
crease the value of the issuer. Investors can have the informa-
tion, but at a price: their investment will be worth less. This is
a point that many sophisticated commentators have made; the
because the method of accounting a taxpayer employs is in accordance
with generally accepted accounting procedures, this "is not to hold that
for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on
the Treasury." 367 U.S. at 693.... Nonetheless, where a taxpayer's
generally accepted method of accounting is made compulsory by the regu-
latory agency and that method clearly reflects income, it is almost pre-
sumptively controlling of federal income tax consequences.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted). See also Mazzocchi Bus Co. v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue Service, 14 F.3d 923 (3rd Cir. 1994). The link between financial reporting
accounting and tax accounting was made explicit for three years under the alter-
native minimum tax passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 § 701(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2326-2327, added a new § 56(f)(1) to
the Code which added 50 percent of the amount by which the adjusted net book
income of the corporation exceeded the alternative minimum taxable income for
tax years beginning in 1987, 1988 and 1989 to the alternative minimum taxable
income. Adjusted net book income was defined as 'the net income or loss of the
taxpayer set forth on the taxpayer's applicable financial statement, adjusted as
provided in this paragraph." 26 U.S.C. § 56(f)(2)(AX1988)(repealed 1990). The Sen-
ate Committee on Finance explained:
Tax fairness also requires that corporate taxpayers pay amounts of tax
appropriate for their level of earnings. The committee finds it unjustifi-
able for some corporations to report large earnings and pay significant
dividends to their shareholders, yet pay little or no taxes on that income
to the government. The committee has designed a strong alternative
minimum tax for corporations, based on a broad tax base, to prevent
corporations from significantly reducing their tax liability. A unique fea.
ture of this alternative minimum tax is the inclusion of a corporation's
book income in the tax base used for this computation.
S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986). The then expired provision was
removed from the Internal Revenue Code in 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990 § 11801(c)(2), 104 Stat. 1388-522 (Nov. 5, 1990) 26 U.S.C. § 56
(g)(4)(c)(1994).
German accounting is creditor-and-tax driven. German taxes are based on the
reported results. These earnings are smoothed from year-to-year, which provides a
more even flow of revenue to the government. For instance, Daimler-Benz, which
after its listing on the New York Stock Exchange reports both German and U.S.
GAAP results, reported profits on a German accounting basis in a recession year,
while reporting a loss on U.S. GAAP. See Barry Riley, Prudence and Pragmatism
in German Reporting, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 27, available in WESTLAW,
FTF Database.
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analyst needs to be sensitive to the costs of disclosure, includ-
ing the effects on an issuer's competitive position. But the
point is always made for analytic completeness, not to suggest
that it is a real problem." Indeed, concerns about harm to
"' Langevoort devotes several sentences to this problem.
Under the electronic system, the disclosure rule should allow companies
to withhold confidential information from the electronic file when the best
interests of the corporate entity-that is, those of the shareholders as a
group-outweigh the need for prompt disclosure. In such circumstance,
the investing public has no legitimate expectation of disclosure. The privi-
lege not to disclose, however, should be limited to prospective information
about plans, proposals, negotiations, and the like that premature disclo-
sure might thwart. Management should not be able to withhold material
information simply because disclosure would embarrass or inflict some
other sort of inchoate "harm" on the company. In order to strike a bal-
ance between these two legitimate interests, the electronic disclosure rule
should require that a corporation disclose all material information unless
it can show a significant risk of financial harm to its shareholders.
Langevoort, supra note 209, at 791. "A potential detriment is the possible, com-
petitive injury to issuers mating future-oriented disclosures, although the competi-
tive gains achieved by access to the disclosures of others may ameliorate this
injury:" Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projec-
tions: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1212 (1987).
More importantly, as we have seen, to require disclosure imposes costs
upon the corporation and society if the disclosure is 'premature' or other-
wise advantages competitors. Disclosure of a projection, asset appraisal,
or other information whose import may be unassailable as a matter of
logic, may ]foperly not be required to be disclosed because of its costs to
the corporation and its nontransacting stockholders.
Brudney, supra note 165, at 742-43 (footnotes omitted). The accountants recognize
these costs in FASB CONCEPTS 1, supra note 1, 9 23 and somewhat oddly (given
the subject of the statement) in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATE-
MENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 2: QUALITATIVE CHARACTrRiSTICS
OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 9 137, 140 (1980) [hereinafter IFASB CONCEPTS 21.
See also GEORGE J. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND
THE USA 142-43 (1976).
1 It has not been a problem in securities regulation. This could be explained
in two different ways. One, that issuer need for secrecy is not in fact a problem.
The other, that issuer need for secrecy has not been a problem because the securi-
ties laws have not required the disclosure of information important enough to be
kept secret. COX, E' AL., supra note 20, capture the received senre of its impor-
tance when they observe: "As Basic indicates, there will naturally be costs ausoci-
ated with a broad definition of materiality. At the extreme, some confidential infor-
mation may be exposed." COx, ET AL, supra note 20, at 75 (emphasis added).
FASB CONCEPTS 2, supra note 230, 1 139, recognizes, but is somewhat d sive
of, competitive concerns:
From the point of view of society, the loss of competitive advantage that
is said to result from some disclosure requirements is clearly in a differ-
ent category from the other costs involved. Although the loss to one busi-
ness enterprise may be the gain to another, the Board is aware of and
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the issuer have become so attenuated in the culture of secu-
rities law that the need for secrecy is hardly ever used as an
argument.s In the years before the rise of accuracy enhance-
concerned about the economic effects of the possible discouragement of
initiative, innovation, and willingness to take risks if a reward to risk
taking is denied. That is another cost that is impossible to begin to
quantify.
This is illustrated by the approach a securities lawyer takes to a problem
involving disclosure of significant but unasserted claims that exist against the
issuer. For example, Problem 2-1 in COX, Er AL., supra note 20, at 80, involves an
issuer in the process of preparing a 10-K whose only plant has recently been dis-
covered to encroach two feet onto adjoining property due to a surveying error
made 20 years ago. If the owner of the adjoining property discovers the encroach-
ment and asserts its rights, it will be necessary to close the plant to correct the
encroachment, with a large financial loss. If the owner of the adjoining property
does not discover the encroachment (which it has not for almost 20 years), the
period of adverse possession will have run and the claim will be lost. Does the
issuer have to disclose the encroachment in the 10-K, thus greatly increasing the
likelihood that the claim will be asserted and the issuer will suffer loss? The an-
swer turns out to be no, but the securities lawyer gets there not on the ground
that disclosure harmful to the issuer is not required, but by a long and convoluted
process that requires examination of all the items of required disclosure on 10-K,
FASB 5 on contingent liabilities, and careful evaluation of the Basic standard of
materiality. See William F. Bavinger & John T. Sant, Disclosure of Unascerted
Claims Under GAAP and the Securities Laws: Inviting Liability, 6 INSIGHTS,
September 1992, at 14. See also Problem 2-1 in TEACHER'S MANUAL for Cox, LT
AL., supra note 20, at 13.
Yet, why wouldn't the Court's reasonable investor consider the encroachment
significant, and prefer to calculate for himself whether or not the right will be
asserted? Of course, any reasonable stockholder would prefer that the encroach-
ment not be disclosed, since then it might be asserted, but the Court's reasonable
investor is unconcerned about cost.
The convoluted metaphysics of disclosure law creates a potential area of prac-
tice for outside counsel, since an issuer whose decision not to disclose has been
reached after consultation with a securities lawyer can later argue the absence of
scienter in an implied Rule 10b-5 action when it is sued after the bad (good) news
comes out and the stock price falls (rises). See David S. Ruder, Development of a
Corporate Disclosure Compliance Program, 6 INSIGHTS, June 1992, at 3 for an
example of a leading academic securities lawyer (and ex-Commission Chairman)
arguing the need for outside counsel:
A role may also exist for outside counsel. The law department may be
well advised to maintain contact with outside counsel experienced in
disclosure matters, so that it can consult regarding important or unusual
problems that may arise. It also may be useful from time to time to ask
outside counsel to review the corporation's disclosure practices and poli-
cies in order to determine whether improvements can be made.
Id. at 6. And: "For instance, a competent disclosure lawyer may help to interpret
the materiality standards of [Basic].... Experienced outside counsel may assist
in reaching important judgments on materiality in the probability/magnitude con-
text of this test." Id. at 6 n.8. The immunizing effect of a lawyer's opinion on 10b-
5 liability is discussed in Bevis Longstreth, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a De-
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ment, the argument against expanding the scope of disclosure
was either that it would result in the disclosure of too much
information, which would overwhelm the investor, or that it
would result in the disclosure of confusing information, whose
uncertainties the investor would be unable to evaluate. Both
are poor arguments' which no longer sound persuasive to
the decisionmakers, but they do appear to have curbed (or at
least justified curbing) the expansion of the disclosure obliga-
tion for years.
fense to Securities Law Volations, 37 BUS. LAW. 1185 (1982). It is not so clear,
however, what an experienced lawyer is actually willing to conclude about materi-
ality
The determination of 'materiality" of a fact or its omission, or of whether
there is a material inaccuracy in a statement, involves many questions of
fact and judgment. Usually any legal judgment will be based on a factual
analysis peculiarly within the knowledge and capability of the manage-
ment of the issuer. Although a lawyer can be helpful in bringing his
experience, interrogation techniques and judgment to bear on question of
materiality, he cannot-and should not-take over from the issuer or
other more qualified parties the responsibility for decision in these gray
areas.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by Spccial Committee on
Lawyer's Role in Securities Transactions, 32 BUS. LAW. 1879, 1895 (1977).
1 The first, because the investor can use a table of contents to locate the
information of interest, the second because an important part of the audience
consists of professional analysts who are as prepared to use the information as
anyone.
"' In Basic the defendants did, atypically, make an argument based on harm to
an issuer involved in merger negotiations. But they made it quietly. Petitioner's
Reply Brief at 7, Basic v. Levinson, No. 86-279, 485 U.S. 224 (1988('There is
sometimes a tension between the desire to keep investors informed and the attain-
ment of results that are in the best interests of stockholders"). The principal
thrust of the defendant's arguments was that they had not made a misrepresenta-
tion. The Court's response was brieft "[W]e think that creating an exception to a
regulatory scheme founded on a prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because com-
plying with the regulation might be 'bad for business,' is a role for Congress, not
this Court." Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). The Court gives the
argument some credence earlier in the opinion:
We need not ascertain, however, whether secrecy neceuarily maximizes
shareholder wealth ... for this case does not concern the timing of a
disclosure;.... Arguments based on the premise that _ome disclosure
would be "premature" in a sense are more properly considered under the
rubric of an issuer's duty to disclose. The "secrecy' rationale is simply
inapposite to the definition of materiality.
Id. at 235 (footnotes omitted). The Court does not explain why the "secrecy ratio-
nale" is "more properly considered under the rubric of an issuer's duty to disclos.7
The statutes make the duty to file a 10.K, 8-H, 10.Q or a registration statement
for a public offering absolute, with no special timing or exemptive treatment based
on the need for secrecy.
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If concerns about the harm to issuers are in fact a sub-
stantial problem, as where competitive strategies rather than
minor details are sought to be kept secret, then the objective of
accuracy enhancement becomes highly problematic. It is impos-
sible to provide disclosures that purport to reveal all material
information relevant to the value of a business while permit-
ting the omission of relevant information because of the need
for secrecy. The investor cannot use the resulting document as
an authoritative guide to the value of the issuer, since he can-
not even determine what is omitted.
Lawyers form their judgment about the importance of
secrecy for business from the legal system. The reported trade-
secret cases involve technical information about production
processes and information about the identity, location and
needs of customers. The defendant in such cases is typically a
low-level employee involved in production or dealing directly
with customers who has left the plaintiffs employment to form
or work for a competing business. Businesses do not sue de-
parting high-level management employees because of their
access to strategic and planning information about the busi-
ness.' But the protection of secrecy through litigation is al-
ways problematic. It is difficult to sue claiming that a secret
has been stolen without identifying the secret, at least to the
defendant. The identity of the crucial information may be the
most important secret of all.2
6
Another way to understand the role of secrecy is to develop
a model of the functions management performs in order to
" In the summer of 1993 General Motors departed from this pattern when
Vice President S. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua left General Motors for Volkswagen,
and General Motors pursued him with legal actions (including criminal investiga-
tions) on two continents. Court Proposes GM-VW Settlement; New Probe Due,
WASH. POST, November 10, 1993, at F4; GM: VW Ruining Germany's Image,
WARD'S AUTO WORLD, June 1, 1994, at 19. Proctor & Gamble has recently been
pursuing an aggressive litigation strategy against high-level management employ-
ees departing for Johnson & Johnson. Jennifer Kent, Pepper Going to Court Over
Trade Secrets; P&G Sues Ex-Workers Hired by Rival Company, CINCINNATI POST,
Sept. 23, 1994. That case has been settled. P.G. Lawsuit Involving Trade Secrets
Is Settled, N.Y. TIMwS, Oct. 4, 1994, at D4.
"3 The loyalty of high-level employees may be virtually assured by the level
and structure of compensation packages. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler,
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(1974); Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70
J. POL. ECON. 9 (1970).
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identify the type of information management needs to perform
those functions, and then to determine whether it is important
to the effective performance of the function that the informa-
tion remain confidential. The legal literature focuses not on the
positive functions of management but on the constraints which
the law places on management.
Surely all would agree that a principal management fime-
tion is the function of increasing the value of the business.'m
That function has important implications for disclosure policy.
The reason that information about past results provides an
incomplete basis for valuing a firm is that the important ques-
tion is not what the past results were, but what management
is going to do about the past results. Maybe a long string of
poor results shows that management doesn't know what to do;
or maybe a long string of poor results increases the likelihood
that management will be forced to do, and will do, something.
So is born the turnaround play. Conversely, a long string of
good results is important only if management knows how to
continue to get good results. If the purpose of disclosure is to
enable investors to correctly value the stock of the issuer, the
information they need is information about what steps man-
agement is taking, and is going to take, to improve or preserve
the performance of the issuer. The investor can then evaluate
those steps and decide for him or herself whether they are
likely to work.
The problem is that if management has correctly identified
the steps to take, once competitors learn what the steps are
they can proceed to follow those steps. If, for instance, the key
is to get out of one business which is losing money and has no
prospect for improvement while expanding investment in an-
other, which is more profitable and likely to grow, then once
the issuer discloses these steps and the reasons why they are
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance provide that "a corporation
should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTM, PICI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOmmENDATIONS § 2.01(a)
(1992) [hereinafter "ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCEI. The Principles
do not analyze, however, the nature of the environment which best enables the
corporation to achieve that objective. The board of directors is assigned the power,
but not the function, of managing the corporation. ALI PRiNCIpLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 3.02(b)(6). The Principles do not analyze what it means to managa
a corporation.
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the right steps to take, competitors can simply do the same
thing. Of course, when they enter the business thought to be
profitable they will drive down its profitability.
The harm to the issuer of disclosure is compounded by the
fact that the implementation of significant changes in a busi-
ness takes time, sometimes lots of time. It can take half a
decade or more to complete the downsizing of one business
while expanding another, or to design, engineer, produce and
market a new product. The longer the lead time, the easier it
is for competitors to catch up once the strategy is disclosed.
The ability of competitors to use information is, of course,
not quite that simple. Even if managements can obtain infor-
mation about the strategy of their competitors, they must still
decide which competitor they should follow. The answer is to
follow the competitor that has the right strategy. But how does
one know which competitor has the right strategy without
knowing what the right strategy is, in which case there is no
need to follow? The answer, of course, is to copy the manage-
ment best at picking the correct strategy.
Although it is impossible to observe the internal
decisionmaking and implementation procedures of manage-
ments, an analogy helps explain the argument. Think of a
business management as a portfolio manager. The business's
portfolio consists of its present activities. Management's prob-
lem is to manage the portfolio. This requires it to identify
those activities from which it should withdraw (sell the stock)
and those activities in which it should invest (buy the stock).
To enhance the value of the portfolio, management needs to
make the decisions which, ex post, maximize the value of the
portfolio.
Since much of the activity of managing portfolios is observ-
able and the results are unblinkingly numeric, there is an
empirical literature on that activity. Pursuing that analogy, we
know that the managers of portfolios are likely, on average, to
obtain results equal to those of the market as a whole.' But
we also know that some managements will obtain a string of
2' RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON
STOCKS 53-63 (2d ed. 1983). The classic study was lichael C. Jenson, The Perfor-
mance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. FIN. 389 (1968), which
found that mutual funds had an average return of 0.1 percent a year less than a
comparable index fund.
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above-average results. When they do, others begin to copy their
moves and the moves become less profitable. Thus in the activ-
ity of managing portfolios we observe that managers with a
reputation for success will seek confidentiality. To escape the
disclosure requirements of the Investment Company Act they
organize an offshore fund,' 9 or they take control of insurance
companies whose portfolios are reported on a delayed and
fragmented basis."4 Even if there is no reason to predict that
a manager successful in beating the averages in one year can
do it the next, it is clear that a manager who is believed to be
successful will lower his chances of success if his competitors
mimic his decisions.
Corporate managements face the same problem. Take the
simple problem of reporting how much money the business has
made. When a successful manager reports that his single-prod-
uct business is very profitable, other firms will target the busi-
ness for entry when they see just how profitable the business
is. If they do, the profitability of the business will decline. We
do not, of course, think of information about the profitability of
a business as a trade secret. That is because businesses know
how to report their profits in ways which comport with the
21 Hedge" fimds are either organized with fewer than 100 investors (so as to
be exempt from the reporting requirements of the Investment Company Act of
1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I) (1995), or are organized as off-shore invest-
ment funds that are not open to American investors directly. The largo hedge
finds managed by people such as George Soros, I'ichael Steinhardt and Bruce
Kovner are off-shore. There is a dealer market in London, see Leslie Eaton, Trou-
ble for Soros-Reichmann Team, N.Y. TIRES, Sept. 25 1994, at Fl1, although they
are off-shore the UX as well. Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Bermuda, Luxembourg
and the Republic of Ireland are favored jurizdictions. See Tracy Corrigan, Not a
Basket for all of Your Eggs-Hedge Fundsla Look at the Place of an Instrument
That Has Disturbed World Markets, FT Guide for the Serious Investor, FRI. TRlES,
Sept. 17/Sept. 18, 1994, at 12; E. Lee Hennessee, Flowering Hcdges: The Funds
Have Had a Very Good Year, BARRON'S, Dec. 13, 1993, at 16, 1993. No potential
investor should make the mistake of assuming that because an investment manag-
er is not subject to public reporting requirements that the manager is succesul
I Warren Buffett has gone even farther by increasingly investing through
unique, individually negotiated transactions that are not available on the public
market. None of these strategies avoid the requirement of § 13(d)(1) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(1994), that any person acquiring more than 5
percent of any securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 781 (1994), report the position to the issuer, to each exchange where the
securities is traded, and to the Commission. Many of the hedge funds (but not
Buffett) appear to be active in markets for products such as currencies and over-
the-counter derivatives where there are no position reporting requirements.
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securities laws but conceal which of their activities are really
profitable. For a single-activity business, however, publicly
reporting high profits can be devastating.
These arguments do not support the position that any
regulation which reduces the amount of information which
firms ,can protect with secrecy would reduce social welfare.
Economic theory, for instance, does not suggest what amount
of competitive lead time derived from secrecy is the "right"
amount.2" One can imagine an economy in which the
thoughts and plans of all managements would be transparent
to the managements of every other firm. Such an economy
would still be competitive. 42 It would also be an economy in
which innovation and risk-taking would occur less frequently
than they do in an economy with greater inherent first-mover
advantage. 3 But any system of required transparency be-
tween firms cannot be implemented simply by imposing the
requirement only on firms subject to the U.S. securities laws.
Those firms face competition from firms not subject to the U.S.
securities laws-most notably the non-U.S. multinationals.
241 The optimal lead time issue is important in the literature on patents, whore
economists display a tendency to prefer the natural amount of lead time, whatever
it happens to be, and although it differs from industry to industry and activity to
activity. Patents are a property right, one of whose effects is to increase the
amount of lead time over the amount that would otherwise be available. The liter.
ature, on the whole, is uncomfortable with patents. The classic judgment is that of
Fritz Machlup: "If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences to recommend
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it." FRITz MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80, STUDY NO.
15 of SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 1958). More recent literature is discussed
and cited in Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Pat.
ent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). For a similarly ambivalent reaction to
copyrights (which also increase lead time) by a lawyer (and now Supreme Court
Justice) influenced by the economics literature see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case of Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Pro-
grams, 84 IARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
24 Although the efforts of firms to facilitate inter-firm communication through
trade associations or other devices have been attacked under the antitrust laws,
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
' This is the point of the FASB CONCEPTS 2, supra note 230, q 139, quoted in
note 231.
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Surely the United States should not require firms subject to
U.S. securities laws to share useful commercial information
with all of their competitors when many of their competitors
are not subject to the same requirement.
2. Case Studies of the Implementation of Accuracy
Enhancement as Examples of the Problem
The case studies expounded in the first part of this Article
can be used to illustrate the types of problems that cause issu-
ers to resist implementation of accuracy enhancement. Why
havenlt the SEC's efforts to implement the accuracy-enhance-
ment ideal gone smoothly? Of course, there are technical prob-
lems, but why haven't the issuers, accountants, securities law-
yers and regulators formed one effective team whose shared
objective is to iron out the difficulties and move ahead? The
short answer is that the issuers have not been willing to help.
Why?
a. Projections
At first blush it might seem that projections could have no
competitive importance. After all, a projection is nothing but a
prediction about what might happen. There is a market in the
world for predictions, but it is a limited one. The problem with
a system for the disclosure of projections is that embedded
within projections may be information about how a firm ex-
pects to react to the conditions which it anticipates, and this is
more likely to be true the more rigorous the projection. Sup-
pose one firm expects sales of its principal product (say insula-
tion) to decline because of a projected decline in housing starts
caused by a rise in interest rates. Suppose the firm notices
that its principal competitor does not project a decline? Why? A
new marketing strategy? A new product? What supports the
projection? If the projection is rigorous and informative, it will
explain why the fall in housing starts will not have the other-
wise expected impact on sales. If the reason is a change in the
firm's business strategies, perhaps the competitor should mim-
ic them. Note how the logic of the SEC's proposal for projec-
tions led toward the production of more and more informa-
tion--disclose not only your projections, but the logic behind
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your projections, and once you disclose projections, disclose any
change in projections, and so on. It is easy to see that once the
SEC was committed to a system of projections it would lead to
pressures for a better system of projections, which would lead
to requirements for the production of more information, and so
on.
b. Segmentation
The SEC does require some segmentation, but so many of
the rules for the implementation of the segmentation require-
ment are left to the discretion of the individual issuer that it is
unlikely that they lead to the disclosure of much information of
competitive or investment value. Activities can be grouped and
costs allocated in so many different ways that it would be diffi-
cult, if not foolhardy, for a competitor to use segmented FASB
data as a blueprint for one's own competitive strategy. The
problem of competitive harm is particularly unimportant for
relatively large, multiproduct firms.
The defects in the present segmentation requirements lead
to demands for better segmentation. For instance, more than
ten significant changes in required segmenting procedures
suggested by the Association for Investment Management and
Research (which represents 23,000 professional financial ana-
lysts worldwide) were prominently reported in a recent FASB
research report, Reporting Disaggregated Information.2"
Additional precision and detail in the segmentation re-
quirements would provide additional relevant data for financial
analysts to understand and use to make predictions about issu-
ers. But it would also increase the ability of competitors and
others to understand issuers' areas of vulnerability and
strengths and weaknesses, and thereby be better able to devel-
op successful competitive strategies. Reporting Disaggregated
Information contains a chapter summarizing views of financial
analysts, lending and credit officers, financial information
publishers and other users of financial reports." It contains
no material on the views of the producers of financial reports.
In a concluding chapter, Reporting Disaggregated Informa-
2' PACTER, supra note 79, at vi-vi.
" PACTER, supra note 79, at itl, 59-116.
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tion identifies twenty-seven issues requiring twenty-three
pages to describe what the FASB should consider in connection
with a reevaluation of the segmentation requirements. Only
one issue deals with the issue of possible harm to the entity
subject to the standards. It is:
ISSUE 21: Can specific examples be found of how Statement 14
disclosures have been harmful to competition, and what changes
should be made to the Statement to ameliorate the harm in the
future? For example, should companies be allowed to omit disclo-
sures that management deems competitively harmful, with disclo-
sure of the omission?"
What, the reader wonders, is a sufficiently specific example to
be relevant? And why are examples of harm under the existing
requirements the only issue. What about harm under any of
the proposed changes?
c. MD&A and the Caterpillar Case
It is impossible for a management to prepare a "good"
MD&A disclosure-that is, a disclosure that truly achieves the
objectives of the required disclosure-without revealing a good
deal about what it thinks about its businesses, the markets in
which its businesses operate, and how those markets will
evolve. That is inherent in the very analytic process which the
disclosure solicits. But there is the further problem that the
disclosure may aggravate the very problem that management
is attempting to address. Take the example of Caterpillar's
business in Brazil. Caterpillar was, presumably, quite worried
about what to do about its business in Brazil. Would it have
helped if Caterpillar had disclosed, in the midst of the political
transition going on in Brazil, that nearly one-quarter of its
worldwide profits came from its Brazilian subsidiary? Aside
from the fact that such a disclosure might have been mislead-
ing because the results reflected accounting conventions and
not economic reality, could not such a disclosure have led
to attacks from politicians in Brazil that Caterpillar was "prof-
" PATER, supra note 79, at 225 (emphasis added). A number of foreign ac-
counting systems permit managements to omit segment information if they deter-
mine that such information would be competitively harmful, with disclosure of the
omission. PACTEP, supra note 79, at 52.
2' See the discussion supra note 144.
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it gouging" the Brazilian people? Brazilian officials certainly
would have said: "Can you believe it? Caterpillar operates all
over the world, in the United States, in Japan, in Europe, and
yet last year they made almost a quarter of their enormous
profits off the backs of the Brazilian people. Something must
be done." That something might not have been very good for
Caterpillar.
d. Merger Negotiations: Basic
Why didn't the Basic management simply disclose the
merger negotiations? Why do managements now say "no com-
ment," rather than disclose the truth? One explanation that
has been offered is that suitors in a merger situation want
secrecy in order to avoid competing bids. That is, prospective
suitors will be reluctant to make a serious offer if they predict
that their offer will simply be used to interest another suit-
or." s Another explanation is that anything that increases the
" "One specter facing any potential buyer is the winner's curse--the prospect
that the high bidder wins the auction only because he alone has placed an unreal-
istically high value on the assets." Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1176 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.).
News that merger negotiations were in progress would signal to other
investors that Basic was an attractive merger prospect, allowing them to
"free ride" on Combustion's investment in information about Basic. The
simple identity of valuable takeover targets is information that lends
itself to free riding. This is because the identification of a firm such as
Basic as a likely takeover target "signals to other investors that under-
valued assets have been located. Because the subsequent bidders have
incurred no costs to acquire information, they can offer more to target.
firm shareholders, forcing the initial bidder to increase her offer or lose
the opportunity to acquire the target firm." The free-rider problem ad-
versely affects investor wealth maximization to the extent it discourages
acquirors who would otherwise pay shareholders a takeover premium for
the shares they own. After al, "no firm wants to be the first bidder
unless it has some advantage, such as speed, over subsequent bidders to
compensate for the fact that only it had to incur monitoring costs. And,
of course, if there is no first bidder there will be no later bidders and no
tender premium." For this reason, among others, it is well settled that
premature disclosure of merger discussions may thwart the merger, there-
by "destroying the source of the value sought to be disclosed."
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analy-
sis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1069-70 (1990).
Macey and Miller would permit management to issue false statements to further
this interest. Id. at 1071. In fact, Basic may not have been a good example of this
point, since there were unique advantages to a merger between the particular
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verifiable certainty that a merger will occur is likely to in-
crease the percentage of stock held by arbitragers, who will put
increasing pressure on management to strike a deal, even if
they must accept terms somewhat less attractive than those
that could be obtained from harder bargaining.
e. Market-Value Accounting
Market-value accounting presents a number of different
problems for issuers. First of all, issues of valuation present
uncertainties which can become matters for litigation. Under a
cost-based system, the issuer can always defend on the
grounds that the balance sheet disclosed the cost. In a market-
value system, on the other hand, the plaintiffs can always
argue that a valuation was wrong. If the values have fallen or
risen sharply from the amounts used on the balance sheet,
they may seem, with the benefit of hindsight, to have been
prepared with the required scienter.
Second, a market-value system requires the collection of
information that the issuer would not have to collect on a regu-
lar operating basis. Although managements need to have some
idea of what their assets are worth in order to properly deter-
mine whether they should be sold, precise value information is
not something they will prepare annually with sufficient care
to withstand possible Rule 10b-5 liability. The ease of valuing
particular assets turns on whether they are regularly traded in
markets with public price reporting, even though those public-
ly reported prices are nothing more than a consensus of indi-
vidual estimates, none verifiable. The securities whose valua-
tion is required by FASB 115 can be valued easily, perhaps
even automatically valued by a computer programmed to
download market prices. Real estate can be valued based on
information provided by actual transactions whose prices are
in the public record, applying appropriate adjustments to re-
flect the lack of perfect comparability. But as the asset be-
comes more specialized to the business-custom-designed ma-
chinery, trademarks, intangible assets-the problem of deter-
parties, to judge by the fact that Combustion Engineering (the acquiror) pursued
Basic consistently for thirteen years. See the chronology in Levinson v. Basic 786
F.2d 741, 743-45 (6th Cir. 1986).
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mining a value for the asset comes closer and closer to the
problem of making forecasts about the business in which the
firm competes, for the value of these specialized assets is noth-
ing more than the present value of the cash flows they will
generate when used in business. 49
The financial institutions most directly affected by FASB
115 (because of the high proportion of qualifying securities on
the asset side of their balance sheets) objected vehemently to
FASB 1 1 5 .'o They objected to the fact that it required mar-
ket valuation of a portion of the asset side of the balance sheet,
but of no portion of the liability side, with the result that
FASB 115 would cause economically meaningless changes in
net worth."' They argued that to avoid this effect bankers
' Tom Lee, Mark to Market: The U.K Experience, J. OF ACCT., Sept. 1994, at
84, reports on a trial run in the U.K. with mark to market accounting, which,
among other things, obtained reactions from issuer management:
Preparing the company's market-value based accounting statements
proved to be relatively easy. However, the statement preparation was
influenced by senior management's longtime use of historical costs and its
doubts about the relevance of market values and was constrained by the
difficulty of obtaining market value data for special or unmarketable
assets.
Id. at 86. After the trial run, a group of accountants recommended using "a mix
of current value methods appropriate to the assets being reported" rather than
only net realizable current value. Id. at 88.
20 The controversy is reviewed as of 1991 in Donald J. Kirk, Commentary:
Competitive Disadvantage and Mark-To-Market Accounting, 5 ACCT. HORIZONS,
June 1991, at 98. U.S. banks were required to use market-value accounting prior
to 1938. In that year the U.S. Treasury and the bank regulators changed their
position, and required cost-of- acquisition accounting. See id. at 102-03. The back-
ground of the 1938 accord is reviewed in Donald G. Simonson & George H.
Hempel, Banking Lessons form the Past: The 1938 Regulatory Agreement Interpret-
ed, 7 J. FIN. SERVS. REs. 249 (1993). The authors conclude that the 1938 accord
was based not on normative accounting principles but on a desire to ease bank
credit.
"Z To take a simple example, assume a bank owns $1,000,000 of 5-year U.S.
government notes paying six percent. It also has $1,000,000 in deposit liabilities
on five year certificates of deposit paying four percent. Interest rates rise. The
value of the government notes fall, but so does the present value of the liability
claim. If these offset, there is no impact on net worth. Under FASB 115, net
worth is reduced. The structure of the arguments for and against the market
valuation approach is the same. That is, both sides argue that the proposal they
oppose would lead to "unreal" results. The advocates of market value accounting
argued that cost accounting was "once upon a time" accounting that would lead to
artificial behavior, such as the sale of appreciated portfolio securities in order to
affect reported net income. See testimony of SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, su-
pra note 186 and accompanying text.
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would change their investment strategies, particularly by re-
ducing investments in long-term instruments, whose values
are more strongly affected by changes in interest rates. More-
over, the critics implied that FASB 115 would even create
problems in the government bond market.
It is difficult to determine from the banker's complaints
why a change in the volatility of their reported net worth
would change their behavior. 2 One explanation would be
that the change in the accounting procedure would affect bank-
ing regulation. The mark-to-market valuation procedure would
be incorporated into the minimum capital requirements, so
that the change in the reported balance-sheet net worth would
change the way they would have to respond to the regulation.
In turn, they face competition for loans with banks from other
jurisdictions who might not be subject to the same rule. If the
regulatory consequences of the accounting procedure changed
their real costs, they would be disadvantaged in this competition.=3
' WILhin months of the adoption of FASB 115 the American Bankers Ascia-
tion and the Independent Bankers Association of America were claiming that
FASB 115 had already affected bank behavior, most notably causing banks to
shorten the maturities of their asset portfolio. Bankers' Dire Predictions on FASB
115"s Bad Effects Are Coming True, Groups Warn 62 BANMNG REP. (BNA) No.62,
at 698 (April 18, 1994). On February 14, 1995, Federal Reserve Governor John
LaWare said in a speech to the Independent Bankers Association of America that
'Financial Accounting Standards Board Standard 115 has weakened investment
portfolio positions and will continue to add volatility to bank balance sheats.! Reg-
ulatory Relief, Expanded Powers on Horizon for Banks, Laware Tells IBAA, 64
BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 64, at 361 (Feb. 20, 1995).
' I have not found a place where this is argued explicitly. See Walter Wriston,
'Mark to Market. Widd Accountants' Crazy Idea, WALL ST. J., Juno 11, 1992, at
A14. Although a passionate and quite eloquent tirade against FASB 115 by an
elder statesman of the banking industry, (former CEO of Citibank), it doas not
make this point. Wriston's basic argument is that balance shoets already reflect
numerous "artificial" conventions (such as the failure to value numerous intangi-
bles as an asset) so that a reform designed to eliminate one such convention out
of many on the ground that it is "artificial" makes little sense. Id. Donald G.
Simonson, Marking-To-Market: Is It Any Way to Run a Bank?, U.S. BANKER, Nov.
1992, at 64, dismisses the bankers opposition on the ground that "The essence of
such criticisms is that better information is economically dangerous. M ost econo-
mists argue that, on the contrary, fuller information is important to insure that
markets operate efficiently." See also Donald G. Simonson, Securitics Accounting:
Half a Loaf, U.S. BANKER, Jan. 1993, at 49. In spite of the title, Kirk, cupra note
250, only refers to and criticizes a speech by SEC Commissioner Philip I. Lochner
arguing that FASB fails to take the impact of its standards on international com-
petition into account. Why was the argument from regulatory requirements not
made? One possible explanation is that the bankers wanted to reserve the option
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Ironically (because the move towards market-value bal-
ance sheets has been justified by the example), a market-value
balance sheet does not reveal the basic problem that got the
savings and loans into difficulty in the first place; that was a
failure of the maturities of their assets and liabilities to match.
Thus before the rise in interest rates that led to their insolven-
cy, their market-value balance sheets would have shown that
they were solvent, but would not have revealed the maturity
mismatch that made their solvency so fragile.
f. Portfolio Managers
Finally, why haven't investment companies been eager to
disclose the identity of portfolio managers? If the disclosure
documents identify the portfolio manager, it would be possible
for third parties to compile performance records for particular
portfolio managers. Those who compiled a good record would
acquire a valuable reputation in the market. The portfolio
manager can then bargain for higher compensation by threat-
ening to take his or her reputation and go elsewhere. The
investment companies want the public to be loyal to the com-
pany, not to the individual portfolio manager. Many invest-
ment companies have avoided the impact of the new disclosure
that if FASB 115 was adopted (as seemed very likely once Richard Breeden had
been so emphatic, supra note 186 and accompanying text) they could then argue
to the regulators that the regulators should not change their rules to reflect the
changes of FASB 115. This is in fact what happened. The Federal Reserve, for
instance, first proposed, 56 Fed. Reg. 68563, Dec. 28, 1993, but then did not adopt
FASB 115 for purposes of computing regulatory capital. 59 Fed. Reg. 63241 (1994).
So did the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See OTS Reverses FASB 116
Compliance Policy, Ending Requirement for Thrifts, BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 64,
at 833 (Dec. 5, 1994); FDIC Approves Several Final Rules, 1995 Budget, and Tech-
nical Amendments, BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 64, at 9 (Jan. 2, 1995). Only the
credit-union regulator did so, to the dismay of the credit unions. See CUNA [The
Credit Union Association] Suggests NCUA [The National Credit Union Administra-
tion] Delay Effective Date Requiring Credit Unions to Adopt FASB 115, BANKING
REP. (BNA) No. 64, at 36 (Jan. 2, 1995). The leading opponents of using FASB
115 in the computation of bank capital were the smaller banks, and their argu-
ments were the same that had been made against FASB 115 itself. The Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee criticized the banking regulators for their failure
to incorporate FASB 115 into their minimum capital standards. Group Wants Ban
on Charter Flips Lifted, Criticizes Regulators for Snubbing FASB, BANKING REPORT
(BNA) No. 63 at 920 (Dec. 19, 1994).
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requirements by placing responsibility for investment decisions
on a group, rather than an individual.,
3. The History
Why, if the need for secrecy is an important problem un-
der the securities laws, hasn't the point been made frequently
and vehemently by issuers? The answer is that the securities
laws have not required the disclosure of sensitive information.
The accuracy enhancement goal, however, requires that they
do, and if implemented, would make the problem a serious one.
The need for confidentiality was, in fact, a credible argu-
ment in the formative years of the securities laws. Arguments
2r'
When the SEC does try to improve disclosure, funds often race to find
the nearest loophole. After the agency began requiring greater disclosure
about fund managers, many funds, including a number from Invesco,
changed from divulging the names of lead managers to claiming the
funds were under the direction of co-managers or teams, which allows
them to skirt the new rules. (Invesco claim its funds have always been
team-managed.) About a third of the funds surveyed by Morningstar now.
say they have a team of two or more managers, more than twice the
number just five years ago. In its fund prospectus, T. Rowe Price tells
prospective shareholders only how long a fund manager has worked for
the Baltimore company and the length of time he or she has been invest-
ing. No further information about his professional background is given.
Argues Jane hite, director of shareholder communications: "Whether he
went to Harvard or keeps bees or managed taxable bonds and is now
managing municipal bonds doesn't add that much.'
Stewart & Cramer, supra note 214, at 98, 100. See also, Don Phillips (publisher of
Morningstar M utual Funds), What Mutual Funds Don't Tell You, Important Infor-
mation that Could be Dangerous to Your Wealth, BOTTOM LINE, July 15, 1994 at 1
("So why do funds prefer to say that they are run by committee? Becaure when
the key manager leaves the fund, investors may leave with him/her.).
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based on an issuer need for secrecy were only briefly voiced 5
in the hearings on the Exchange Act. A section was added to
the Exchange Act specifically addressing trade secrets. As
enacted, section 24(a) provided, "Nothing in this title shall be
construed to require, or to authorize the Commission to re-
quire, the revealing of trade secrets or processes in any appli-
cation, report, or document filed with the Commission under
this title." 6 Section 24(b), in turn, provided a procedure for
persons filing a document to object to its public disclosure, and
that 'The Commission may, in such cases, make available to
the public the information contained in any such... document
only when its judgment a disclosure of such information is in
" I have located only two places where this argument against disclosure is
made in the hearings on the Exchange Act. First:
Sections [22] and [24] of the bill provide that all hearings before the
Commission shall be public and that all information received by it shall
be public records. The latter provision, which would seem to require that
all information which the Federal Trade Commission may receive from
corporations must be made available to any person who wishes to exam-
ine it, may result in putting American business at a distinct disadvan-
tage in competing with foreign enterprises. We all know that every im-
portant business has trade secrets and processes and formulas which
have value chiefly because they are not available to competitors. In like
manner, many of the statistics in regard to the operations of companies
are of little value to stockholders and investors, but of inestimable worth
to competitors. These provisions requiring publicity may, therefore, have
very serious consequences.
A Resolution to Investigate Practices of Stock Exchanges with Respect to the Buying
and Selling and the Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities: Hearings on S.
Res. 84 before the Senate Comm. on Banking Currency, 73rd Cong. 1st Sees., re-
printed in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
6640 (1973) (J.S. Ellenberger et al., eds. 1973) (Statement of Richard Whitney,
President of the New York Stock Exchange in Regard to H.R. 7852). Second:
Sections [22] and [24], relating to publicity of all hearings, records, re-
ports, and documents will be welcomed by thousands of competitors of
those whose success has depended upon legitimate business secrets, such
as secret processes, ideas, etc. This may well destroy the property right
of every corporation in its good will, its method of doing business, the
development of ideas for its benefit, and similar intangible property. It
will also be welcomed by all who engage in the bringing of strike suits
against corporations.
Id. at 7020 (Letter from the New York Airbrake Co., Feb. 27, 1934). Thomas
Corcoran's answer to these arguments is quoted in the text, supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
" Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 901 (June 6, 1934) (codified as
amended at Title I § 24, ch. 404, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994)). The Securities Act of
1933 contained no comparable provision, probably because its provisions could be
avoided completely simply by not making a public offering.
[Vol. 61: 763
1995] THE THEORYAND PRACTICE OF SECURIIYS DISCLOSURE 867
the public interest.' 7
In the floor debates, an argument based on issuer need for
secrecy was one of the points made by the opponents of the
Exchange Act in spite of Section 24. For example, one Senator
argued that:
The objection was raised before the committee that the commission
could require the divulging of trade secrets. The committee provided
against that by appropriate language. But there is still in this sec-
tion [12, requiring registration] an absolutely unrestrained power in
the commission to require of corporations information which, al-
l Id. § 24(b) (emphasis added). Section 24 was amended by the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 19, 89 Stat. 158 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1994)). The purpose of the amendment was to conform the
statute to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b) of the
amended section prohibits disclosure of any records '(1) in contravention of the
rules and regulations of the Commission under section 552 of Title 5, United
States Code [the Freedom of Information Act] or (2) in circumstances where the
Commission has determined pursuant to such rules to accord confidential treat-
ment to such information." 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b) (1994). The right to seek confiden-
tial treatment from the Commission continues under the Securities Act, Rule 406,
17 C.F.R. § 230.406 (1995), and under the Exchange Act, Rule 24b-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.24b-2 (1995). Rule 406 does not set out the ground on which the Commission
might grant confidential treatment, but does require the applicant for confidential
treatment to provide "a detailed explanation of why, based on the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case, disclosure of the information is unnecessary for
the protection of investors." 17 C.F.R § 230.406(b)(2)(iii) (1995). One situation
where requests for confidential treatment apparently are made with some success
is where a material contract required to be filed with the Commission under Item
601(a)(10) of Regulation 17, 29 C.F.L § 229.601(b)(10) (1995), which contains
nonmaterial information whose disclosure would have competitive implications for
the issuer. See Comizio, supra note 213, at 789-90. An example might be a pricing
formula contained in an important supply contract. Rule 24-b provides that the
grounds for confidential treatment are those items exempt from disclosure under
its Freedom of Information Act regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 200.80 (1995). The most
likely exemption is exemption 4: 'trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidentiaL" 17 C.F.R. §
200.80(b)(4) (1995). Of course, the reference is circular, since if the Commission
denies confidential treatment, the information no longer qualifies. The Freedom of
Information Act regulation, 17 C.FR. § 200.80 (1995), describes numerous docu-
ments that may qualify, but does not mention documents required to be filed.
Comizio cautiously concludes: "arguments under exemption 4 for nondisclosure of
commercial and financial information may be of limited utility due to the circum-
stances under which such information is required to be disclosed pursuant to the
public disclosure goals of the securities laws." Comizio, supra note 213, at 80S.
Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, in
SECURITIES REGULATION 164, 171 (Richard W. Jennings, ed., 7th ed. 1992), excerpt-
ed from a 1988 version of Schneider, supra note 214, offers an understated conclu-
sion worthy of securities lawyers, which, of course, they are: "[lit is difficult to ob-
tai confidential treatment as a practical matter.7
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though not falling within the definition of trade secrets, is neverthe-
less very confidential in its character. There is still in this section
the complete and full possibility that the commission may at any
time require of any corporation disclosure of facts which will be very
beneficial to the competitor of that corporation."
The concerns about secrecy in the debates and during the
earlier years of the act can be better understood in the context
of the coverage of the Securities Acts as first passed. The Secu-
rities Act could be avoided by not engaging in a public offering.
The disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act were little
different from those already imposed by the New York Stock
ExchangeY9 The original Exchange Act, however, was not
limited to companies listed on exchanges. It also extended
disclosure requirements to unlisted issuers traded on exchang-
es, and gave the Commission power to require registration of
any company whose securities were traded in the over-the-
counter market. Commission power to require disclosure from
issuers whose securities were traded in the over-the-counter
market was included out of a fear that issuers might flee the
exchanges for the over-the-counter market."' The original
" 78 Cong. Rec. 8274 (1934) (statement of Sen. Steiwer). He returns to this
argument at 78 Cong. Rec. 8277 (1934). See also 78 Cong. Rec. 8284 (1934) (state-
ment of Sen. Walcott) and 78 Cong. Rea. 8497 (1934) (Statement of the National
Automobile Chamber of Commerce submitted by Sen. Hastings).
" "In order for a corporation to list its securities on the New York Stock Ex-
change the rules of the exchange require it to furnish all the information provided
for in this bill except that concerning salaries and bonuses." 78 Cong. Roe. 1934-35
(May 2, 1934) (statement of Rep. Chapman).
Now, I want to say that before a man can list his stock on the New
York Stock Exchange, he may be required to file that much or more [as
the disclosures required by the act] (apart from the disclosure of bonuses,
which certainly the investing public has a right to know), but there
seems to be a fear running around that the Government is going to regi-
ment business.
78 Cong. Rae. 7697 (April 30, 1934) (statement of Rep. Rayburn). "They [previsions
for decent and frequent corporate reports] simply standardize requirements which
the stock exchanges are already making at a standard which offers at least a
beginning of protection against the concealment of management interests of inves-
tors who have hitherto bought into listed securities almost entirely blindly." 78
Cong. Rea. 7699 (April 30, 1934) (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
"Frankly, this section of the bill protects the legitimate exchange from the
over-the-counter fellows in having them run from the exchange to the unregulated
market." 78 Cong. Rec. 8036 (May 3, 1934) (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
The language of section 15 is calculated to cause those corporations to
remain upon the exchange because it will let them know that they will
be subject to regulation, either on the exchange, or if they try to avoid
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Section 15 provided:
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and to insure to investors protection comparable to
that provided by and under authority of this title in the case of
national securities exchanges, (1) for any broker... to make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
for the purpose of making... a market... for both the purchase
and sale of any security.... Such rules and regulation may pro-
vide.., for the registration of the securities for which they make or
create a market.2 1
Because of Section 15, a theme of opponents of the Ex-
change Act was that it was not simply a statute about the
exchanges and securities brokers, but that it was a regulatory
regime that could potentially reach almost every issuer of non-
exempt securities in the United States.' This meant that
the information disclosure requirements could reach most busi-
nesses of any size, including those far too small to be listed on
the regulatory powers provided for in the bill and endeavor to have their
securities traded in over the counter, they will meet the same regulation.
78 Cong. Rec. 8186 (May 7, 1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes).
IL 48 Stat. 901 (June 6, 1934) (codified as amended at Title I § 15, 15 U.S.C.
§78k-l(c) (1994)).
1 "So that the Commission could indirectly, under the bill, control every in-
dustry in the United States if it wanted to.7 78 Cong. Rec. 7710 (April 30, 1934)
(statement of Rep. Britten).
What justification, I ask, is there for the enactment of legislation which
places the business of the United States in a strait-jacket of this
kind?.... We are dealing with honest enterprise; we are dealing with
legitimate investment; and the good with the bad are going to be brought
within the strictest requirements of this measure, held down by sections
12, 13 and 19, if they attempt to operate upon the stock exchanges, and
then driven back to the stock exchanges by section 15 if they attempt to
sell their securities in the market over the counter.
78 Cong. Rec. 8279 (May 8, 1934) (statement of Sen. Steiwer). This reading of §
15 was contested by supporters of the bill
But those who tell you that the over-the-counter provisions of the bill
will interfere directly or indirectly with the small industrial concern are
either willfully misleading you or are ignorant of what the bill really
does. The control of the Commission with respect to the over-tho-counter
markets may be exercised only over dealers or brokers who maintain a
public market.
78 Cong. Rec. 7868 (lay 1, 1934) (statement of Rep. Maloney). In a long colloquy
in the Senate between Senators Dill, Barkley, Black and Byrnes, 78 Cong. Rec.
8190-8191 (Mlay 7, 1934), the argument was made that the Commission would not
exercise its power in full.
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
an exchange. This potential reach of the statute added cogency
to the concerns about confidentiality.
In any event, the original reach of the original section 15
was never implemented. In 1936 the SEC recommended, and
Congress passed, amendments which removed this jurisdiction
from the SEC.2" Joel Seligman attributes the Commission's
position to concerns about the reach of the interstate commerce
power.2 Another possible reason is that the Commission
found its administrative and political agendas full enough
without having to deal, as well, with the imposition of disclo-
sure practices on over-the-counter issuers who had never been
subject, and never expected (prior to 1934) to be subject to
disclosure requirements. And by 1936 it must have been clear
that the Exchange Act was not going to cause wholesale flight
from the exchanges by issuers.
In the early period after passage of the Exchange Act,
many companies sought trade-secrecy protection for informa-
tion relating to their profitability."5 At first the Commission
granted many of these requests,266 but then turned to a policy
of denying them routinely, without a hearing.267 The compa-
nies sought review in the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals (the predecessor to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia). At the end of 1937, fifteen cases
were pending. The Commission argued that its orders de-
"' Pub. Law 74-462 § 3, amending Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15,
49 Stat. 1377 (May 27, 1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §781-i (1995)). The same act
also extended exchange trading privileges for grandfathered unlisted securities
indefinitely. Pub. Law 74-462 § 1, amending Securities and Exchange Act of 1984
§ 12(f), 49 Stat. 1375 (May 27, 1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78o.1 (1995)).
' SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 142.
288 In the year ended June 30, 1936, 631 registrants objected to publication of
966 items of information, and 218 companies objected to disclosure of matter in
annual reports. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMIISSION SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 25
(1936), as summarized in Comment, Confidential Treatment of Information Re-
quired by the Securities Exchange Act, 47 YALE L.J. 790, 792 n. 17 (1938) [herein.
after "YALE Comment"].
"8 "For some time, however, the Commission granted confidential treatment
rather freely in these type situations." YALE Comment, supra note 265, at 795.
27 "[Wjhen investigations revealed that in many cases competitors or customers
already had obtained the disputed information either through underhand activities
or from other public records, and that the figures had little effect upon buying
policies, the number of exemptions decreased." YALE Comment, supra note 265, at
795.
28 As of June 30, 1937, 31 petitions for review had been filed, but 16 were
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nying confidential treatment were nonappealable. The Court
rejected the Commission's arguments in an opinion which
stressed the importance which Congress had placed on busi-
ness confidentiality in the statute, and even suggested that
were not the interest protected by a hearing and a right of
judicial review, the statute would be unconstitutional."
Thereafter, the case was returned to the Commission for a
hearing. The American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation became
the only continuing litigant." The Commission wrote a long
fact-specific opinion justifying the denial of confidential treat-
ment on the specific facts, without taking any general posi-
tion.'
1
A Yale comment, generally supportive of the Commission
effort to resist requests for confidentiality, reports two argu-
ments made by issuers seeking confidential treatment in situa-
tions where the comment said "confidential treatment may
well be in the public interest":
In the first, a relatively small company, most of whose output is sold
to one large buyer, will attempt to show that publication of its mar-
voluntarily dismissed. SECURTIES EXCHANGE COMMSSION THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
179 (1937), as summarized in YALE Comment, cupra note 265, at 792 n18.
"' American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 93 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937). The
decision was forcefully criticized in YALE Comment, supra note 265. The comment
concluded.
it might be well to create a presumption of public interest in any item
required by the Commission's rules to place something akin to the bur-
den of proof upon anyone demanding confidential treatment. The Ian-
guage of the Act may seem to stand in the way.... it seems clear that
the purpose of the Act is to make publicity the norm and confidential
treatment the exception.
YALE Comment, supra note 265, at 798.
270 Why this is so is not clear. Perhaps the issuers seeking confidential treat-
ment selected American Sumatra to carry a test case forward. As early as Febru-
ary, 1936 (the date of the SEC's legislative proposals amending §§ 12(f) and 15) it
must have been clear that issuers who were traded in the over-the-counter market
and who did not make a public offering would never be subject to disclosure re-
quirements. Another factor probably was that the issuers learned how to comply
with the act in ways that would not affect their business. For instance, profitable
single-product companies combined with other businesses so the profitable product
line could no longer be identified, or they delisted from an exchange. As explained
in the text following this note, American Sumatra was in a particularly invulnera-
ble competitive position and thus may have been more willing than others to be
the test case.
21 In re American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation, 7 S.E.C. 1033 (1939), Release
34-2628, 1939 WL 1345 (Feb. 1, 1939) [hereinafter "Release 2628'1.
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gin of profit will give the buyer an additional lever with which to
demand lower prices. Second, companies whose competitors need not
disclose their margins of profit because they are not listed on any
exchange may contend that the latter will acquire various competi-
tive advantages, such as an opportunity to persuade buyers that the
registrant's margin of profit, which has become a matter of public
record, is excessive.2n
Neither argument is very persuasive, since buyers should care
more about the price they pay than the seller's profit."3
From a vantage point more than half a century later, it is
striking how seriously the Commission took the arguments.
Not only was the opinion in American Sumatra lengthy, the
Court of Appeals opinion in the American Sumatra case tells
us that the abstracted administrative record on appeal occu-
pied 703 printed pages. It is also striking how unpersuasive
the arguments of American Sumatra were. The American Su-
matra Tobacco Corporation was a single-product company 4
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Most of its competi-
tors were not publicly held. It grew, harvested, cured and sold
cigar-wrapper tobacco. And its accounting statements showed
that it made a lot of money, with a high margin between its
sales revenue and the cost of goods sold. The company sought
confidential treatment of its figures as to sales and cost of
goods sold, so that it could begin its profit-and-loss statement
with its net profit from goods sold.
The analysis here suggests that American Sumatra should
have objected to the disclosure of the information on the
7 YALE Comment, supra note 265, at 795.
s Of course if the buyer has the ability to substitute its own production, or to
induce alternative suppliers to enter the market, knowledge of the seller's profits
will be very important information, and the threat that the seller will be replaced
if the prices are not lowered very real.
' Or about as single product as a company is likely to be. American Sumatra
in fact produced two different grades of cigar-wrapper tobacco, Type 61, grown in
the Connecticut Valley of New England, and good for fancy cigars, and type 62,
grown in Georgia and Florida, and used for cheap cigars. Release 2628, supra note
271, at 4, 9.
It follows also that the contention of the registrant that it produces only
one product is without substance. The existence of many different grades
selling for widely different prices, together with the fact that the demand
of many manufacturers is for specific qualities of grades of Type 61 or
Type 62 and not for wrapper in general, demonstrates that the different
types and grades are treated in practice as different commodities.
Release 2628, supra note 271, at 10.
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ground that public disclosure of the fact that growing cigar-
wrapper tobacco was a very profitable business would attract
new competition, decreasing its profits. The objection seems to
have been but weakly made. The opinion of the SEC discloses
facts that suggest why American Sumatra could not make such
an argument. The wrapper-tobacco industry was subject to con-
trol by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.' The
marketing agreement in effect for wrapper tobacco prescribed
minimum prices and allocated production acreage. There would
be no entry in the business, no matter how profitable.26
American Sumatra instead made an argument much like
that reported in the Yale comment. If American Sumatra's
customers knew how much money it was making, it would be
forced to lower its prices. The Commission explained the argu-
ment:
Since its customers, the cigar manufacturers, are in position to stay
out of the market for one or two years [because of their inventory of
wrapper tobacco], they would, if they knew the registrants profit
margin, refuse to purchase its tobacco unless it reduced its profits by
lowering its prices; ... [and] since the registrant is the only compa-
ny engaged exclusively in the business of growing, processing and
selling wrapper tobacco which has securities listed on a national
securities exchange, disclosure of its sales and cost of sales would be
disadvantageous to it from a competitive standpoint?'
Much of the SEC opinion declaims on the value of information
about profit margins for investors. It is an early and quite
eloquent exposition of the accuracy-enhancement goal. The
opinion provides:
To particularize, one of the essential purposes of the profit-and-loss
statement is to furnish the investor or prospective investor with
adequate historical data definitive of past earning power, and of
Release No. 2628, supra note 271, at 8.
The control program also would have explained the high profit margin of
American Sumatra's accounting statement. The base acreage allocations were in
fact an asset but would not have had their value reflected either on the balance
sheet, nor any proportional depreciation cost reflected in the income statement.
American Sumatra might have feared that disclosure that it was making a lot of
money because of the government's price control program could have contributed to
political pressures to change the program to the detriment of American Sumatra.
It did not make this argument.
Release 2628, supra note 271, at 4. The Commission did not consider that
purchasers might extrapolate from the financial statements of American Sumatra
that all growers of wrapper tobacco were likely to have high profit margins.
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prime importance in forecasting future earning power.... If the
factors contributing to the wide profit margin cannot be duplicated,
strength may be indicated. To the extent that the contributing fac-
tors may not be lasting, weakness may be indicated. So a wide profit
margin constitutes a warning signal; the investor must determine to
what extent the margin is likely to continue.2"
The case then returned to what is now the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 9
Again, the court treated the issue as a serious one. According
to the court:
[W]e can also say that we have no difficulty in understanding
petitioner's reasons for apprehension that the disclosure will be
harmful, and if the question were before us as an original proposi-
tion, we could easily see our way to sustaining the objections to
general publication... In this case the Commission has not justified
its position on the ground of a general rule or a general policy. If it
had, the case would have been different and would have demanded
different treatment."'
Based on the Commission's firm-specific findings in the record,
the Court of Appeals affirmed.
So ended the challenge to securities disclosure based on
the need for secrecy. By then most issuers had learned that the
disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act did not affect
their business, or if they did, had modified their businesses so
disclosure would not be threatening, or had delisted from an
exchange, finding immunity from disclosure regulation in the
over-the-counter market.
III. THREE APPLICATIONS: INSIDER TRADING, THE SCOPE OF
THE IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE ROLE OF ISSUER
WELFARE IN DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING RULES
Mandatory disclosure requirements are not correctly un-
derstood as simply a matter of disclosure, more disclosure, and
still more disclosure in pursuit of accurate market valuations.
Accuracy enhancement is but one of many goals of the disclo-
sure mandated by securities regulation. Other and competing
28 Release 2628 supra note 271, at 6. The Commission did not consider that
publication of a wide profit margin might contribute to the speed of this decline.
" American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 110 F.2d 117 (1940).
280 Id. at 121.
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goals include the welfare of the issuer, restraints on fiduciary
abuse, control of promotional practices,"' reasonable compli-
ance costs, and enforcement feasibility. The customary disclo-
sure practices, which provided the disclosure template for the
securities statutes, inevitably incorporated compromises among
these goals. So, too, does disclosure as it is actually practiced.
This insight is not simply a matter of accurate description and
persuasive justification. It has implications for specific issues,
including (1) the scope of the prohibition of insider trading, (2)
the scope of the implied right of action under Rule 10b-5; (3)
the desirable and feasible agenda of accounting and disclosure
rulemaking; and (4) the role of the SEC.
A. Insider Trading
The debate about insider trading has focused on the ques-
tion: why is insider trading prohibited? It is possible, however,
to turn the question around, and ask why insider trading is
permitted. The conventional position, of course, is that it is not
permitted. But once it is acknowledged that an issuer's disclo-
sures do not contain all information relevant to a correct valu-
ation of the issuer's securities, it becomes clear that whenever
insiders buy or sell they are trading with an informational
advantage. Why are they permitted to do so?
A common corporate procedure is to limit trading by key
management personnel to periods shortly after periodic disclo-
sure documents have been filed and disseminated.' The the-
ory is that during such a period an insider who trades could
not be trading based on an informational advantage since the
issuer has now disclosed all material information. The theory
critically depends on the assumption that issuer's disclosure
documents, in fact, do disclose all material information. But
this is a fiction: issuer disclosure documents seldom dis-
'M Mahoney, supra note 5, argues that the disclosure requirements of the scU-
rities laws have their origin in promoter abuses that exploited limitations in com-
mon law agency doctrines and fiduciary disclosure requirements.
21 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COLIPANY MANUAL § 309.00, at 3-4
to 3-6; Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, Corporate Director's
Guidebook-1994 Edition, 49 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1276 (1994).
m I use the qualifier "seldom" because the activities of some issuras are so
simple that there is no nonpublic information for the issuer' management to pos-
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close all material corporate information. The broad definition
of materiality in Basic combined with a prohibition of all trad-
ing while a person is in possession of material inside informa-
tion is logically equivalent to a rule that key management
personnel can never trade. After all, there will never be a time
when key personnel are not in the exclusive possession of in-
formation, to paraphrase Basic, that a reasonable investor
would consider important. The finding of the finance literature
that trades by insiders produce an above-average rate of return
supports the conclusion that insiders do trade with an informa-
tional advantage.'
Of course, the actual insider-trading cases that are
brought involve trading based on information that does more
than significantly alter the total mix of information available;
they involve information that when released can reasonably be
expected to have a significant impact on the current market
price of the security. Thus this seemingly broad prohibition of
trading by personnel in possession of sensitive information
may reflect only the fact that the definition of materiality in
Basic is broader than the test that in fact is applied in insider
trading cases.' Perhaps the de facto definition of materiality
is something narrower, more like the New York Stock
Exchange's: "materially affect the market;" or the United
sess. An example, a closed-end unit trust holding a fixed portfolio of securities.
' H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J. OF
L. & EcoN. 149, 158-167 (1992), documents the abnormal profits that insiders
obtain from their transactions. See also D. Scott Lee et al., Managers' Trading
Around Stock Repurchases, 47 J. OF FIN. 1947 (1992), the works discussed id. at
1959-60, and the works cited in Seyhun, supra, 158 n.21 and in ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 281, § 8.4, n.1 (1986).
' This is the conclusion of Seyhun, supra note 284, at 151:
Neither the shareholders nor the new statutes enacted during the 1980's
seemed to provide effective additional constraints on insider trading. This
evidence suggests that everyday insider trading does not fall under the
definition of legally material information. Since insiders do trade on eco-
nomically material information, evidence indicates that legal materiality
is highly stringent.
Brudney, supra note 165, at 740 n.53, rejects the construction of Basic offered
hero on the ground that its results are unacceptable:
To be sure, to the extent that too expansive a definition of materiality
makes the rule of 'disclose or abstain' a categorical prohibition against
insiders buying or selling their corporation's securities, it may impose a
wasteful cost upon society. Hence there are limits to how far the concept
of material information may be expanded even for insider trading cases.
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Kingdom's "information which... if it were made public would
be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any secu-
rities."2a Doubtless the scope of the actual prohibition in U.S.
law will continue to be refined in case decisions; but given that
trading on inside information presents a conflict of interest
situation, why is not the correct legal response to prohibit trad-
ing by persons in possession of any sensitive information? Why
not "just say no"? The explanation offered in the New York
Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual is that "[mlany
shareholders feel that directors and officers should have a
meaningful investment in the companies they manage," but it
is not explained why shareholder feelings should control, or
what the connection is between these feelings and the issue of
insider trading.
An advantage of share ownership by key management
employees is that their ownership of shares tends to counteract
the divergence in interest between the issuer and its manage-
ment agents. If the key management employees have a signifi-
cant part of their personal wealth in the form of the issuer's
securities, it increases their interest in managing the issuer so
that the securities increase in value. This is also the interest of
the shareholders as a group. Thus management ownership of
shares can help to overcome the divergence between ownership
and control, or in the contemporary jargon, reduce agency costs.
Management employees, however, have good reasons not
Criminal Justice Act, 1933, § 56(l)(d) (Eng.). For purpozee of the section
"'price' includes value." Id. § 56(3). NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, ISTED COMIPANY
MANUAL 2-4 §202.05 (continuously updated). The current United Kingdom provi-
sions are described in Eva Lomnicka, Note: The New Insider Dealing Prouislona:
Criminal Justice Act 1993, Part V, 1994 J. Bus. LAW 173, 178. Mmy juriadictions
define materiality only for the purpose of insider trading, since they have no stat-
utorily mandated form of disclosure, the required disclasure being imposed and
administered by the securities exchanges. Some jurisdictions follow the American
definition while others require some form of significant market impact See Harvey
L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Wthout Frontiers: Trends in the International
Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTELIP. PROBS. 199 (1992). Commenta-
tors have not taken note of this distinction, probably because it is of interest only
as a matter of theory. That is, as a matter of definition American law may pro-
hibit trading on any information that would be of interest to the average investor,
but there will be no enforcement proceeding or lawsuit unless the information,
when released, has a significant effect on the market price.
"' This advantage of share ownership by managerial employees is examined at
length in Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Ineentive8:
A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICHL L. REV. 2088, 2096-2106 (1994).
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to hold their wealth in the form of the securities of their em-
ployer. A substantial portion of their human capital is tied up
in their relationship with their employer. Diversification coun-
sels that they should hold their financial capital so that its
value is not related to the success or failure of their employer.
Any natural reluctance to hold shares in the employer will be
increased if assets held in that form are subject to special
restrictions on the ability of the employee to buy and sell them.
The desirable scope of regulation of insider trading re-
quires the accommodation of a conflict between the goal of
preventing employees from using employer information for
their own rather than the employer's benefit, or even adversely
to the interest of their employer, and the goal of encouraging
employee ownership of shares in the firm. The common law,
the short-swing trading prohibitions of Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act,' and the judicial interpretation that makes
Rule 10b-5 a prohibition of insider trading can all be seen as
implementations of a common dilemma: how to draw a line be-
tween transactions in which insiders are permitted to exploit
the information advantage resulting from their employment
and transactions in which they are not. The line has moved
over the years, but it has never been a line that has separated
transactions that involve no exploitation of insider advantage
from transactions that do.
This perspective might contribute to softening the righ-
teous tone that has suffused the debate on insider trading.
Under any conceivable set of rules governing insider trading
there are going to be situations in which insiders can take
advantage in the market of information because of their em-
ployment relationship. The issues relating to the desirable
reach of the prohibition necessarily involve a complex set of
practical tradeoffs among competing goals. In this debate, the
argument that the fact that insider trading will tend to make
market prices move in the correct direction cannot be dis-
missed casually on the ground that the mandatory disclosure
system does a better job of furthering the same goal. 9
This is the approach to § 16(b) developed in Fox, supra note 287.
This was one of the two desirable features of insider trading identified by
Henry Manne. MANNE supra note 11, at 77-91. The eistence of this phenomenon
has been studied recently by Lisa Meulbroek. Moulbroek, supra note 11.
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B. The Implied Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5
It is common for sizeable movements in the price of an
issuer's security to be followed by a class action under Rule
10b-5. This can be explained by the fact that the price move-
ment creates a situation where the 10b-5 cause of action, if
successful, will result in the award of a large monetary
amount. Accuracy enhancement also plays a role in making
such lawsuits plausible. An implication of accuracy enhance-
ment is that if an issuer observes the disclosure requirements,
the market will never be surprised, and thus large changes in
price will never occur." How is it possible that the price fell
(or rose) ten percent in a day unless there was something that
they knew about and didn't tell us, or they told us something
that turned out not to be true? Obviously there has been a
violation of the securities laws, and the only thing to do is to
file a lawsuit under the securities laws and use the discovery
process to find out what the violation was. If, however, securi-
ties disclosure is properly incomplete, then atypical price move-
ments are something to be expected. The fact of the price
movement alone does not suggest anything about whether or
not a securities law violation has occurred.
One of the most interesting suggestions from a theoretical
point of view to come out of the contemporary discussions of
reform of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action is the proposal of
former SEC Commissioner J. Carter Beese that a safe harbor
for forward-looking statements be based on the business-judg-
ment rule. Beese suggests that:
[Tihe safe harbor would establish a principle of judicial non-inter-
vention. As such, the safe harbor would protect directors and officers
from judicial review of shareholder antifraud claims when forward-
looking statements are made unless a plaintiff can establish a con-
flict, a lack of good faith, or a failure of honest and reasonable
belief.21
21 This is the logic behind the proposal of Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffery LL
Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Ca.es: Applications at
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 BUS. LAW. 545, 548-49 (1994), to
prove materiality by showing that the information, when releaced, is followed by
price movements in the issuer's security that exhibit cumulative abnormal returns.
The use of the event study methodology outlined can demonstrate that information
is material even when the resulting stock price movements are relatively smalL
22 1994 Concept Release, supra note 77, at 11. The link between the businss
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This proposal points in the direction of rejoining disclosure law
with corporate law generally, recognizing that information is
like any other corporate asset, and that decisions about when,
where and how it is to be used involve difficult tradeoffs, judg-
ments and risk taking that the courts are poorly equipped to
review. 
2
The absence of any role for business judgment in the Su-
preme Court's securities law jurisprudence explains why it was
so difficult for the defendants in Basic29 3 to make a persua-
sive argument to the Court. The decisions of the Third Circuit,
which held that there was no obligation to disclose merger
negotiations until agreement has been reached on "price and
structure," 4 can be understood as decisions which drew a
line between an area of disclosure policy where courts should
judgment rule and corporate information policy was suggested by a footnote in
Texas Gulf Sulphur v. SEC, 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We do not
suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately; the timing of disclosure
is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate officers entrusted with the
management of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure requirements
promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC.") Some commentators on earlier
drafts of this Article have suggested that one could read this language as recog-
nizing a general business-judgment exception to the disclosure requirements. I
believe that the correct reading is that the business judgment can only be exer-
cised "within the affirmative disclosure requirements," i.e. that it can only apply to
matters not otherwise required to be disclosed. The area in which this business
judgment can be exercised has shrunk as the matters subject to affirmative disclo-
sure requirements have expanded since 1968, particularly through the MD&A.
2 This connection was obvious to Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, writ-
ing in 1932 before corporate law and securities disclosure regulation had become
separate bodies of law.
[A]ny development in the law must contemplate at least the possibility of
a legal privilege in the management permitting them to withhold infor-
mation where in their honest judgment it is for the best interests of all
concerned; and as to this, the honesty and good faith of the management
should be conclusive. In practice, honesty and good faith are frequently
tested by ascertaining whether or not the management or friends and
connections of it have made arrangements to profit by the disclosure or
non-disclosure. Good faith will hardly be evoked where the management
can be found to have profited. Bad faith will probably be difficult to
prove where in fact no such profit has been made.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 324 (1933). Berle's view of the matter still seems to characterize
corporate (as opposed to securities) law, at least in New York. See Lindner Fund,
Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 219, 624 N.E.2d 160 (1993).
Supra text accompanying note 158.
"' Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 61: 763
1995] TRE THEORYAND PRACTICE OF SECURES DISCLOSURE 881
defer to managements business judgment and an area where
there is insufficient justification for a management decision not
to disclose. The Third Circuit stressed that once agreement on
price and structure has been reached, it is less likely that dis-
closure of the negotiations will cause them to break down and
for the public to be led to believe that a merger will occur
when it is still not improbable that the negotiations will break
down. 5 It is also the case that once agreement has been
reached on price and structure, it is necessary for information
about the negotiations to be shared with the much larger num-
ber of people required to prepare the implementing merger
documents, and the larger number of people "in the know"
decreases the chances that it will be possible to maintain the
secrecy of the merger negotiations. Thus one can view the
Third Circuit's "price-and-structure" bright-line test as an
effort to distinguish between the time when management can
decide in good faith that it is in the issuer's interest not to
disclose the merger negotiations and to use literally true but
incomplete statements such as "the Company is aware of no
reason that would explain the activity in its stock" to avoid
disclosure of the negotiations, and the time when the corporate
interest in continued nondisclosure becomes so weak that man-
agement no longer has this discretion. An argument in this
form would have required a Court receptive to the idea that
the securities laws recognize that there is a legitimate domain
for the exercise of management discretion over corporate dis-
closure policies. The opinion in Basic is the work of Justices
who would not have been persuaded by an argument that
depended upon this idea.
The safe-harbor concept presents the Commission with
intractable choices. It is impossible to draw a coherent line
between that information whose production needs to be encour-
aged by providing protection from liability and that informa-
tion whose accuracy needs to be encouraged by imposing an
exacting standard of liability. The narrower the reach of any
safe harbor, the less its practical importance, as the experience
with Rule 175 so clearly illustrates. The broader the reach of a
11 "Finally, with both price and structure agreed to, there is only a minimal
chance that a public announcement would quash the deal or that the investing
public would be misled as to likely corporate activity.' Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757.
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safe harbor, the more the anomaly of leaving the remaining
information unprotected. 6 This is a contradiction at the
heart of the liability scheme of the securities laws that cannot
be obscured by a safe harbor, no matter how complex. Perhaps
some day the Supreme Court will return to the scienter stan-
dard of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,' and interpret it in a
way that provides more protection from liability for speech
related to the value of securities than any of the safe harbors
ever proposed would do only for forward-looking statements.
C. Accounting and Disclosure Rulemaking
Changes in the rules and procedures of mandatory disclo-
sure are costly. The thousands of persons involved in the daily
administration of these rules must learn the new rules and
make the necessary changes in issuer and accounting-firm
procedures. If the changes reasonably can be expected to in-
crease the social benefits of the disclosure system, then those
benefits may exceed the costs. If, however, there is no standard
which can be applied to judge whether there are social benefits
from any proposed change, then prudence cautions against
2" The lower courts have permitted issuers to create their own home-made safe
harbor through what has come to be called the "bespeaks caution doctrine." The
doctrine is based on the simple notion that statements must be read in their con-
text, and that if forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by a sufficiently
clear warnings, no reasonable investor would rely on them, and therefore they are
not material, an amalgam of the materiality test and fraud on the market doctrine
of Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See In re Donald J. Trump, 7 F.3d 357,
364 (3d Cir. 1993). See generally Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution
Doctrine: Revisiting the Application of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Esti-
mates, 19 J. CORP. L. 243 (1994). But why should the doctrine be limited to only
certain kinds of statements? Why can't the entire document be qualified so that no
reasonable investor would rely on any of it? For instance, the 1993 ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF CORNING, INC. states on the inside back cover "Neither this report nor
any statement contained herein is furnished in connection with any offering of
securities or for the purpose of promoting or influencing the sale of securities."
" Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975). Section 204 of H.R. 10,
104th Cong. 1st Sess., adds a new section 10A to the Exchange Act. Section
1OA(a)(2) would provide that the plaintiff in an implied private action for money
damages must prove "that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at
the time it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such
omission would render misleading the statements made at the time they were
made." HR. 10, introduced January 4, 1995, titled A Bill to Reform the Federal
Civil Justice System; to Reform Product Liability Law, is part of the legislative
package popularly known as the contract with America.
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change.
Reform is particularly problematic where the rule looks to
the use of a mandatory requirement. There can be no reasoned
objection to revised or improved accounting practices which the
profession, or firms in the profession, develop and successfully
persuade users to adopt voluntarily. No one can disagree that
"[i]ndependent auditors must constantly strive the improve
their services to add continuing value to the users of financial
information." 8 That is, however, a quite different process
than one where adoption is required by the law, whether or
not the practice is of benefit to the user or society. If a practice
does indeed add continuing value, then why do we not expect
the users to adopt the practice voluntarily? And if they will not
adopt the practice voluntarily, what does that tell us about its
value?
The mandated nature of disclosure accounting is the rea-
son why there is something to be said for Kripke's (and many
others') arguments that disclosure accounting should be gov-
erned by the SEC, not by the accounting profession. The
accounting profession is only one party in interest in the de-
bate about accounting standards, and accounting standards
that are unduly responsive to the interests of the accounting
profession in the sale of accounting services, rather than the
interests of all the affected parties, are probably not socially
beneficial. The rhetoric of contemporary accounting
rulemaking-which focuses on the desires of user groups such
as financial analysts who are asked what they would like if
they do not have to pay for it, and which is implicitly embraced
by the Supreme Court in Basic-simply ignores many consider-
ations that are important to the social interest. At least in
theory, all of the affected parties, including issuers, are more
likely to have their interests considered by the SEC than by
'1 BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ALIERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, MEETING THE FINANCIAL REPORTING NEEDS OF THE FuruRE: A
PUBLIC COMM-IENT FROM THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 1 (1993).
22 KRIPKE, supra note 6, at 153: '11m determination of what accounting should
mean is the SECs most important job-too important to be left to others? In the
103rd Congress Senator Joseph Leiberman introduced S. 2525 which would require
that accounting standards whose use is required in documents filed under the
Exchange Act be adopted by a majority vote of the SEC itzelE 40 Cong. Roc 514,
47806 (1994).
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the FASB, if only because the process of appointment to the
SEC is more open than that of appointment to the FASB.00
Another alternative is to leave the design of disclosure
requirements to negotiation between the issuers, the under-
writers, the exchanges, and where represented directly, the
purchasers, requiring only that the issuer's disclosure practices
be fully disclosed, and once disclosed, followed.
The most striking feature of the mandatory disclosure
system as it has developed is the way in which it has sup-
pressed variation in practice. One size fits all-large and
small, debt and equity, initial public offering and continuing
disclosure-and all fit only one size-there is little disclosure
beyond, and in any form different from, that mandated by the
Commission. An alternative form of disclosure regulation
would permit issuers to choose from a range of acceptable
menus, imposing only the condition that they clearly specify
which menu they are choosing from."0' For instance, it would
0 The members of the FASB are appointed by the Financial Accounting Foun-
dation, whose trustees are in turn elected by constituent professional organizations.
The organizations (with the number of trustees in parenthesis) are the American
Accounting Association (1), the American Institute of CPAs (4), the Financial Ana-
lysts Federation (now the Association for Investment Management Research) (1),
the Financial Executives Institute (2), the National Association of Accountants (1),
the Securities Industry Association (1), and various governmental accounting
groups (3). Three additional trustees are selected by the trustees, for a total of 16
votes. See PAUL B. W. MILLER, THE FASB: THE PEOPLE, THE PROCESS, AND THE
POLITICS 16 (1988). The Financial Executives Institute and the National Associ-
ation of Accountants, largely composed of employees of private issuers, have three
votes. If the government representatives are viewed as issuer representatives,
there are six issuer votes. If the government representatives view themselves as
issuer representatives only insofar as the issues affect government securities, and
otherwise consider themselves regulators, then there are only three clear issuer
votes. The Association for Investment Management Research and the Securities
Industry Association are users, and together with the providers of accounting ser-
vices and education, there are seven votes. Extensive information on the structure
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board can be found in PELHAM GORE, THE
FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAmEWORK PROJECT 1973-1985: AN ANALYSIS (1992). The
problem of the conflict of interest inherent in professional control of rules and
requirements applicable to others is not limited to the accounting profession. Eg.,
Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preference, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure,
23 J. OF LEG. STUDIES 627 (1994). A number of readers of earlier drafts of this
Article have expressed dismay at the consequences should the SEC become more
deeply involved in accounting, and the FASE can be viewed as a brilliant, if jury-
rigged, device to avoid just that.
"' There are elements of current practice that give issuers choices as to disclo-
sure format. An issuer who qualifies can, for instance, choose between the require-
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be possible to permit a range of approaches to segmentation
from no segmentation to segmentation more detailed than any
now practiced with only the requirement that management
disclose the segmentation practice it has chosen to follow.
A result of a one-size-fits-all disclosure system is that it
suppresses any opportunity for experimentation, change and
innovation in accounting and disclosure. Rather than observing
particular firms successfully adopt changes in accounting pro-
cedures that are then adopted by others, any reform must be
channeled through the FASB or the SEC on an all-or-nothing
basis, and either adopted before it is tried or rejected without a
trial.
A simple change to the SEC's disclosure regulations that
would recognize the interest of the issuer in confidentiality
would be additional regulations-regulations twinned to the
present materiality regulations, Rules 408 and 12b-20,P that
would acknowledge that managements can omit (with disclo-
sure of their election to omit) required disclosures if they deter-
mine that the disclosure of the item "might prejudice the
company's business interests.'
A possible and fundamental change would be for the Com-
mission to abandon its present approach in which it attempts
to identify and mandate the "best" practice to an approach in
which it would provide issuers with a list of acceptable options
from which they could choose. The Commission could include
as acceptable options disclosure practices and formats that
satisfy the prudent investor concept9"-that is, disclosure
practices that have proven acceptable to both buyers and sell-
ers in repeat transactions.
An advantage of a change to a permissive-options ap-
ments of S-1, S-2 or S-3, or to transact under the SB Regulations, Regulation A,
or Regulation D. Even more importantly, in the modern world issuers can often
choose which national regulatory regime to use, which is in part a form of choos-
ing their disclosure format.
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1995) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b.20 (1995), quoted oupra
page 66.
' The language is from the disclosure rules of the London Stock Erchanga, as
quoted in NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S
"BIG BANGP AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MLARETS 247 (1991) (quoting LONDON
STOCK EXCHANGE, ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING, at §§ 5.08-5.10 (1987)
(known as the 'Yellow Book")).
"' Described supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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proach is that the Commission could switch its focus from
trying to determine and mandate the best practice, to instead
identifying and preventing the use of those practices that have
shown themselves to be harmful. In other words, the Commis-
sion could include on its menu of options practices which have
proven attractive and useful to intelligent and capable com-
mercial parties in repeat transactions, while prohibiting those
practices that have been shown useful to those who prey with
such regularity on the financial markets. For instance, the
Commission might simply provide that transactions carried out
and documented in accord with United Kingdom, German or
Japanese requirements-to give but a few examples-satisfy
U.S. requirements."' It might also provide that a financial
statement certified by an accountant who has not satisfied the
licensing requirements of any recognized regulatory regime
does not qualify as a certified statement, or that a best-efforts
underwriting in which the proceeds are not subject to escrow is
not permitted.
This is an approach that could be implemented
incrementally, without undertaking a systematic revision of
the entire body of disclosure requirements. The SEC could
simply add the permissive options approach to its regulatory
methods. For instance, in connection with its current initiative
... Readers who are disconcerted by the thought that securities might be sold in
the United States under foreign documentation should consider that such securities
can already be sold in U.S. markets under Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(1995). The 144A market is open to (among others) qualified institutional buyers
who in the aggregate own and invest on a discretionary basis at least $100 mil-
lion in securities. It is impossible to explain the category of eligible participants on
the theory that they are the only persons who are capable of understanding non-
U.S. documentation. A Japanese expatriate businessman living and working in the
United States might be equally or better able to understand the documentation
accompanying a security issued under Japanese documentation than the American
trained executives of a large insurance company. A more likely explanation is that
the firms permitted to participate in the 144A market are large enough to operate
directly in non-U.S. markets. See, for example, Rule 902(oX6), 17 C.PR. §
230.902(o)(6) (1995), which excludes from the definition of U.S. person in Regula-
tion S (providing a safe-harbor for non-U.S. public offerings from the Securities
Act) "any agency or branch of a U.S. person located outside the United States ...
if (i) the agency or branch operates for valid business reasons; and (ii) the agency
or branch is engaged in the business of insurance or banking and is subject to
substantive insurance or banking regulation, respectively, in the jurisdiction where
located."
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reviewing the treatment of forward-looking statements,3 it
could consider addressing the problem by giving issuers a
range of choices, requiring only that issuers select one, that
they disclose which selection they have made, and that they
provide notice when they change their selection.
CONCLUSION
Accuracy enhancement fits nicely with the reassuring
patter of the securities salesman. "Don't worry, this issuer is
required under the law to disclose the information material to
the correct valuation of its securities. I know you haven't had
time to look at it, but our people in New York have examined
it carefully and they say this is a good price." The securities
salesman cannot persuade as many customers to buy or sell if
he or she says, "Look, this is a shot in the dark. There is a lot
that neither you nor I know about these companies. I can't
really say what will happen, but my goodness, would life be
any fun if we didn't take chances?" It is easy for an agency
focused on the securities industry to fall into the error of
equating the ability of the industry to sell securities with the
health of the capital markets. But it is not only the function of
investors to buy securities, it is also their function to assume
and carry risk, and that is a function they will better perform
if they understand that that is what they are doing. Securities
salesman under any system will try to suggest that the appli-
cable regulatory regime is one which makes the customers'
decisions to transact easy, but it is not the function of the SEC,
an agency whose mission is to serve the public interest,/ to
enhance the credibility of that suggestion.P
'6 1994 Concept Release, supra note 77.
22 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994), which
established the SEC in § 4, provides that "trasactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation
and control of such transactions."
"2 To quote Kenneth Boulding.
There is something to be said ... for a certain naivet6 and simplicity in
accounting practice. If accounts are bound to be untruths anyhow, as I
have argued, there is much to be said for the simple untruth as against
a complicated untruth, for if the untruth is simple, it seems to me that
we have a fair chance of knowing what kind of untruth it is. A known
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untruth is much better than a lie, and provided that the accounting
rituals are well known and understood, accounting may be untrue but it
is not lies; it does not deceive because we know that it does not tell the
truth, and we are able to make our own adjustment in each individual
case, using the results of the accountant as evidence rather than as de-
finitive information.
Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics and Accounting: The Uncongenial Twins, in STUD-
IES IN ACCOUNTING THEORY 44, 55 (W.T. Baxter & Sidney Davidson eds., 1962).
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